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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates how American foundations decide to distribute their 
philanthropic gifts to internationally-oriented causes and nongovernmental organizations. 
Amid myriad pressing social, economic, and environmental challenges spanning the 
globe, there is increased demand for financial assistance from private sources, including 
foundations. Yet these resources are scarce relative to the needs of grant-seeking 
organizations. While much has been written about the normative implications of U.S. 
foundations, whose private funds ostensibly serve public purposes, little work has sought 
to understand how foundations select their grantmaking strategies and grantees, 
especially in the international realm. Employing a relational approach to the study of 
philanthropy, in which attention is paid to the effects of the field in which foundations are 
embedded, I conducted more than 70 in-depth interviews with a range of actors across the 
field of international grantmaking, including more than a dozen highly endowed and 
prominent private foundations, as well as engaged in participant observation at several 
conferences for grantmakers. My findings reveal philanthropic decision-making 
processes centered around the pursuit of impact. Rather than driven by the altruistic or 
  x 
self-interested motives of foundation leaders or by mimicking their peers, the large, 
private, predominantly independent philanthropic foundations in my sample share an 
orientation to the maximization of impact. Their desire to create measurable social 
change that does not overlap excessively with existing charitable endeavors is what 
shapes their subsequent grantmaking decisions. However, the notion of impact is 
understood and operationalized by foundations only in relation to other sets of actors: the 
agendas of development institutions and foreign governments; the presence of potential 
grantee organizations; and the behavior of peer foundations. In doing so, foundations may 
ultimately shy away from funding those causes and organizations whose needs are 
greatest. Thus, to understand how foundations distribute their gifts, scholars must attend 
to the field-level forces that shape giving practices and legitimize particular grantmaking 
approaches but not others. Only by opening the “black box” of philanthropy can we make 
sense of the unequal allocation of funding and create spaces in which more equitable 
outcomes are possible. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTERNATIONAL GRANTMAKING IN CONTEXT:  
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES  
Introduction 
In early June of 2016, the MacArthur Foundation, an increasingly influential 
player among other large, private foundations in the U.S., launched its brand new 
“100&Change” contest, a global competition culminating in the award of a $100 million 
grant to a nonprofit operating programs that promise impactful, sustainable solutions to 
pressing global issues. In the days that followed, the New York Times facilitated a debate 
on the topic, posing the question of whether $100 million was really “enough to ‘solve’ a 
social problem.” But, nearly one year later, at a national conference for grantmakers and 
foundations, I sat in a small ballroom with some four-dozen foundation representatives 
eager to discuss the selection process as managing director Cecilia Conrad recounted the 
Foundation’s challenges in awarding this unprecedented amount. In the coming months, 
the Sesame Workshop and the International Rescue Committee would receive this 
substantial grant to create multimedia educational content for programs supporting Syrian 
refugees across the Middle East.  
This competition is emblematic of other “big bets” major American foundations 
are making (Gelles, 2015) in an effort to maximize the impact their grantmaking can have 
on the myriad global social, economic, and environmental challenges that grow 
seemingly more intractable each day. These internationally-oriented foundations, among 
them the MacArthur Foundation, are based in the U.S. and make grants that support 
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recipients in other countries in broadly defined ways (Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010). This 
includes funding directly to organizations overseas, to organizations based in the U.S. 
that operate programs overseas, or to organizations in the U.S. with an international angle 
(such as think tanks studying global issues). In part as a result of the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation’s ambitious and rather public global health agenda, these actors have 
drawn increasing attention as they become a burgeoning force across the international 
development and humanitarian landscape.  
In this way, U.S. foundations are increasingly gatekeepers of valuable 
philanthropic resources that are scarce relative to the worldwide needs of grant-seeking 
organizations (Bob, 2010), vying for funding in the “contributions marketplace” 
(Frumkin & Kim, 2001). Though “international grantmaking” was not recognized as a 
distinct funding category until 2002 (Vogel, 2010), estimates now place current U.S. 
foundation support for international efforts between $4 billion and $7 billion (Global 
Impact, 2013; Hudson Institute, 2016). In its 2016 report, for example, the Index of 
Global Philanthropy and Remittances placed U.S. philanthropic giving at roughly $4.7 
billion. Though not the largest donors1 across the global development landscape, they are 
forceful, dynamic players about which little is known or understood. Amid their 
expanding involvement in and material support for an array of global issues, important 
questions and puzzles arise, particularly as it is increasingly evident that foundations 
offer scant support for the countries and organizations most in need (Needles et al., 
                                                        
1 In the same time period, public charities (U.S.-based 501(c)(3) organizations) contributed $15.4 billion 
and corporations $11.3 billion. U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) totaled $33.1 billion (Hudson 
Institute, 2016). 
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2018). The motivating questions for the dissertation are thus twofold: First, how do 
foundations in the U.S. select among these different issues in determining which places, 
populations, and projects to support? And second, why do they pursue certain 
grantmaking strategies and support certain grantees but not others? 
Why Study Foundations? 
 International grantmaking is a fascinating world, but it has received relatively 
little scholarly attention (Moran, 2014). Contemporary philanthropic foundations, a so-
called “genuine American invention” (Zunz, 2011, p. 22), have a long history in the U.S., 
emerging more than a century ago as, largely, a historical accident (Hall, 2006). Part of 
the well-established civil society that has garnered the attention of international observers 
(e.g., de Tocqueville, 1945), the story of the modern foundation locates its origins within 
Americans’ relation to the state and the appropriate role of government (Karl & Katz, 
1981). Questions about this relationship have eternally plague the philanthropic sector. 
But since these early beginnings, pioneers of the new philanthropic form exhibited a 
notable interest in global issues, their philanthropic endeavors knowing no national 
bounds (Curti, 1988; Zunz, 2011). Yet despite their longstanding contributions to 
international affairs and development, it was not until the 1980s that scholars critically 
reflected on the meaning and motives underlying these international efforts.  
Since this time, much of what has been written of U.S. foundations’ international 
grantmaking falls into one of two categories. It is either an historical account of their 
activities (e.g., Benjamin & Quigley, 2010; Curti, 1988; Zunz, 2011), or it is a 
theorization of philanthropy as driven by philanthropists own self-interest in reproducing 
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U.S. hegemony (e.g., Arnove, 1980; Berman, 1983; Levich, 2015). In describing the 
latter, Moran (2014, p. 7) states, “Despite the considerable interlude since these narratives 
gained traction, this remains the dominant approach within the academy for those who 
examine programs beyond American borders from a critical frame.” What is sorely 
lacking from sustained scholarly attention is an account of how foundations operate and 
the practices they employ in determining their grantmaking strategies, selecting grantees, 
and assessing outcomes. In other words, extant literature offers little in the way of causal 
explanations for how and why foundations distribute their gifts globally in the ways that 
they do.  
This paucity of satisfactory explanations is a motivating factor for my dissertation 
research and warrants close analysis of philanthropic decision-making practices, which 
have historically been shrouded in, more or less, secrecy. It is precisely this lack of 
transparency – a perennial critique of the philanthropic sector – and expansive freedom to 
distribute funds however desired that render foundations of great interest to observers. As 
Fleishman (2007, p. 61) observes, “Foundation leaders enjoy the broadest imaginable 
freedom, having large amounts of money to spend on unspecified social problems that 
they are free to define as they see fit.” As some of the least accountable institutions in 
society (Reich, 2016), investigations of their practices is of societal importance, 
particularly because foundation money is private but with a purportedly public purpose 
(Oelberger, 2016). “That philanthropy is public in its intentions and seeks to enact a 
private vision of the common good,” Frumkin (2006, p. 100) argues, “raises 
accountability issues precisely because the act of giving projects private values and 
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commitments into the public sphere.” In other words, who are foundations to determine 
which “problems or people [are] deserving of foundation – and, by implication, public – 
attention” (Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010, p. 211)? Were it not for the tax benefits 
foundations enjoy, this task would fall upon democratically elected government 
representatives.  
Foundations thus play a critical “gatekeeping” role as they are free to define and 
enact the public benefit as they deem appropriate and, as such, do far more than simply 
make grants (Ylvisaker, 1987). Because philanthropic leaders are not democratically 
elected, accountable to the public, or even subject to consumer preferences in the market, 
this power has prompted important questions and debate on the democratic credentials of 
foundations (e.g., Bernholz, Cordelli, & Reich, 2016; Heydemann & Toepler, 2006), 
particularly amid increasing concentrations of wealth and power (Callahan, 2017; Wu, 
2018). But these issues are magnified once one turns their attention to the global aspect of 
their work, where the consequences of America’s foreign affairs and international 
development efforts loom large and where notions of “distant suffering” (Boltanski, 
1999) reign, and so complicate, philanthropic giving (Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010).  
 These challenges – navigating near-constant critique, questions of institutional 
legitimacy, and loaded involvement in the international sphere (Heydemann & Toepler, 
2006) – are what make international grantmakers such a rich site of inquiry. And it is for 
these reasons that I interrogate the decision-making practices of American foundations 
that seek to contribute to global development efforts, however defined. These practices 
have important material consequences; they are “engines of social action” (Brandtner, 
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2017, p. 202) as they determine the way philanthropic funding is distributed across the 
globe. Because there is greater need for funding to support nongovernment organizations 
(NGOs) worldwide than that which foundations can meet (Bob, 2010), difficult decisions 
must be made in determining who benefits, in what ways, and where.  
Yet despite the outsize demand for foundation funding to support nonprofits and 
NGOs around the globe, I find that large, primarily independent foundations in the U.S. 
generally do not distribute their funding in accordance to where need is greatest, but 
rather in accordance to where the impact of their financial contribution is thought to be 
greatest. Reaching this conclusion requires foundations to consider themselves and their 
potential contribution in relation to three sets of actors: the U.S. state, foreign 
governments, and multilateral development institutions; the array of grantees they may 
support; and their peers across the philanthropic field. Together, their global distribution 
of philanthropic gifts reflects a relational approach amid efforts to maximize their 
contribution to measurable and meaningful social change – one that produces diversity in 
funding strategies and recipients (Needles et al., 2018).  
The decision-making considerations, practices, and understandings embedded 
within this relational approach and illustrated in the following chapters help shed crucial 
light on the broader importance of allocative and selection criteria so critical to social 
processes (Brandtner, 2017; Lamont, 2012), from as how college admission is granted 
and downsizing layoffs are decided (Elster, 1992) to how elite job offers are made 
(Rivera, 2012) and research funding is awarded (Lamont, 2009). Underlying each of 
these decisions are processes of evaluation and productions of value (Bessy & Chauvin, 
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2013) through which foundations render particular grantmaking strategies and grantees as 
worthy of pursuit. As such, they “impact upon notions of what, and thereby who, is 
legitimate, desirable, and worthy, and thus by definition what and who is not” (Smith 
Maguire & Matthews, 2012, p. 552). This dissertation therefore informs understandings 
of the processes through which foundations adjudicate between funding strategies and 
ultimately allocate their resources to particular funding approaches and grantee 
organizations. In illuminating one set of actors and processes that help determine how 
funding flows from the global North to the global South, this dissertation also aims to 
shed light on the spaces of intervention in hopes of constructing more equitable 
outcomes.  
A Review of the Literature 
Beyond Motive 
U.S. philanthropic foundations have long been a source of scholarly intrigue and 
inquiry (e.g., Curti, 1988; Karl & Katz, 1987), as well as source of contestation (Hall, 
1992; 2006). Despite burgeoning scholarship on foundations and the intentions of their 
private giving for purportedly public purposes – a practice long subject to various forms 
of critique (Adloff, 2015; Zunz, 2011) – many theories of foundation giving treat the 
motives of donors as the primary, if not sole, explanatory factor in their distribution of 
philanthropic resources. In other words, gift-giving and grantmaking outcomes 
necessarily follow from donor intent. There are two primary ways these motives have 
been described – reflecting “the polarized nature of debates over philanthropy” (Moran, 
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2014, p. 10) – which have spawned the relational approach, discussed below, that this 
dissertation employs.  
The first line of scholarship treats gift-giving as an outcome of a donor’s altruism 
or a foundation’s mission (Comte, 1973; Whitman, 2008). As such, gifts are distributed 
in disinterested ways that do not serve to benefit the donor but that reflect their interests 
and generosity (Titmuss, 1997). This perspective typically treats altruistic motives as 
internal to individuals (and the philanthropic vehicles they establish) and reflects an 
approach of methodological individualism, more commonly found in economists’ and 
psychologists’ studies of philanthropy (Barman, 2016b; Simpson & Willer, 2015), as well 
as in the understandings of members of the philanthropic field. When, for example, I 
spoke with the executive director of an affinity group for donors2 focused on a global 
substantive issue, she asserts: 
One of the things you [as a grant-seeker] want to take into account is what is the mission 
of the actual foundation itself? Because that’ll shape what type of thing you would want 
to do. So one foundation may not ever, because of its mission, because of its founder, be 
willing to support grassroots stuff. They may only ever want to support research or 
academic strategies or organizations, and that just is what it is. 
 
Attending to funders’ stated missions or altruistic motives, however, sheds little 
light on how grantmaking decisions unfold. This is in part because philanthropic missions 
are notoriously vague (though intentionally so, to maintain relevance over time; Leat, 
2016). Not only do donor preferences and grantmaking priorities change (Carson, 2000), 
but they “develop for a wide variety of idiosyncratic reasons – sometimes careful efforts 
                                                        
2 Affinity groups are formalized networks for foundations to strategize with and learn from one another 
(Soskis & Katz, 2016). They are most often organized around particular substantive issue areas or 
geographic regions of interest. 
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to evaluate overseas needs, but also and probably more often donors’ personal 
experiences, institutional histories, and ideological beliefs” (Bob, 2010, p. 144). In 
addition, as Leat (2016) notes, despite narrowing the scope of their work to certain issue 
areas, there is great variation: “Even among foundations focused on, say, health, priorities 
and programs vary. Some focus on medical research, others on, for example, palliative 
care, maternal health, or facilities for children” (p. 32). Similarly, “even clarity of mission 
and criteria does not readily resolve all the subjectivities and imponderables that go into 
deciding whether a particular proposal is worth the investment” (Ylvisaker 1987, p. 365). 
In other words, strict attention to mission and the altruistic motives of donors cannot 
account for grantmaking decisions and outcomes. Were this the case, we might expect 
donors to support areas of greatest need that align with their altruistic motives and 
particular missions, but the chapters that follow question this claim.  
The second line of scholarship argues that gift-giving is a self-interested act that 
benefits donors. For elite donors, this is often reflected in efforts to bolster their status 
among peers, rather than address social inequalities in meaningful ways (Bourdieu, 1990; 
Ostrower, 1995; Silber, 1998). Corporate donors often develop social responsibility 
programs or philanthropic arms of their business in pursuit of a double or triple bottom-
line, in which they seek to enhance shareholder value through efforts to make social or 
environmental contributions (Brown, Helland, & Kilhom Smith, 2006) or by improving 
their public image (Barman, 2017). These understandings of what determines the 
direction of philanthropic resources suggest donors’ motives are centered more on the 
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benefits they accrue than those to funding recipients (Levich, 2015; Mohan & Breeze, 
2016).   
For philanthropic foundations, then, scholars in this tradition contend that 
grantmaking decisions are motivated by efforts to reaffirm the hegemonic social, 
political, and economic arrangements that have enabled their vast accumulation of wealth 
(Fisher, 1983; Karl & Katz, 1987) – even if this occurs with little intention (e.g., Kohl-
Arenas, 2015). Bourdieu (1990), for one, locates the power of philanthropy in donors’ 
ability to convert their economic capital into symbolic capital (Morvaridi, 2012; Silber, 
2009), which renders invisible the hegemonic arrangements through which elites 
reproduce their status. He therefore calls the “financing of ‘disinterested’ foundations” a 
form of “legitimizing redistribution…through which the dominant groups secure a capital 
of ‘credit’ which seems to owe nothing to the logic of exploitation” (1990, p. 133). That 
is, their dominance remains unquestioned because their underlying economic interests are 
masked by apparent generosity (Swartz, 1997).  
Distinct from Bourdieu’s critical take on philanthropy, many scholars have 
adopted a Gramscian approach to examine the role of prominent American foundations in 
bolstering the cultural and political hegemony of capitalist democracy, in part by 
discouraging dissent and preventing more radical structural change from occurring 
(Morvaridi, 2012; Roelofs, 2007). In the context of domestic grantmaking, many argue 
that foundations avoid funding grassroots, potentially radical, social movement 
organizations whose advocacy threatens the hegemonic arrangements from which 
foundations benefit (Jenkins, 1998). Kohl-Arenas (2015), for example, describes how the 
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self-help poverty reduction programs supported by seemingly well-intentioned 
foundations in California ultimately diluted the labor organizing agendas of nonprofit 
organizations. Because such programs were perceived as “benign” by foundation 
leadership, they were preferable grantmaking strategies relative to labor organizing 
campaigns.  
Internationally, scholars point to dubious motives behind large foundations’ 
grantmaking. Challenging the benevolence of early institutional philanthropy, Berman 
(1983, p. 25) argues, “The Rockefeller Foundation programs in the developing countries 
– be they medical, agricultural, or educational – consistently followed in the wake of 
commercial activities associated with the Rockefeller family financial empire.” These 
self-interested motives may thus be commercial or political, as manifested in support for 
educational initiatives around the world – area studies or international development 
studies (Berman, 1983; Brooks, 2015) – to diffuse “knowledge and ideas that reinforce 
the capitalist market economy and influence U.S. foreign policy” (Morvaridi, 2012, p. 
1201). In this way, the transfer of America ideas emerges as a form of ‘soft power’ 
through which to exert global control (Stone, 2010) and promote neoliberal ideals (Nally 
& Taylor, 2015). For example, Aksartova (2009) finds that American philanthropy drove 
the post-Soviet NGO boom through the diffusion of NGOs as an institutional form: 
“American civil society donors have established a universe of post-Soviet NGOs 
clamoring for their continuing support” (p. 161), which created the funding demand 
foundations needed to promote democracy and civil society abroad. If, however, it is true 
that foundations operate according to self-interested motives, we would expect them to 
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support only “mainstream,” less politically contentious issues; organizations in wealthy 
countries; and large international nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, 
or think tanks (Aksartova, 2003). We may anticipate little to no support for small, 
grassroots organizations or any sort of “movement building” activity, yet recent empirical 
evidence suggests otherwise (see Foundation Center & Human Rights Funders Network, 
2018; Stacey & Aksartova, 2002).  
To be sure, a burgeoning body of literature complicates the straightforward causal 
claims of strict attention to motives, such as by pointing to the internal complexities of 
foundations (Millesen & Marten, 2014) like internal politics and contestations among 
staff or the inertia of past decisions, often codified in long-established operating 
procedures and routinized behavior. Diaz (1999, p. 151) contends, “Generally speaking, 
scholars appear to be prone to view [foundations] as monolithic instruments of an 
economic ‘elite’…when in reality, they may be driven as much by staff, organizational 
habit, and yes, on occasion, plain confusion.” In other cases, attention is paid to the 
diversity of foundation types and characteristics – whether these are categorized by 
organization, size, or aspiration (Leat, 1999; Oelberger, 2016; Ostrower, 2004; 
Tompkins-Stange, 2016). These understandings of foundation behavior expose the 
variation in grantmaking practices, from governance structures to solicitations for 
funding requests (Leat, 2016; Ylvisaker, 1987), and they challenge sweeping assumptions 
of foundations as “goal directed and hierarchical” (Diaz, 1999, p. 143). However, their 
limited explanatory power with respect to the direction of philanthropic funding results 
from greater attention to foundations’ characteristics than to their position relative to 
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other actors within a given field. Moving beyond this methodological individualism and 
employing a relational perspective to the international grantmaking practices of U.S. 
foundations is what this dissertation seeks to do.  
 
Toward A Relational Approach to Philanthropy? 
In recent decades, sociological theorizing has brought a distinctly relational 
approach to the study of the nonprofit sector, a response to the predominance of 
methodological individualism (Barman, 2016b; Simpson & Willer, 2015), with its focus 
on the intrinsic motivations of individuals or entities as a causal explanation for action. 
This perspective understands the nonprofit sector as “the aggregated outcome of 
individuals’ voluntaristic action (pro-social, other-oriented behavior…), as opposed to 
action generated out of coercion in the public sector or self-interest in the market” 
(Barman, 2016b, p. 445). A relational approach to the nonprofit sector, however, 
fundamentally rejects this assumption by drawing attention to donors’ social context to 
account for variations in the frequency, quantity, and direction of giving. As “actors’ 
philanthropic behavior is contingent upon their embeddedness in dynamic and changing 
social relationships” (Barman, 2017, p. 278), sociologists convincingly demonstrate the 
social and relational underpinning of philanthropy.   
Across various analytical levels (e.g., Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Healy, 2006; 
Wiepking & Bekkers, 2012; Zunz, 2011), our understanding of philanthropy as a product 
of particular configurations of actors and organizations is solidifying. Healy (2006), for 
example, demonstrates how variations in organ donation are highly dependent upon the 
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efforts of organ procurement organizations that facilitate giving. On a global scale, Bob 
(2002) illustrates how causes go to great lengths to spread their message and garner 
funding, but their success is largely dependent upon the NGOs that publicize their plight. 
This relational approach (Emirbayer, 1997) thus conceptualizes philanthropic and pro-
social action as resulting from the effects of the field in which actors and organizations 
are located (Barman, 2017).  
One salient iteration of field theory hails from New Institutionalism, which 
examines how organizations are affected by their institutional environments (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutions provide prescriptions for 
appropriate behavior, thereby guiding goals and the means actors employ to achieve 
them. In so doing, conforming to such expectations – even if ceremonially (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977) – affords legitimacy in the eyes of relevant others (Deephouse, 1996). 
Over time, organizations within a field come to resemble one another more closely 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; but see Oliver, 1991), as their institutional environments 
expose them to isomorphic pressures inciting their adoption of particular policies or 
practices, such as civil service reform (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), regulations set forth by 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (Barnes & Burke, 2006), or innovations to promote 
diversity in corporations (Dobbin, Kim, & Kalev, 2011). These pressures can be 
normative, stemming from the influence of professionals and experts; mimetic, the 
compulsion to imitate competitors perceived as more successful; or coercive, in which 
organizations respond to formal or informal pressure exerted by those whose resources 
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they depend upon (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In this way, an entity’s position within a 
field helps account for its actions.  
In the organizational field of philanthropy (Spires, 2011), much has been written 
about how philanthropic foundations are guided by – and, importantly, incite – New 
Institutionalism’s central tenets. One line of work analyzes the isomorphic pressures 
philanthropic foundations exert on grantees as the funding source they depend upon. In 
other words, because foundations control the purse strings, they can dictate behavioral 
changes in the organizations they support (Aksartova, 2009; Gronbjerg, Martell, & 
Paarlberg, 2000; Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010). One example of this is the increasingly 
salient mandate of outcome measurement and other rationalized practices, such as 
strategic plans, that foundations have imposed on grant recipients (Barman & MacIndoe, 
2012; Hwang & Powell, 2009). Others, meanwhile, have examined the role of 
philanthropic foundations in the proto-institutionalization of fluid organizational fields 
through their ability to convene diverse actors and offer financial support to strengthen 
organizations in times of transition (Powell, Oberg, Korff, Oelberger, & Kloos, 2017). 
A second line of New Institutionalist scholarship has examined foundations’ quest 
for legitimacy in the eyes of the public and state, long contested within the sector. Spires 
(2011) argues that the regulatory constraints on foundations, the influences of foundation 
professionals and trustees, and the standards regarding accountability and transparency 
all indicate the extent to which foundations are members of an organizational field that 
orients their action toward uniformity. Frumkin (1999) provides empirical evidence for 
this claim, finding that foundations have been subject to institutional forces following the 
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Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1969, which sought to increase the sector’s accountability to 
the public and state. This resulted in the bureaucratization and professionalization of 
foundations and the philanthropic sector as a whole.  
In addition, because foundations in the U.S. have consistently needed to defend 
their legitimacy and demonstrate their accountability (Frumkin, 2004; Prewitt, 2006), 
scholars find that many opt to fund “elite” grantees that can provide them with the 
legitimacy they seek (Aksartova, 2003; Botetzagias & Koutiva, 2014).3 Foundations 
frequently demonstrate a preference for those grantees that can report on the outcomes of 
philanthropic funding, as this allows foundations to define their societal contribution and 
justify their existence and tax-exempt status (Barman, 2013; Hall, 2004). In other cases, 
however, a grantee’s reputation or its relationship with its funder are often more 
important in grantmaking decisions than objective measures of performance (Tassie, 
Murray, Cutt, & Bragg, 1996). In large part, the process of grantmaking, according to 
Gronbjerg et al. (2000, p. 11) is beset by: 
profound ambiguity…There is no definitive knowledge base for deciding which activities 
will produce a particular outcome, and the interpretation of success and failure is 
inherently complicated and subject to challenge because of the complex environment in 
which funded activities take place. 
 
Thus, in the uncertain context of grantmaking – particularly acute in international giving, 
where challenges are exacerbated by temporal, geographic, and cultural differences 
(Nichols & Mackinnon, 2004; Renz & Samson-Atienza, 1997) – foundations may be 
expected to emulate the grantmaking activities of their more successful peers (DiMaggio 
                                                        
3 This supports the self-interested motives line of argument noted earlier, as foundations may be unwilling 
to fund organizations that threaten their sense of legitimacy.  
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& Powell, 1983). For U.S.-based foundations intent on using their grantmaking to support 
international efforts in some capacity, however, the challenges faced in doing so are 
myriad and complicated.  
These include power inequalities (Doerfel, Atouba, & Harris, 2017; Tompkins-
Stange, 2016; Villanueva, 2018) – long identified between donors and recipients but 
exacerbated on a global scale due to historical legacies of colonialism, extraction, and 
imperialism – as well as cultural differences, language barriers, diverse regulatory 
environments, and issues with the efficacy of monitoring and evaluation efforts to 
determine “whether potential grantees cater more to the funder’s guidelines than to the 
objectives of their organizations” (Renz & Samson-Atienza, 1997, p. 5). As Nichols and 
Mackinnon (2004) observe, “Distance affects how grant makers follow the progress of a 
project, support grantees in solving problems, and handle such mundane issues as 
currency exchange” (p. 10). Mimicking their peers can thus reduce the ambiguity 
foundations face about the use, management, and outcomes of their funding. 
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989), for example, find that under conditions of 
uncertainty, corporations fund the same nonprofits that members of their professional 
networks already have. In a similar vein, Kallman (2017) documents the interpersonal 
networks through which foundations discover and support grantees; rather than taking 
chances on small, novel organizations, they mitigate risk by funding who and what their 
peers already do.  
Thus, if mimicry is the salient driving force behind how foundations distribute 
their gifts, we would expect very little diversity in funding topics, geographies, and 
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approaches. There are trends, to be sure, but reports about international giving indicate a 
more diversified field (e.g., Foundation Center & Human Rights Funders Network, 2018; 
Needles et al., 2018). While the contributions from New Institutionalism alert us to the 
role that legitimacy plays in organizational decision-making, such that organizations 
within a given field will tend toward uniformity over time, this strand of literature does 
not explain differences in goals and strategies across a field, as this dissertation finds. To 
this end, I employ a theoretical lens based upon a second salient iteration of field theory.    
Theoretical Frame 
Bourdieusian Field Theory 
Broadly, field theory explains social action as a result of an actor’s location or 
position in a given field, as opposed to qualities held by individuals, such as demographic 
characteristics (Barman, 2016b). Fields are shared spaces of actors that understand 
themselves and operate in relation to one another (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). 
Members of a field share a similar set of assumptions and understandings, yet it is an 
entity’s position within a set of structured relations, as well as its “awareness of linkages 
to and interactions with other actors” (Barman, 2016b, p. 446), that account for its 
behavior.  
This version of field theory originates in the work of French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu and has greatly influenced American sociology (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007). It 
provides an instructive analytical framework with which to analyze not isomorphism, but 
differentiation (Barman, 2002; Krause, 2014). Bourdieu’s conception of a field is 
characterized by “a terrain of contestation between occupants of positions differentially 
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endowed with the resources necessary for gaining and safeguarding an ascendant position 
within that terrain” (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008, p. 6). In other words, fields, as a 
“network, or a configuration, of objective relations” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97), 
are not only shared social spaces like organizational fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), 
but explicitly sites of competition between actors whose positions in the field are defined 
by the amount and type of capital they possess. This capital can be economic, social, or 
cultural; it may be field-specific, as in the case of religion (Bourdieu, 1991) and 
humanitarianism (Krause, 2014); and its importance lies in actors’ ability to convert it 
into different forms. Fields contain a particular arrangement of power relations, as well as 
shared sets of assumptions about what is at stake and how to play “the game” (Bourdieu 
& Wacquant, 1992), ultimately for the possession of a form of symbolic capital that 
endows actors with “the capacity to define the possession of capital as legitimate and so 
not subject to contestation by other actors” (Barman, 2016b, p. 447).  
In its application to the nonprofit sector, Bourdieu (1990) treats philanthropy as a 
means for elites to maintain their dominant social position. As described earlier, he 
contends this dominance is maintained “based on the conversion of economic capital into 
symbolic capital, with all forms of the legitimizing redistribution, public (‘social’ 
policies) and private (financing of ‘disinterested’ foundations, donations to hospitals, 
academic and cultural institutions, etc.)” (1990, p. 133). Similarly, in her study of 
wealthy donors in New York City, Francie Ostrower (1995) illustrates how elite donors 
employ philanthropy to distinguish themselves from their peers, including the “new rich.” 
Their giving signaled to others their membership in high society, and affiliation with 
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certain causes and organizations, particularly cultural institutions, enabled the acquisition 
of status in ways that involvement with other organizations did not. 
Despite his own critique of philanthropy and foundations, and beyond 
examinations of elites in the nonprofit sector, Bourdieu’s field theory has gained little 
traction in analyses of other aspects of giving (Barman, 2016b). To be sure, some have 
employed Bourdieu’s notion of capital to analyze nonprofit organizations (Greenspan, 
2014; Schneider, 2009), while others have taken up the notion of habitus to examine 
changes in the provision of social services (Woolford & Curran, 2012). One notable 
exception is the work of Monika Krause (2014), which employs a Bourdieusian 
theoretical lens to analyze the global resource allocation practices of humanitarian NGOs. 
These organizations compete with one another for a particular form a symbolic capital – 
humanitarian authority – which produces a logic determining which disasters are aided 
and where. NGOs work to produce “good projects” to receive funding from donors and 
distinguish themselves from their peers (Barman, 2002) in asserting their humanitarian 
expertise. As a consequence, projects are often independent from the wants and needs of 
intended beneficiaries (Bob, 2002; but see Buthe, Major, & de Mello e Souza, 2012). 
Krause’s is a useful study that helps inform the methodology and analysis of this 
dissertation.   
 
Evaluation and Valuation 
To understand why particular humanitarian projects (in Krause’s case) or causes 
and organizations (in mine) are preferred over others, I draw upon insights from the 
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sociology of evaluation and valuation. These insights alert us to the social construction of 
value – that is, how it is produced through social interaction. Valuation, as economic 
sociologists have shown, is the process of assigning value to entities as diverse as fashion 
models (Mears, 2011), art (Velthuis, 2005), and the environment (Fourcade, 2011). In 
contrast to economists who perceive the value of goods as revealed through prices and 
the amount consumers willingly pay, contemporary sociological understandings focus on 
value as socially constituted and contingent (Herrnstein Smith, 1988). Rather than an 
inherent aspect of goods, in other words, value is instead dependent upon the cultural 
meanings social actors assign. To understand value in this way is to acknowledge that – 
in our case – providing funding to build an orphanage in Cambodia does not inherently 
merit greater value than providing funding for training on safe sex practices in 
Zimbabwe. But because extant research on valuation has largely focused on its attribution 
to market and nonmarket goods, less scholarship has examined “how the organized 
pursuit of social good” – through, for example, charitable projects around the world – “is 
defined and assessed” (Barman, 2016a, p. 9).  
 Contra Bourdieu’s critical sociology, many economic sociologists treat the 
process of valuation as practical action (Dewey, 1939; Lamont, 2009), whereby value 
represents both a characteristic and an accomplishment (Helgesson & Muniesa, 2014; 
Muniesa, 2012). In the chapters that follow, my focus has been on “unveiling evaluation 
criteria and bringing to light the devices, institutions, or cultural and social structures that 
support or enable them” (Lamont, 2012, p. 208). To do so, I describe and examine the 
infrastructure of actors and practices (Brandtner, 2017) that enable certain causes or 
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organizations to be assessed and in particular ways. Because assessments of value – 
evaluations – are constructed by and conducted within the international grantmaking 
field, my analysis grants primacy to the critical sociological approach that attends to the 
relational dynamics within and across fields (Strandvad, 2014). To this end, the 
assessments of grantmaking strategies and grantees that philanthropic actors make are 
necessarily made in relation to other actors. But, in doing so, their evaluations are not 
neutral because they ultimately valorize (Bessy & Chauvin, 2013) – or make more 
valuable (Heuts & Mol, 2013; Vatin, 2013) – particular approaches to international 
grantmaking. As Muniesa (2012, p. 32) notes, “Valuation is about considering a reality 
while provoking it,” whereby philanthropic actors infuse value in certain causes and 
organizations worldwide.  
American Philanthropy and International Grantmaking 
Origins of Institutional Philanthropy 
The contemporary philanthropic foundation locates its origins within Americans’ 
relation to the state and the appropriate role of government. The Gilded Age, having 
produced vast inequalities of wealth, gave birth to the Progressive Era toward a reformed 
capitalism and social welfare programs, but it also “collided with a general political 
culture which could not accept a national government bent on such reform” (Karl & Katz, 
1981, p. 238). The robber barons of the era, such as Andrew Carnegie and John D. 
Rockefeller (Adloff, 2015) – once middle-class men themselves (Karl & Katz, 1987) – 
exhibited what they felt was a genuine desire to put their spectacular fortunes to 
benevolent ends. To do so, they envisioned bringing the practices that brought them 
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success in the marketplace to their charitable endeavors, an effort many see as initiating 
the rationalization of charity (Berman, 1983; Karl & Katz, 1981). With waning faith in 
the temporary solutions of traditional charity, these captains of industry touted a long-
term approach to identify and address the root causes of America’s social and economic 
ills (Adloff, 2015; Anheier & Toepler, 1999). In his 1889 Gospel of Wealth, Carnegie 
argued that “the responsibility for remedying the evils of the industrial economy lay with 
those who had created it,” but who must also “be willing to administer their wealth 
wisely” (Hall, 1992, p. 45). The way their wealth was to be administered, however, 
would become the subject of much debate.  
The first truly open-ended, endowed foundation was created by Margaret Olivia 
Slocum Sage in her late husband’s name. Carnegie and Rockefeller would come to do the 
same. But while Carnegie’s articulation of “a new doctrine of benevolence” (Hall, 1992, 
p. 44) greatly influenced Rockefeller, the latter did not originally conceive of the private, 
endowed foundation as we currently understand it. Rather, he “genuinely intended to give 
the foundation to the public by creating a government corporation headed by a board” 
whose members would be approved by leaders in the highest political positions (Karl & 
Katz, 1987, p. 11). Needless to say, this vision was not realized; Congress was unwilling 
to grant him a federal charter for a foundation in 1910, though the state of New York 
granted him one three years later. Congress and Progressive reformers remained deeply 
skeptical about the intentions of the captains of industry, the vast accumulations of wealth 
in private hands, and the threat a foundation may pose to democracy (Brilliant, 2000; 
Reich, 2016). After all, Zunz (2011, p. 20) notes, Rockefeller and his peers were “the 
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titans of industry who caused the very afflictions that reformers sought to undo.” Much 
like contemporary critiques (e.g., Heydemann & Toepler, 2006; Tompkins-Stange, 2016), 
many felt that the means by which Rockefeller and his ilk had accumulated their 
immense fortunes – often the result of exploitative labor practices – could not be 
mollified by any amount of charitable giving (Brilliant, 2000; Hall, 2006).  
In spite of some setbacks and continued skepticism, the early philanthropists 
moved forward with their “general purpose” foundations in New York, inspired in part by 
the scientific and technological advancements of the industrial age (Adloff, 2015). In so 
doing, they began articulating solutions to America’s problems at the national level in 
ways the federal government at the time could not (Karl & Katz, 1987). Employing their 
“scientific approach to philanthropy,” rooted in medicine (Adloff, 2015), and in sharp 
contrast to traditional conceptions of charity – alleviating suffering, but not targeting its 
root causes – they promoted the “wellbeing of mankind” (Hall, 2006) with broad 
mandates to ensure their continued relevancy through changing times (Leat, 2016). Since 
the creation of these first foundations, “what has persisted has been the notion of large 
economic resources devoted in perpetuity to the advancement of the general welfare of 
society and distributed according to…the legal custodians of the fund” (Karl & Katz, 
1981, p. 246). These defining traits of early institutional philanthropy established the 
broad framework within which foundations continue to operate today (Heydemann & 
Kinsey, 2010), as well as foundations’ continued efforts to defend their legitimacy and 
their appropriate role in a democratic society – both in question since their emergence 
(Brilliant, 2000; Frumkin, 2004; Karl & Katz, 1987; Reich, 2016).   
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A Century of Suspicion 
 Since the Revenue Act of 1913, certain public benefit organizations (e.g., those 
with an explicit charitable purpose) have been exempt from taxation, but it was not until 
the Revenue Act of 1921 that the private foundation was distinguished from other tax-
exempt charitable organizations. The question of tax-exemption, Karl and Katz (1987, p. 
35) contend, “has been, and will certainly remain, the battlefield on which every war over 
foundation influence is fought.” Thus, as the 20th Century wore on, questions arose about 
foundations as institutions designed to protect family and business wealth.4 When the new 
501(c)(3) section of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, for example, “transformed 
individual and corporate charitable giving into a tax-driven activity” (Hall, 2006, p. 53), 
new concerns emerged about the use of foundations as tax havens. As Hall (2002) notes, 
this development incentivized the creation of philanthropic foundations, which have 
tended to flourish during periods of high tax rates, such as those associated with the costs 
of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The 1954 Code also delineated a clear distinction 
between private foundations, as one realm of charity, and all other charitable 
organizations. This codified distinction would bear on efforts to create a single Third 
Sector several decades later. In the meantime, by the late 1950s, politicians were more 
concerned about the presence of loopholes in the tax code and critiqued the IRS’s lax 
monitoring of foundations and other tax-exempt organizations (Brilliant, 2000).  
                                                        
4 The Revenue Act of 1950 was an effort to prevent foundations from withholding their wealth by requiring 
them to make “reasonable” annual payouts from their endowments. This, however, was barely enforced 
(Brilliant, 2000) until the Tax Reform Act of 1969 mandated a certain payout percentage (Hall, 1992).  
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In the decades that followed, the House Ways and Means Committee held 
hearings with prominent foundation leaders, often featuring hostility. The hearings dealt 
with the potential wrongdoing of foundations, which “threatened the fiscal viability of the 
federal government” (Barman, 2013, p. 112), but – somewhat insidiously – right-wing 
politicians also questioned the allegiance of philanthropists, claiming that large 
foundations harbored communist sympathies and supported anti-American causes 
(Brilliant, 2000). Two Congressional subcommittees – the Cox Committee, established in 
1952, and the Reece Committee, formed one year later – investigated foundations’ 
behavior. A product of ideological assumptions, questions about public subsidies for 
private giving, and a certain anti-elitism, these “attacks on foundations” not only found 
little to confirm wrongdoing, but also had limited influence on Congressional action at 
the time (Brilliant, 2000). Yet they continued to render clear the animus some in 
government directed to prominent foundations.  
At the time, there was no distinct philanthropic community or sector to speak of. 
Even as calls for increased foundation regulation grew louder, “the defenders of 
charitable tax-exempt organizations were remarkably ununified in their efforts to defend 
themselves” (Hall, 1992, p. 72). This was evidenced in the distinct responses different 
foundations offered in reaction to a 1965 Treasury Department report – the outcome of a 
1961 speech by Congressman Patman and subsequent investigations – recommending 
guidelines for foundation behavior. Though representatives of the large, endowed 
foundations (such as Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller) spoke out against additional 
regulations, cautioning against government overreach that could threaten the diversity 
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and pluralism foundations helped foster, they generally supported increasing their 
accountability through annual reports and other published materials (Brilliant, 2000). Yet, 
as Hall (1992) notes, even the institutionalized trade associations, the Foundation Center 
and Council on Foundations, faced such disagreement among members that they could 
not offer recommendations for regulation. In addition, the Council on Foundations 
primarily served smaller foundations, and the Foundation Center was mostly an 
information provider; neither was in an ideal position to rally or speak on behalf of the 
philanthropic sector.  
What followed this series of Congressional inquiries and critiques was the 1969 
Tax Reform Act, which stipulated a set of regulations by which foundations would abide. 
The regulations appeared much stricter than anticipated (punitive, as some argued at the 
time) and ruffled more than a few foundations’ feathers. In addition to mandating an 
annual payout rate (i.e., that foundations would make grants each year totally at least a 
designated percentage5 of its endowment), the TRA also enforced a distinction between 
private foundations and public charities by directing its regulations specifically to 
foundations (Barman, 2013). In the leadup to the TRA, John D. Rockefeller 3rd, an ardent 
supporter of philanthropy and its role in American society, initiated two private 
commissions with the intention of countering the public’s negative perception of 
foundations and influencing public policy directed at these institutionalized forms of 
giving. The first, the Peterson Commission, sought to defend the tax benefits foundations 
                                                        
5 This percentage has varied over the years, from 4.5% to 7%, but it has stayed at 5% per the Filer 
Commission’s recommendation (Brilliant, 2000).  
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received and stifle additional government oversight by asserting their contributions to 
society (Hall, 1992), but it did not complete its report until 1970. Later, the Filer 
Commission boasted an ambitious research agenda into the role of private organizations 
in fulfilling public needs, tax incentives for private organizations, and their appropriate 
relationship to government (Brilliant, 2000). Its report, published in 1977, is largely 
credited with creating what we now recognize as the Third Sector, a distinct non-state, 
non-market societal realm encompassing both private foundations and public charities 
(Barman, 2013; Brilliant, 2000; Hall, 1992). Because both were oriented to the provision 
of social good, bringing previously disparate sectors under one roof enabled John D. 
Rockefeller 3rd to demonstrate the value of philanthropy to society and tame observers’ 
suspicions (Barman, 2013) – an achievement from which the sector has continued to 
benefit (Hall, 2004).  
 
Early International Giving 
American foundations have a long legacy of international giving, one that 
scholars frequently laud as characterized by promotions of peace and security, economic 
and agricultural development, and the strengthening of civil society (Heydemann & 
Kinsey, 2010), and with roles as diverse as institution builders, legitimacy providers, 
exporters of ideas, coalition builders, and amplifiers of grantee activities (Benjamin & 
Quigley, 2010). The earliest philanthropists – Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, 
in particular – remained steadfast in their foreign interests (Zunz, 2011). For example, 
Carnegie consistently provided funding for the development of public libraries in 
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England, Scotland, Ireland, and Canada for, to him, “there were no national boundaries to 
the benefits of scientific research to mankind” (Curti, 1988, p. 195). And when the 
Rockefeller Foundation was established in 1913, it contained an explicit international 
focus and the desire to promote progress and societal improvement around the world. 
This often translated into funding for research in the health and medical fields abroad, 
such as through its support for the Peking Union Medical College in China (Berman, 
1983).  
In the early 20th Century, the Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation 
worked in tandem with U.S. government efforts abroad, though their relation to the state 
has shifted greatly since this time (Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010; Zunz, 2011). During 
World War I, Rockefeller initiated a relief program in Europe and later cooperated with 
the Red Cross to fight Serbia’s typhus epidemic (Curti, 1988). Carnegie would focus on 
rebuilding the libraries of Europe that were devastated by the War. Because both 
philanthropists operated “on the assumption that the increase and diffusion of knowledge 
is an essential factor in promoting international understanding” (Curti, 1988, p. 305) and 
so averting significant global conflict, they deliberately funded or created institutions to 
this end (Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010). The Carnegie Endowment’s Division of 
International Law, for example, not only provided advisement on various foreign policy 
issues, but was later a contributing factor to the establishment of the United Nations.  
Foundations’ early work in the U.S., which focused on education for African 
Americans and the eradication of hookworm disease in the South (Zunz, 2011), came to 
characterize their approach to international giving, as these efforts “established 
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precedents for their later overseas activities” (Berman, 1983, p. 15). The Rockefeller 
Foundation, in particular, turned its support for increased agricultural productivity and 
public health efforts in the U.S. South “into an international humanitarian movement for 
global health and development…[as they] hoped to make their agenda of public health 
and farm productivity a pattern for the world” (Zunz, 2011, p. 40-41). The Foundation’s 
desire to eradicate disease wherever possible thus spawned its International Health 
Commission in 1917. In a similar vein, Carnegie’s support for schools and public 
libraries across Africa, beginning in Kenya in 1925, drew upon the Carnegie 
Corporation’s earlier work in the American South (Berman, 1983; Curti, 1988). 
 
Foundations’ Post-World War II Agenda 
The almost-given international focus of these early foundations reflected their 
historical context, but also laid the groundwork for how foundations would operate 
internationally in the coming century. Their support for global governance and cultural 
understanding – “seen as an essential support for America’s role as a global superpower” 
(Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010, p. 215) – began in the interwar period, but accelerated 
rapidly after the Second World War. After a second global conflict, when the explicit 
pursuit of international development (Escobar, 1995) was articulated, U.S. foundations 
approached world affairs with renewed vigor and intensity. The War-Peace Studies 
Project (1939-1945) of the Council on Foreign Relations (which had received foundation 
grants since the 1920s; Berman, 1983) outlined the post-WWII landscape. Consequently, 
the major U.S. foundations began heavily supporting area studies, international law 
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studies, and opportunities for foreign students to study in the U.S., as well as the 
strengthening of foreign educational institutions (Zunz, 2011).  
These efforts were intended to promote not only mutual understanding across 
nations, but also the global political and economic stability on which U.S. economic 
growth depended. As such, some claim (Arnove, 1980; Berman, 1983) their international 
grantmaking was an explicit promotion of American interests abroad in a wider attempt 
to counter communist ideology and the power of the Soviet Union: “America’s largest 
foundations provided funds and collaborated… [with] the U.S. government…[to] put 
culture to the service of what became known as ‘psychological warfare’ against 
communist ideology” (Zunz, 2011, p. 146). This suggests close contact between elite 
foundations and the U.S. government, and the relationship between the two was 
effectively a revolving door (Berman, 1983), as various foundation leaders previously 
held U.S. government positions and vice versa. For example, Dean Rusk, President of the 
Rockefeller Foundation in the 1950s, had served in the U.S. State Department, and Paul 
Hoffman, President of the Ford Foundation, had administered the Marshall Plan in 
Europe (Zunz, 2011). Several Rockefeller trustees would later become Secretaries of 
State (Berman, 1983), and the Rockefeller family even donated the land on which the 
United Nations headquarters would be built (Zunz, 2011).  
Often, the justifications for increased international involvement that both 
foundations and the U.S. government offered were largely indistinguishable (Berman, 
1983). The federal government drew upon earlier philanthropic foundation experiments 
in crafting its post-WWII foreign assistance program, particularly in the areas of public 
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health and agriculture (Nally & Taylor, 2015). The U.S. government supported these 
efforts, such as the Rockefeller Foundation’s “Green Revolution” in Mexico and later 
South America, India, and parts of Africa, as well as the W.K. Kellogg Foundation’s 
expanded health and agricultural programs across Latin America, as means of containing 
communism in newly independent nations. As an explicit form of soft power, President 
Truman hoped philanthropic foundations “would give the Cold War its humanitarian 
face” (Zunz, 2011, p. 155). A former Ford Foundation president readily acknowledged 
the institution’s efforts to curtail communist sentiment. To this end, the Foundation-
commissioned Gaither Report of 19486 envisioned a larger role for the Foundation abroad 
to promote a “liberal internationalist program” (Berghahn, 2001; Zunz, 2011, p. 182). As 
Brooks (2015) notes, “Gaither had suggested that philanthropy was well-placed to ‘assist 
in the fundamental issues of policies where our Government or the United Nations may 
lack objectivity, talents or time’” (p. 40). In this way, foundations began to articulate a 
new role for themselves internationally to support the broader pro-American, anti-
communist cause.   
In addition to a focus on agriculture and health, then, foundations concentrated 
heavily on the topic of education, both at home in the U.S. and abroad. This included 
funding for international area studies that sought to expand U.S. scholars’ knowledge 
about other countries (for example, Carnegie provided seed money to create the Russian 
Research Center at Harvard University in the late 1940s) to assist in crafting American 
                                                        
6 The Gaither Report, so named for its committee chair, was commissioned by the Ford Foundation’s Board 
of Trustees in 1948 after Henry Ford’s death in 1947. His death resulted in a huge growth in the 
Foundation’s assets, and the Board hoped Gaither could determine the assets’ best use (Brooks, 2015).  
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foreign policy. They also worked to strengthen institutions of higher education across 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where critical scholars argue they hoped to groom a 
future generation of leaders espousing Western worldviews with whom U.S. leaders 
could later work (Berman, 1983) – a “well-educated Third World elite dedicated to 
capitalism and economic growth” (Roelofs, 2007, p. 497). In addition, Ford and Carnegie 
funded programs to educate teachers in other countries, while Ford and Rockefeller 
focused on training scholars in the social sciences, particularly economics (Berman, 
1983; Gemelli, 2006). Many scholars are critical of this philanthropic support for the 
U.S.’ Cold War strategy, understood as a means of extending Western hegemonic 
interests on a global scale (Arnove, 1980; Bilgin & Morton, 2002; Brooks, 2015) – or, if 
nothing else, foundations’ business interests. Education and leadership training programs 
in Nigeria, Berman (1983) contends, were motivated by the importance of regional 
stability and potential investment opportunities for American commerce.  
Despite the close relationship and ideological alignment between foundations and 
the U.S. government throughout the 1940s and 1950s, foundations expressed a desire not 
to be seen as mere tools of U.S. foreign policy (Micinski, 2017). Though there was 
significant growth in area and development studies between the end of WWII until the 
mid-1960s, thanks to foundation support, their funding for such activities waned during 
the 1960s as the federal government offered more support for programs internationally 
(Berman, 1983; Petersen & McClure, 2011). The creation of new government agencies 
supporting international development, such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), effectively displaced some foundation work (Heydemann & 
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Kinsey, 2010). “By the 1970s, [USAID’s] work largely crowded out the technical 
assistance programs run by private foundations,” Micinski (2017, p. 1319) notes, such 
that USAID’s “larger footprint displaced private foundations from their traditional role of 
working in cohort with foreign governments.” At the same time, however, because large 
foundations “had extensive political and cultural dealings with nations on every continent 
at a time when the U.S. government maintained only formal diplomatic relations,” 
(Roelofs, 2007, p. 496), they still served to greatly benefit federal agencies and 
multilateral institutions.   
Heydemann and Kinsey (2010) therefore characterize foundations’ autonomy 
from the U.S. state during the 20th Century as “contingent” (p. 213), with variation in the 
extent to which the two sectors collaborated (for example, in Europe after WWII) and 
conflicted (such as when foundations sought to curtail the nuclear arms race). However, 
despite the government’s burgeoning presence overseas, large foundations like the Ford 
and Rockefeller Foundations remained engaged internationally, although “the balance of 
funding, influence, and visibility shifted decisively toward the state…by the 1960s and 
1970s” (Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010, p. 215).  
 
The New Millennium 
Toward the end of the 20th Century, international grantmaking by U.S. foundations 
swelled, even as then-President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, made an 
impassioned plea to U.S. foundations at the 1998 Council on Foundations annual meeting 
to increase their contributions globally (Campbell & Lewis, 1999). Following 
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technological advancements, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the proliferation of 
nongovernmental organizations worldwide (Benjamin & Quigley, 2010; Watkins, 
Swidler, & Hannan, 2012), foundations “joined an unstable but powerful associational 
movement that has reshaped civil society in many parts of the world…[amid] 
opportunities to promote capitalism and civil society as engines of democracy” (Zunz, 
2011, p. 264). Having grown significantly in number (from roughly 32,000 in 1990 to 
75,000 in 2008; Spero, 2010), U.S. foundations responded quickly to the opportunities in 
Eastern Europe, playing “an important role in identifying individuals, institutions, and 
issues that warranted further investment” by institutions like USAID and the World Bank 
(Benjamin & Quigley, 2010, p. 253). Yet some suggest foundations were not simply 
responding to opportunity, but rather actively cultivating a blossoming post-Soviet civil 
society sector to absorb their funds, or, in other words, creating demand for their supply 
(Aksartova, 2009; Ostrander & Schervish, 1990).  
As the times changed, so too did foundations’ priorities and partnerships. Where 
their previous work had concerned the promotion of international understanding amid 
World Wars and Cold War tensions, their attention turned to democratization and the 
development of civil society in previously repressive countries, as well as global health 
and environmental issues (Benjamin & Quigley, 2010; Renz & Samson-Atienza, 1997). 
In addition, foundations shifted from working primarily with governments, as they had in 
decades past, to working almost exclusively with a burgeoning array of nongovernmental 
organizations (Micinski, 2017; Zunz, 2011). And while their resources granted to Eastern 
Europe were smaller than those of USAID or the World Bank, they still “had their niche” 
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(Zunz, 2011, p. 272). They also built upon previous relationships forged and investments 
made in those countries. The Ford Foundation, for example, worked with George Soros 
of the Open Society Institute to help found Helsinki Watch in 1978, later the Human 
Rights Watch (Zunz, 2011). However, their international engagement continues to be 
critiqued as working “hand-in-hand with the hard realities of Western imperialism” 
(Levich, 2015, p. 707), whether exemplified by the Gates Foundation’s influence on 
global health governance or claims that big philanthropy collaborated with USAID to 
promote Ukrainian regime change in 2014 (Levich, 2015).  
Over the past two decades, several trends have emerged: First, the Gates 
Foundation has become a major player in international grantmaking as it pursues an 
ambitious global development agenda. Though its substantial support for global health 
can skew wider trends in philanthropic giving, its grantmaking reflects areas of interest to 
other donors. For example, the three substantive areas that capture the most international 
giving by American foundations – with or without funding from the Gates Foundation – 
are health, economic development, and the environment (Needles et al., 2018). Second, 
foundations continue to rely heavily on intermediaries and public charities to channel 
their funds to international beneficiaries. These organizations are frequently located in the 
U.S. and Western Europe, and the majority of grants flow through these organizations, as 
opposed to directly benefitting organizations headquartered in other countries (Lawrence 
& Mukai, 2010; Needles et al., 2018). Finally, and crucially, the least amount of funding 
supports the poorest countries. Needles and her co-authors (2018), for example, find that 
between 2011 and 2015, 16.7% of international giving by U.S. foundations supported 
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beneficiaries in low income countries, whereas two-thirds of giving funded beneficiaries 
in lower-middle and upper-middle income countries. Because only certain organizations 
in certain countries benefit from U.S. foundations’ international grantmaking, these 
patterns warrant closer attention and interrogation: Why are grants dispersed in these 
ways, but not others? 
Methodology 
To investigate how U.S. philanthropic foundations select which places, 
populations, and projects to support amid myriad global challenges, I employed two 
primary methods of data collection: First, semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 
philanthropic foundation representatives and others within the international grantmaking 
field, which took place between March 2017 and January 2018; and second, participant 
observation at several conferences and gatherings for international grantmakers during 
the Spring and Summer of 2017. I also drew upon foundation documents and reports, 
advice for grantmakers, and secondary research to triangulate my findings. I 
acknowledge that the scope of the research is wider than comparable studies because I 
maintain a focus on the entire international grantmaking field and not a subset within it, 
whether a handful of donors, a particular policy arena (Tompkins-Strang, 2016), or a 
narrower substantive focus (Bartley, 2007). This is because I am interested in the full 
expanse of the field and the boundaries that extend beyond and across individual 
substantive issue areas and geographic concentrations. 
As noted, sociological scholarship has consistently demonstrated that 
philanthropic grantmaking and charitable giving are not simply matters of actors’ 
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altruism, but also of their social setting (Barman, 2007; Healy, 2006). This data collection 
strategy thus approaches the field of international grantmaking through a Bourdieusian 
analytical lens, which allows me to interrogate to what extent, and how, philanthropic 
actors operate in relation to one another in pursuit of a particular form of capital 
(Bourdieu, 2005; Emirbayer, 1997), meaningful only in the context of a given field 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), in addition to how organizations distinguish themselves 
from their peers through their actions and assertions (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). An 
illustrative example asserting the importance of this relational approach to organizational 
behavior is as follows: using the example of a corporation’s charitable gift, Emirbayer 
and Johnson (2008) write, “This position-taking – not only the fact of donation, but the 
fact of donation to this rather than that cause – cannot be grasped in its meaning except 
with reference to the corporation’s position and trajectory in its organizational field” (p. 
15). Endeavoring to understanding the boundaries of the international grantmaking field, 
its central players, and how actors within it behave in relation to one another thus 
informed my data collection and analytical approach.  
 
In-Depth Interviews 
First, I conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with more than 70 
respondents representing a variety of positions, activities, and perspectives within the 
international grantmaking field (see Table I for a categorization) to gather data “not only, 
or primarily, about behavior, but also about representations, classification systems, 
boundary work, identity, imagined realties and cultural ideals, as well as emotional 
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states” (Lamont & Swidler, 2014, p. 157). This field includes program officers, program 
directors, and grants managers7 of foundations (independent and endowed, corporate, and 
government) and program officers and executive directors of public charities – 
organizations akin to the Global Fund for Women, Human Rights Watch, or the World 
Wildlife Fund – that receive funding from private foundations and either re-grant it to 
smaller organizations or operate their own programs located abroad. Because public 
charities are not constrained by the same IRS regulations facing private foundations (New 
York Community Trust, 2002), they have significantly more leeway and freedom in 
selecting funding recipients. Public charities are equipped to channel funding overseas to 
a range of recipients and so can provide access to those recipients that funders may not 
otherwise have because of IRS restrictions and administrative costs (this is explored in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters). When possible, I spoke with higher-ups within 
each organization, who serve as relevant experts, especially knowledgeable about their 
particular organizations (Weiss, 1994). For foundations, these were often longtime, 
experienced program officers who knew the field of international giving, as well as their 
foundation’s grantmaking background, intimately.  
The field also includes representatives of affinity groups, organized around 
particular substantive issue areas or regions, in which funders strategize with and learn 
from one another (Soskis & Katz, 2016), and representatives of infrastructure 
                                                        
7 These roles vary somewhat across foundations, but largely in name only. Those on the program side of 
foundations typically manage grantmaking around certain issues, engage with prospective and existing 
grantees, and evaluate the progress of grantees. Program directors have a slightly higher authority (usually 
to recommend budget allocations across programs), but typically perform many of the same duties as an 
officer. Grants managers perform similar duties to program officers, but typically focus more explicitly on 
the processing and reporting aspects of grantmaking (Philanthropy New York, 2018). 
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organizations or trade associations (Hall, 2004) that offer various resources to 
grantmakers, from conferences, webinars, and maps tracing philanthropic funding flows 
globally to acting as a collective voice representing the philanthropic sector (Kuttab, 
Ibrahim & Monteiro, 2013). Other organizations are service providers, such as those that 
make the IRS-mandated equivalency determinations on behalf of private American 
foundations. In this model, foundations pay a flat fee for the determination process, for 
which the organization will collect the necessary information from the potential grant 
recipient and assess its equivalency to a U.S. 501(c)(3) non-profit organization. Some 
organizations combine this service with the actual transfer of funds across borders 
(Benjamin & Quigley, 2010).  
I also spoke with consultants and advisors who provide a range of services to 
individual philanthropists, private foundations, and corporate grantmakers. This can 
include providing landscape analyses of different funding areas or geographic regions, 
finding (“sourcing,” as it is often called) organizations for foundations to support, or 
brokering relationships between foundations and other stake-holding actors. In addition, I 
conducted several interviews with government and multi-lateral actors promoting 
philanthropy’s role in achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN 
SDGs), a global agenda supporting the eradication of poverty and a multitude of other 
development initiatives. Within and across each set of actors are different positions 
within the field of international grantmaking; as constitutive of the field, all bear on 
foundations’ decision-making processes and their approaches to maximizing impact.  
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Type of Respondent Interviews  Conducted 
Foundation 
(program officers, program 
directors, or strategists) 
Independent 14 
Government 2 
Corporate 4 
Community 1 
Operating 1 
Public charity  
(program officer or executive director) 8 
Affinity group  
(director or researcher) 5 
Infrastructure organization  
(director or researcher) 9 
Consultant/advisor 16 
Service provider 10 
Government or multi-lateral representative 3 
Total 73 
Table 1. Distribution of Respondents. 
There are multiple types of foundations that exist and with whom I spoke. Most 
common among these (representing 14 of these 22 respondents) are private, endowed 
foundations who possess permanent endowments,8 pursue broad missions, and undertake 
grantmaking activities (Leat, 2016; Prewitt, 2006; Reich, 2016). Relative to corporate 
foundations (four in my sample) and government-funded donors (two in my sample), 
these institutions have the greatest independence and autonomy to pursue their 
grantmaking agendas (Leat, 2016), and they are frequently characterized as highly 
formalized and rationalized (Gronbjerg et al., 2000), though this is true of most large 
organizations in the sector (Frumkin, 1999). I also conducted interviews with 
representatives of two other types of foundations: a large, well known operating 
foundation, a type of philanthropic entity that operates its own programs and activities 
(similar to public charities) but is generally treated as a private foundation; and a 
                                                        
8 Two respondents represent foundations whose endowments do not exist in perpetuity and are instead 
“spent down” over a period of years or decades. 
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community foundation, a form of foundation that makes grants in support of its 
geographic area, but also increasingly houses donor-advised funds (Madoff, 2016) 
through which wealthy individuals can hold assets and exercise discretion in where their 
funds go (as opposed to setting up charitable vehicles themselves). 
 Respondents were located through various channels, first through the means of 
purposive sampling, and later, through snowball sampling (Neuman, 2011). In treating 
the field as my object of analysis, I sought interviews with representatives of the most 
influential philanthropic institutions, those whose activities help define field-level 
practices and “rules of the game” (Bourdieu, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacqant, 1992) and 
whose assets afford them more influence on the global stage (Vogel, 2010). As such, I 
began by interviewing philanthropic consultants and other intermediary actors, whose 
names and contact information I located online. For program officers, I began with lists 
drawn from three Foundation Center reports (Foundation Center, 2008; Lawrence & 
Mukai 2010; Mukai, 2012) that indicated the top 15 to 25 internationally grantmaking 
U.S. foundations (see Table 2 for a combined list, as well as figures on their international 
grantmaking). Of the 30 foundations represented across the three lists, I conducted 
interviews with representatives of 12, including some featured in all three rankings.  
I identified the most relevant actors (such as program officers that fund 
international or global causes or other actors that work with or advise international 
grantmakers) at each institution and contacted several via email. However, as I attended 
the conferences described below, met additional actors within the field, and legitimized 
myself to others (Weiss, 1994), a number of respondents directed me to other actors to 
  
 
43 
interview. I remain indebted and grateful to the assistance of respondents without whose 
help I would have been unable to conduct as many rich, informative, and insightful 
interviews as I did. 
  20069 200810 201011 
Foundation Type 
Amount 
of Int’l 
Giving 
($ 
Millions) 
# Int’l 
Grants 
Made 
Amount 
of Int’l 
Giving 
($ 
Millions) 
# Int’l 
Grants 
Made 
Amount 
of Int’l 
Giving 
($ 
Millions) 
# Int’l 
Grants 
Made 
Alcoa Foundation Corporate 15.6 268 -- -- -- -- 
Annenberg Foundation Independent 23 78 -- -- -- -- 
Bloomberg Family 
Foundation 
Independent -- -- -- -- 74.5 8 
Carnegie Corporation Independent 36.5 132 58.3 132 40 93 
Citi Foundation Corporate 37.9 492 38 483 -- -- 
DeMoss Foundation Independent 17.6 20 -- -- -- -- 
Ford Foundation Independent 287.3 1,133 282.9 1,233 198.5 821 
Freeman Foundation Independent 31.5 135 -- -- -- -- 
Gates Foundation Independent 1,974.4 225 2,741.7 526 1,646.6 553 
GE Foundation Corporate 15.8 106 -- -- -- -- 
H. G. Buffett 
Foundation 
Independent 19.7 44 38.3 40 62.8 69 
Hansjoerg Wyss 
Foundation 
Independent 22.6 7 -- -- -- -- 
Hewlett Foundation Independent 116.3 221 622.9 246 106.2 155 
Lincy Foundation Independent -- -- 49.9 22 -- -- 
MacArthur Foundation Independent 100 266 102.5 298 78 231 
McKnight Foundation Independent -- -- -- -- 41 100 
Mellon Foundation Independent 32.1 133 60.6 155 41.5 129 
Moore Foundation Independent 105.4 100 115.4 119 46.2 91 
Mott Foundation Independent 25.3 199 -- -- -- -- 
Open Society Institute Operating 20.6 90 -- -- -- -- 
Packard Foundation Independent 57.4 197 112.8 254 94.3 174 
Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund 
Independent 17.9 168 -- -- -- -- 
Rockefeller Foundation Independent 104.3 157 78 181 75.1 213 
S. T. Buffett 
Foundation 
Independent 60.9 37 187 60 97.2 45 
Silicon Valley C. F. Community 26.8 153 45.7 414 33.2 406 
                                                        
9 Foundation Center. (2008). International grantmaking IV: Highlights. New York, NY. 
10 Foundation Center. (2010). International grantmaking update: A snapshot of U.S. foundation trends. New 
York, NY: S. Lawrence & R. Mukai. 
11 Foundation Center. (2012). International grantmaking update: A snapshot of U.S. foundation trends. New 
York, NY: R. Mukai. 
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Starr Foundation Independent 88.2 76 -- -- -- -- 
Turner Global 
Foundation 
Independent -- -- 50 2 -- -- 
W. K. Kellogg 
Foundation 
Independent 74.3 202 -- -- -- -- 
Walton Family 
Foundation 
Independent -- -- -- -- 130 19 
Weinberg Foundation Independent 29.5 44 -- -- -- -- 
Table 2. Top 30 U.S. International Grantmakers 
 My focus on philanthropic foundations (particularly large, independent, and 
endowed foundations) seeks to fill a notable gap in the literature by investigating their 
decision-making processes. In contrast to the idiosyncratic preferences of individual 
donors, philanthropic foundations must navigate a range of institutional and 
environmental complexities (Spires, 2011) that render their grantmaking tasks 
challenging. In addition, a common refrain echoing across the philanthropic sector (and 
communicated to me on many occasions) is, “If you’ve seen one foundation, you’ve seen 
one foundation.” In light of the general assumption that each foundation is unique (e.g., 
Fleishman, 2007; Ylvisaker, 1987), I have sought to draw patterns across swaths of 
foundations, which I believe I have done so in the pages to follow. 
Because respondents were located all over the United States, geographic and 
logistical constraints limited the number of interviews I conducted in person, so I relied 
on the telephone or Skype, both increasingly common forms of communication in 
qualitative data collection (e.g., Oelberger, 2016) and the “next best thing” to face to face 
interviews (Weiss, 1994, p. 59). Interviewed ranged from 30 to 90 minutes (typically 60 
to 90 minutes for foundation actors, and 30 to 60 minutes for others) and were transcribed 
shortly after being conducted. Respondents were provided with a consent script in 
accordance with IRB protocol, which, in addition to describing the broader aims of my 
  
 
45 
dissertation project, also detailed the confidentiality and anonymity I guaranteed to 
respondents (a strategy that has proven effective for others; e.g., Tompkins-Stange, 
2016). Many respondents were relieved to know their identities and the organizations 
they represent would not be made known.12 
I have sought to honor this condition throughout the dissertation by providing 
relatively vague information about respondents and choosing to describe only their role 
within an organization and the type, size, and geographic region where they are located 
(e.g., Delfin & Tang, 2006). Neither respondents nor the organizations for whom they 
work are named in this dissertation, as I have sought to protect the identities of actors in 
an often contested and heavily critiqued field. While this renders the field analysis 
presented in the chapters to follow more difficult, divulging more information about 
respondents and their organizations (for instance, its program areas or geographic 
concentrations) risks the anonymity I have afforded my respondents.  
Gaining access to members of the philanthropic field can be difficult, as others 
have noted (e.g., Magat, 1999; Oelberger, 2016), reflecting longstanding critiques of 
foundations as lacking transparency, accountability, or a willingness to subject 
themselves to scrutiny (Frumkin, 2004; Hall, 2006). However, I found that many 
philanthropic actors were both quite willing to speak with me and forthcoming in their 
responses. (Guaranteeing confidentiality and anonymity undoubtedly helped facilitate 
this result.) As Tompkins-Stange (2016) similarly observes, respondents were 
                                                        
12 In general, this proved to be an effective strategy. However, one interview fell through over anonymity 
concerns and another took place off the record.  
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delightfully frank because interview questions afforded them the opportunity to ponder 
the details of their work and reflect on the challenges and joys of membership in the 
philanthropic sector. Though interviews with representatives of private, endowed 
foundations, as well as elite consulting firms, were more difficult to secure, conference 
attendance helped pave the way; it was much easier to follow up with respondents via 
email after we had met and exchanged business cards in person. 
These semi-structured, in-depth interviews provide the ideal means of acquiring 
the understandings and perspectives of respondents and gathering information relating to 
particular events or processes (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). I employed a flexible interview 
schedule (see Appendix I) to gather responses about considerations surrounding resource 
allocation (how grantmaking strategy is set, what characterizes an appropriate strategy or 
issue to pursue, how grantee organizations are located and evaluated, etc.), probing 
answers when necessary. In addition, I enquired about the enjoyable and difficult aspects 
of respondents’ positions, how they perceived themselves in relation to other funders, 
how they responded to critiques of foundations, and the role they envisioned for 
themselves in addressing global challenges. After several initial analyses, I sometimes 
emailed respondents to follow up on points of confusion or insufficient information. Most 
responded promptly and thoughtfully to my additional requests. It is worth noting, too, 
that because philanthropic priorities and programs change, the data from these interviews 
capture grantmaking decisions about certain issue areas and geographies at a particular 
point in time and so may not reflect current considerations for some foundations.  
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Participant Observation 
Second, I conducted participant observation at three conferences for grantmakers 
within the international grantmaking field: one large, general conference for foundations 
of all kinds, which contained substantial programming for international grantmakers; one 
small workshop specifically designed for practitioners of international grantmaking; and 
one conference for foundations and public charities interested in a particular transnational 
issue area. Grantmaking conferences provide opportunities for private philanthropic 
foundations and public charities to learn about and discuss trends, challenges, and 
strategies with one another. Indeed, a 2017 report by the Hewlett Foundation found that 
83% of foundation respondents used professional conferences as their primary means of 
sourcing information and knowledge (Edge Research & Harder+Company, 2017; Soskis 
& Katz, 2016). Conferences typically feature speakers addressing pertinent issues with 
ample time for input and contributions from audience members.  
These three conferences, in particular, appeared most topically relevant to my 
investigation. To be sure, I also took advantage of discounts for students and volunteers 
when available because these spaces are otherwise quite exclusive. For example, the 
largest conference offered a $250 fee for students, compared to at least $1,000 for all 
other attendees. For the international grantmaking workshop, an annual event in its 
infancy, there was no established student discount. When I inquired (noting the other 
conference’s discount), the organizers hemmed and hawed for a bit before charging me 
only $250 to attend (I even received my own discount code for registration – 
“EMILY250”), whereas others encountered a fee of nearly $2,000 (which one participant 
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– and later respondent – told me was exceedingly high for the information and quality of 
food provided). I was also asked by one of the organizers to produce a summary report of 
the workshop (which I did), as her request was some variation of, “While we’re happy to 
have you here, we’re wondering if you’d be willing to do something for us.” Finally, the 
last conference I attended, hosted by an affinity group, offered volunteering opportunities 
in exchange for free access to the conference. I helped with set-up and tear-down and 
produced summary reports on several sessions. This provided not only a means of 
engaging with organizers, but also of taking notes without drawing suspicion.  
Most broadly, these sites allowed me to examine the shared understandings and 
“taken-for-granteds,” beliefs, or doxa (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) held by actors in the 
field, as well as the qualities characterizing the field, such as its central players and 
ongoing tensions (Bourdieu, 2005; Krause, 2014). Professional conferences, in particular, 
are useful sites for data collection, as they provide the setting in which collective 
understandings, meanings, and behaviors are debated and disseminated (Garud, 2008; 
Oliver & Montgomery, 2008) and in which new fields emerge (e.g., McInerney, 2008; 
Powell et al., 2017). At each conference, I attended relevant sessions, met numerous 
actors, including prominent philanthropic, government, and corporate actors, and 
recorded content, as well as my thoughts and observations, throughout the day and each 
evening. Having experience in the nonprofit sector, as well as a dissertation topic of great 
interest to this audience, provided a simple means of engaging and building rapport with 
others in these spaces. These conferences have proven invaluable in understanding actors 
in the international grantmaking field, how they operate with and in relation to one 
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another, and what shared meanings circulate in these shared spaces. To be sure, these 
conferences are spaces in which largely elite members of the philanthropic field gather – 
and to which few outsiders have access – and I consequently struggled with the ethical 
dilemma of how much to reveal. (To the extent that conferences or interviews dealt with 
sensitive information, particularly concerning the safety of grantees, I err on the side of 
caution by intentionally revealing little.) 
 
Data Analysis 
In addition, and as a means of triangulating my findings, I collected and reviewed 
innumerable reports about international grantmaking from U.S. philanthropic 
foundations, infrastructure organizations and trade associations, and other observers, as 
well as documents and advice pieces produced for grantmaking audiences, particularly 
those tailored to international grantmakers. After transcribing the majority of my 
interviews (16 of 73 were transcribed by professional transcriptionists), I uploaded all 
data into the data analysis software NVivo. I coded transcripts in a primarily inductive 
manner so as to identify salient themes that emerged across respondents’ answers 
(Becker, 1998; Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Having composed numerous memos throughout 
my data collection and early analysis phases also facilitated this process. However, I 
remained cognizant of the different theoretical frameworks that informed my 
methodology. As such, data analysis was a continual, generative process that entailed 
moving between different theoretical explanations and the data I had gathered 
(Timmermans & Tavory, 2012) and thus included multiple iterations of coding.  
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Dissertation Argument and Outline 
This dissertation calls for a relational theory of philanthropic giving that is 
centered around foundations’ pursuit of impact. Rather than driven by the altruistic or 
self-interested motives of foundation leaders or by mimicking their peers in a context of 
uncertainty, the large, predominantly independent philanthropic foundations in my 
sample share an orientation to the maximization of impact. A focus on impact is not 
necessarily novel, but it has not been advanced as the impetus behind foundations’ 
distribution of philanthropic gifts, nor have scholars interrogated how foundations 
understand it. It is also a relatively recent concept whose salience across the philanthropic 
field can be traced to the notion of strategic philanthropy (Brest & Harvey, 2008) amid 
calls for foundations to make the most of every dollar spent by, among other things, 
funding effective and impactful grantees (Porter & Kramer, 1999). It is now associated 
with actors like the Gates Foundation (Levich, 2015) and a growing subset of millennials 
donors (Goldseker & Moody, 2017), as well as to shifts in philanthropic practices as 
exemplified by philanthropic capitalism (McGoey, 2014) and the California Consensus 
(Edwards, 2009; Morvaridi, 2012).  
The origins of a contemporary philanthropic sector that privileges impact (Lee & 
Nowell, 2015) lie in a wider turn toward measurement and accountability originating in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Lamont, 2012; Woolford & Curran, 2012) that has sought to hold 
the public and nonprofit sectors accountable – by ensuring the efficient and effective use 
of funds – to taxpayers (Barman, 2016a). This “New Public Management” era has 
resulted not only in a collective pursuit to demonstrate impact, but also in the 
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quantification of impact. As such, monitoring and evaluation practices have become 
largely institutionalized across the U.S. nonprofit (Barman & MacIndoe, 2012) and 
international NGO sectors (Elbers & Arts, 2011), as they are increasingly a condition of 
receiving philanthropic funds (Carman, 2009; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Thomson, 2010). 
 For the foundations in my study, impact refers to their desire to create measurable 
social change that does not overlap excessively with existing charitable endeavors. 
Pursuing impact in this way is what shapes their subsequent grantmaking decisions. 
However, the notion of impact is understood and operationalized by foundations only in 
relation to other sets of actors: the agendas of development institutions and foreign 
governments; the presence of potential grantee organizations; and the behavior of peer 
foundations. These sets of actors correspond, respectively, to foundations’ decision-
making processes on macro-, meso-, and micro-level scales, and it is around them that I 
organize the following three empirical chapters. 
 Large American foundations are part of a wider group of “donors,” but they 
envision a unique, innovation-oriented role for themselves across the global development 
landscape that affords them a particular autonomy relative to the state and market. 
Chapter 2 explores how these understandings of perceived autonomy and independence 
render them attractive development partners in the eyes of states and multilaterals 
encouraging foundations’ involvement in the UN Sustainable Development Goals. But 
they also serve as the grounds on which some foundations actively resist working with 
other development actors: in the context of what many view as the “closing space” for 
civil society worldwide, working with others is perceived as “polluting” the autonomy of 
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a field whose existence is designed to hold other societal sectors accountable (including 
foreign governments to their citizenry). Where foundations stand on this issue – by virtue 
of their field position – bears on how they distribute their gifts, as certain funding 
strategies are legitimized while others are not, and so provides a broad orientation to how 
they – through interactions with grantees and other funders – seek to produce impact.  
 Chapter 3 explores how foundations operationalize impact relative to the grantees 
they select to receive funding. They identify and assess potential issue areas to pursue 
and grantees to fund using three salient selection criteria: the presence of areas of need 
(i.e., gaps in funding) where existing charitable activities and levels of funding are not 
too concentrated; geopolitical windows of opportunity and an “enabling environment” for 
civil society organizations that they can support; and a sufficient infrastructure of NGOs 
that can implement foundations’ theories of change. Here, theories of change refer to 
foundations’ understandings of how social change occurs; it is a causal mechanism by 
which certain inputs that they provide are expected to produce a particular set of desired 
outcomes. Foundations target those recipients who provide them with the opportunity to 
carve out a distinct funding niche. But this also means that some areas of high need may 
not receive support – even if their programmatic missions align with foundations – if they 
occupy fields with too much or too little funding, are in countries that constrain civil 
society to a great degree, or where few potential grantees exist to carry out foundations’ 
desired work.  
 Chapter 4, the last empirical chapter, examines how foundations endeavor to 
create impact in how they fund grantees (as opposed to which grantees they fund). 
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Against a backdrop of contentious field-level debate on this subject, foundations’ 
decisions about how to fund their grantees are made in relation to the behavior of their 
philanthropic peers, against which they assess their own grantmaking practices. Many 
foundations in my sample levy scornful critiques against the notion of “donor-driven” 
philanthropy to create impact (in which donors impose their theory of change on 
grantees, fund only short-term projects, and require extensive monitoring and evaluation 
of impact), and instead describe their efforts to listen to and trust grantees and lessen 
burdens placed on them. Yet extending this level of flexibility, though desirable and 
admirable, complicates foundations’ efforts to create unique, measurable social change. 
When coupled with the IRS regulatory and reporting standards to which donors are 
subject, these challenges render foundations’ responsiveness to grantee needs limited, and 
they may struggle to provide the support both they and grantees prefer.  
In the final chapter, I reflect on the theoretical contributions of my findings and 
their insights and implications for the international grantmaking field.  
Throughout each chapter, foundations’ behavior shows itself as driven not – or 
not simply – by altruistic or self-interested motives or by mimicking their peers. Strict 
attention to motives and mimicry fails to conclusively determine how foundations 
distribute their philanthropic gifts. Examining their shared orientation to – and 
operationalization of – impact, however, holds promise for unpacking their resource-
allocation decisions. Thus, to understand how foundations distribute their gifts, scholars 
must attend to the field-level forces that shape giving practices and legitimize particular 
grantmaking approaches but not others. Only by opening the “black box” of philanthropy 
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can we make sense of the unequal allocation of funding and create spaces in which more 
equitable outcomes are possible. I hope my dissertation begins to accomplish this.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
SETTING THE SCENE FOR IMPACT:  
AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
Several years ago, former Rockefeller Foundation President Judith Rodin penned 
a short blogpost entitled “How to maximize impact.” She starts, “When I took the job as 
the President of the Rockefeller Foundation in 2005, philanthropy was facing a kind of 
identity crisis, and had been for awhile.” Noting that “the rules had changed” since the 
Rockefeller Foundation was founded a century prior when “philanthropy was the biggest 
kid on the block,” Rodin (2014) continues: 
But in the mid-20th century the landscape began to shift. Multilateral funders, social 
entrepreneurs, even socially-minded business had joined the businesses of solving social 
and environmental problems. On the whole, this was great news. But philanthropy was 
wondering: where did we fit? Nearly a decade later, and after some soul searching, I 
believe philanthropy has found its identity once again, as a convener, a risk-taker, a 
piloter of good ideas, and a partner in bringing those ideas to scale. 
  
Framed in this way, American philanthropy’s “identity” rests on its ability to create 
impact and maximize the potential of its philanthropic contributions. The pursuit of 
impact represents a shared orientation across the international grantmaking field. If not 
explicitly, it implicitly underlies nearly every conversation between actors in the field and 
nearly every discussion surrounding trends, strategies, and best practices at workshops 
and conferences (e.g., Grady, Ou, & Bellone, 2017; Grady, Ou, Bellone, & Reich, 2018).  
Creating impact, as I argue in this dissertation, relies upon a relational perspective 
of the international grantmaking field, and this chapter examines American foundations 
not only in relation to other global development actors – states, multilateral donors, and 
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development institutions – but also how impact is operationalized through these relations. 
In describing how foundations understand themselves and their potential contribution to 
social change on a global scale, I show how these relational understandings represent the 
first step in maximizing impact because they construct the broader framework within 
which foundations distribute their gifts. Specifically, how foundations understand their 
role is a product of their position within the field of international grantmaking, which is 
shaped by its institutional history and also shapes what approaches these philanthropic 
actors employ in their global pursuits. In subsequent chapters, I describe foundations’ 
decision-making processes on a smaller scale, relative first to potential grantees and, 
later, to their peers. Those decisions are only possible once the broader framework for 
their aspirations in established.  
American foundations supporting international efforts are members of a field 
grappling with anxieties about philanthropic legitimacy, philanthropy’s “added value” 
relative to the state and market, and the sector’s perceived neutrality in contributing to 
global development and humanitarian efforts. Their international grantmaking has 
prompted critiques of foundations as tools of the global hegemonic elite (Levich, 2015; 
Parmar, 2012; Roelofs, 2007) – in line with assumptions of self-interest, as explained in 
the previous chapter – but these critiques have overlooked the self-conception of this 
subset of transnational non-state actors. Such an understanding is crucial to how they 
distribute their philanthropic gifts amid myriad global challenges.  
I begin by reviewing extant literature theorizing this role for donors and then 
describe theoretical understandings of the nonprofit and philanthropic sector in society to 
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set the stage for how American foundations seek to create impact worldwide. My 
findings indicate that philanthropic representatives seek to maintain analytical 
distinctions between foundations, states, and markets; they argue that their self-
conception reflects an innovative spirit as society’s “research and development.” This 
perceived autonomy and independence are qualities that render them attractive 
development partners in the eyes of states and multilaterals, but also serve as the grounds 
on which some contest that involvement as “pollution.” Documenting this tension in 
relation to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a global poverty alleviation 
and development agenda, reveals how perceived identity – by virtue of field position – 
bears on how foundations distribute their gifts by legitimizing certain strategies of 
funding but not others. Ultimately, this understanding is what orients how philanthropic 
actors seek to produce impact.  
Who Are Donors? What Do They Do? 
That donors possess power over donees is well established, reflecting an inherent 
power dynamic between those with – and those in need of – funding (Doerfel et al., 2017; 
Frumkin, 2006; Villanueva, 2018), and one that is particularly acute in the realm of 
global development and humanitarianism (AbouAssi, 2012; Bob, 2010; Meyer, 1995; 
Reith, 2010). But who are donors, and how do they understand their role in these efforts? 
Much extant literature defines donors in exceedingly vague terms, akin to Elbers and 
Arts’ (2011) definition as “those organizations that provide official private development 
funding…[which] includes bi- and multilateral agencies, private aid agencies and 
charitable foundations” (p. 718). Others include non-governmental organizations (e.g., 
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Berthelemy, 2006; Buthe & e Souza, 2012) or “large institutional donors such as major 
foundations and governments” (Bob, 2010, p. 143). Relative to other transnational actors 
in global governance, however, the specific actions and understandings of foundations 
have largely been overlooked (Moran, 2014; Vogel, 2010). Rather, as part of the larger 
category of “donors,” foundations and other funders are typically treated as external 
actors with sets of preferences that funding recipients must satisfy. 
In their respective accounts of the ‘market’ for human rights projects, for 
example, both Bob (2010) and Krause (2014) describe donors in amorphous ways that – 
rightly so – prioritize their identity as holders of the purse strings. At its core, their 
argument is that humanitarian organizations (Krause, 2014) and human rights advocacy 
groups (Bob, 2010) compete with one another for access to the attention and resources of 
donors. Due to “the ubiquity of conflict worldwide [that] creates fierce competition for 
international support…local movements also conform themselves to the needs and 
expectations of potential backers in Western nations” (Bob 2002, p. 37, 40). Here, donors 
are treated as consumers of humanitarian projects at one end of a transaction flow, with 
beneficiaries at the other end, and humanitarian (or other) nongovernmental organizations 
as mediating entities. Apart from this sketch of the global aid chain (Watkins et al., 2012) 
– the many organizations through which funding flows from the global North to South – 
we are otherwise given little sense of who donors are.  
To be sure, Bob (2010) adds some specificity to this question with an example of 
the Ford Foundation’s interest in human rights, which has helped “steer the [human 
rights] movement toward certain goals, rather than others” (p. 143). Yet most accounts 
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“have largely overlooked examining philanthropic foundations as discrete actors in 
international politics and global governance” (Moran, 2014, p. 10). Often, they are 
lumped together with other civil society actors as largely “benign sources of civil society 
funds” (Moran, 2014, p. 10). In this vein, Swidler and Watkins (2017) describe in detail 
the relationships between donors, brokers, and aid recipients in the global HIV/AIDS 
industry, but do not articulate distinctions between or across donors, a category that 
includes bilateral organizations and philanthropic foundations. Even in practice, these 
distinctions remain quite blurred (Lundsgaarde, Funk, Kopyra, Richter, & Steinfeldt, 
2012).  
The issue, however, is that philanthropic actors do not necessarily place 
themselves in the same category as other donors, and conflating this diverse set of 
funders – each with its own resources, institutional histories, and constraints – masks 
important distinctions that bear on resource allocation decisions. Breaking down and 
examining the understandings and actions of one set of donors – in the case of this 
dissertation, American philanthropic foundations – sheds light on this heterogenous 
group and answers Lamont’s (2012) call for sociologists to investigate “the self-concept 
of evaluators” (p. 211). That is to say, how evaluators understand themselves, their role, 
their work, and that which they evaluate, much as she does in her study of professors’ 
deliberations when allocating research funding (Lamont, 2009). Doing so is crucial to this 
analysis because it sheds light on gatekeepers’ decision-making processes and therefore 
understandings of how foundations distribute their gifts on a global scale.  
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The Nonprofit Sector and Foundations 
In the case of philanthropic foundations, which became part of the broader 
nonprofit sector in the U.S. through a classificatory struggle in the 1970s (Barman, 2013), 
a look into their self-conception must start with a brief overview of scholarly 
understandings of America’s nonprofit sector. The nonprofit sector in the U.S. has been 
of great interest to scholars and observers since de Tocqueville’s mid-1800s observations 
(1945), prompting efforts to understand the existence and purpose of a nonprofit sector, 
particularly one as extensive and thriving as in the U.S. Answers to this question are 
multiple (Salamon, 1987) and centered on the failure of states and markets (Young, 
1998a) not only to provide “collective” or “public” goods (those goods and services from 
which everyone benefits and whose use cannot be denied, such as street lights, clean air, 
and public safety), but also those of a certain quality (Young, 1998b). If demand for 
public goods is too low, the market will not provide adequate supply, and if a majority of 
the voting populace forgoes such goods, the government will not provide them for the 
minority. This produces openings for nonprofit organizations to provide higher quality 
public goods because they are perceived as more trustworthy and less exploitative.  
To be sure, America’s extensive nonprofit sector also reflects its distrust of large 
government and aversion to welfare politics: as Karl and Katz (1981, p. 238) note of the 
early 1900s, when institutional philanthropy was still nascent, “a growing consciousness 
of the desirability of national programs of social welfare collided with a general political 
culture which could not accept a national government bent on such reform.” Voluntary 
associations and philanthropic foundations represented private entities with public 
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purposes and so the potential to prevent an overbearing bureaucratic government (Hall, 
2006), much the same way NGOs have carried great appeal in recent decades. Their 
worldwide proliferation in the 1990s has served – in theory, at least – not only to check 
the power of states, but to bypass government bureaucracy and provide services more 
efficiently and effectively than states (Watkins et al., 2012). The nonprofit sector in the 
U.S. and globally remains a distinct societal sphere – a “Third” space – that is ostensibly 
unencumbered by consumer demands and voting majorities. 
Foundations, in particular, are thought to enjoy more freedom and autonomy than 
the state or market, which affords a longer time horizon over which to address challenges. 
As Prewitt (2006, p. 30) notes, “The American foundation, endowed with untaxed private 
wealth, designs grant strategies not governed by election cycles, annual reports to 
stockholders, or short-term bottom line considerations.” While this raises important 
questions about accountability (i.e., to whom are foundations in particular – and the 
nonprofit sector more broadly – accountable if not consumers or the voting public?13), it is 
also called into question empirically. There is, for example, an extensive history of 
government support for the U.S. nonprofit sector (Salamon, 1987), and in recent decades, 
nonprofits have become increasingly commercialized (e.g., Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; 
Maier, Meyer, & Steinbereithner, 2016). Even NGOs abroad face many of the same 
inefficiencies that plague other large organizations (Werker & Ahmed, 2008), suggesting 
their uniqueness is more fiction than fact.  
                                                        
13 Many suggest that communities of beneficiaries targeted for assistance by donors and NGOs ought to be 
the ones holding Third Sector actors accountable (e.g., Ebrahim, 2003; Werker & Ahmed, 2008).   
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For foundations, the societal distinctions are similarly blurred. Foundations’ 
relations to government, in particular, have garnered substantial analytical attention (e.g., 
Frumkin, 2006). Globally, foundations’ autonomy from the U.S. state and other 
development institutions is characterized as “contingent” (Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010, 
p. 213), as the historical overview provided in the previous chapter makes clear. 
Throughout the 20th Century, there have been points of both contention and conversion 
between American foundations’ and the U.S. government’s international engagement. In 
the early days of institutional philanthropy, large U.S. foundations often worked in 
tandem with state efforts abroad, exemplified by Rockefeller’s relief program in Europe 
during World War I (Curti, 1988; Zunz, 2011). Following World War II, their collective 
objective focused on promoting American values abroad and mitigating communist 
sympathies through a variety of educational programs (Arnove, 1980; Berman, 1983; 
Roelofs, 2007). Elite philanthropic and government leaders viewed “as eminently 
appropriate the idea that private institutions could supplement and enhance state capacity 
in addressing international concerns” (Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010, p. 220). In the 1990s, 
the two sectors’ interests were again aligned, as “foundations directed their resources to 
building democratic institutions [in Eastern Europe] while U.S. government funding 
focused on economic restructuring” (Benjamin & Quigley, 2010, p. 252). Philanthropy 
has thus often served as a form of soft power (Stone, 2010) to complement the State 
Department’s agenda. 
At other times, however, the state-foundation relationship has been characterized 
by greater tension – such as when foundations sought to end the nuclear arms race 
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(Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010) – as well as power struggles, as the U.S. government 
became less reliant on large foundations’ funding in expanding its own programming 
overseas. For example, the Ford Foundation’s population programs were “directly 
displaced,” Micinski (2017, p. 1321) suggests, since “President Kennedy drastically 
changed course and began federally funding family planning programs abroad… 
Congress [later] increased the USAID population program budget.” It is in this sense that, 
as Heydemann and Kinsey (2010) contend, “the state is always present, and it bears 
heavily on both what foundations are able to do internationally and how they conduct 
themselves” (p. 213). That is, the U.S. government and philanthropic sector are not nearly 
as delineated in practice as we might otherwise imagine. That their work is shaped in 
relation to states, however, “does not mean they can be reduced to instruments of state 
interests” (Uhlin, 2010, p. 17), which foundations have often sought to ensure (e.g., 
Micinski, 2017).  
Recent empirical work bolsters this claim. American foundations, some find 
(Person et al., 2009; Tremblay-Boire, 2016), distribute their funding internationally in 
ways that parallel the allocation of official U.S. government aid – but not necessarily 
multilateral aid (Foundation Center & Human Rights Funders Network, 2018). That 
countries receiving U.S. ODA are more likely to receive foundations grants, for instance, 
indicates that American foundations frequently play a supplemental role relative to the 
state by providing “private funds on top of USAID assistance when such assistance is 
insufficient” (Tremblay-Boire, 2016, p. 30). These patterns suggest, as historical accounts 
have indicated (Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010; Zunz, 2011), that foundations often exhibit 
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a rather close relationship to the U.S. government, despite the understandings of 
philanthropic actors that prefer more delineated societal spheres.   
Foundations’ Self-Conception 
Innovative Spirit as Society’s “R&D” 
In contrast to extant notions of amorphous donors and the empirical evidence 
questioning the existence of three distinct societal sectors, the representatives of large, 
independent foundations with whom I spoke envision a relatively specific role for 
themselves that guides their grantmaking abroad. Most often, this means defining 
themselves by what they are not. Relative to the state and market, they see themselves as 
the “research and development” component of society. This is an exceedingly common 
refrain among both foundation actors and consultants, suggesting that foundations ought 
to invest in small-scale, experimental projects or under the radar organizations 
approaching issues in new ways. Then, once demonstrated to be effective or impactful, 
foundations expect the private sector, state, or multilateral development institutions such 
as the World Bank to take over funding and “scale up” (i.e., develop and implement on a 
larger scale) an initiative or program. While examples abound (Benjamin & Quigley, 
2010; Fleishman, Kohler, & Schindler, 2007), the oft-cited (and much maligned; e.g., 
Nally & Taylor, 2015) Green Revolution “continues to be referenced as a key example of 
how private funds might be used to achieve big goals” (Moran, 2014, p. 6).  
In this understanding, foundations’ impact can be realized through the process of 
scaling. Says a foundation president: 
We ensure that our programs and projects are demonstrations for others to follow, to 
replicate, and to scale…meaning look at what we’ve done, where we’ve done it, how 
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we’ve done it and go and do it somewhere else…[so] scale to other regions, but also scale 
in terms of getting bigger.  
 
This sentiment is echoed in the response of the director of a U.S. foundation’s Central 
American office: “You support a good idea, you see whether it works and you see 
whether that helps more broadly. And that’s…a big contribution of private donors that 
have the flexibility to be a bit risky or to do things that others might not want to do.” She 
continues, “Some of the interventions certainly will turn out to be really hard to 
determine whether they were effective or not. Or they might be really effective in a 
particular setting but hard to move elsewhere.” In a similar vein, a consultant I 
interviewed who works with a number of well-known foundations notes that philanthropy 
has “that ability to pivot fast, perceive what needs to be done, and either do it 
[themselves] or catalyze some efforts to do it.” Time and again, foundations are 
perceived as highly flexible and agile, something a behemoth government bureaucracy or 
large corporation may be unable to claim.  
That foundations can be flexible lies in the philanthropic sector’s “ability to 
accept risk that, say, a more traditional donor- a government, an institutional donor 
can’t,” suggests one respondent. “So what Rockefeller [or another foundation] can do…is 
try out a whole bunch of ideas and figure out what’s the best one or ones to run with and 
replicate.” It’s the “ability to kind of throw spaghetti at the wall and see what sticks” that 
is the role of philanthropy in this understanding. In fact, this perception of foundations is 
so strongly held by many (though not all) respondents that one former program officer 
states, “If there’s a strong critique of foundations, it’s when they’re not taking those risks, 
when they’re playing it safe, and they’re not serving as the R&D of civil society.” This 
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suggests a normative understanding for foundation behavior, regardless of whether it 
aligns with concrete grantmaking practices.  
Foundations also see themselves as independent actors, autonomous from the 
market and the state (Micinski, 2017), though this autonomy is questioned both 
empirically and theoretically. To what extent can a foundation be truly independent from 
the market if the source of its endowment is the market itself? And how can foundations 
exercise autonomy in grantee selection when the U.S. government and foreign 
governments, as discussed below, impose tax laws and restrictions on who and what is 
funded? Perhaps because of the blurring societal distinctions noted above (e.g., 
Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Maier et al., 2016; McGoey, 2014), representatives of 
foundations, trade associations, and consulting firms assert these analytical distinctions. 
In conversation with a researcher at an infrastructure organization, she notes, “I like 
philanthropy in the sense that it’s not constrained as much [by] bureaucracy as bilateral 
and multilateral organizations, which means it should be more nimble…more responsive 
and more innovative. At least that’s the hope.” Echoing this sentiment, a program officer 
on the East Coast states, “I think [philanthropy] can be creative and untied from market 
and political restrictions, and come up with solutions that government and the private 
sector might not come up with, either because they're not on a political agenda or they're 
not profitable in the moment.” A foundation strategist similarly contends, “because 
[foundations] have a certain level of independence, that’s what allows them to take risks 
and to be innovative and to try things that the government…or that corporations could 
never try and to be able to think long term.” In these statements, respondents reify a sense 
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of sectoral autonomy and independence, which positions them in a particular way relative 
to the state and market such that they are best primed to find and initially support 
approaches to addressing global challenges that promise greatest impact.  
It is not simply this independence, but also a sense of neutrality, that foundations 
and non-foundation respondents alike admire. For example, the vice president of 
programs at a Californian foundation states: 
Unlike government, and especially with all the political constraints, and even unlike the 
marketplace, which is often consumed by short-term returns on investments, philanthropy 
has the ability, the flexibility and the inclination, or should, to think long-term. You 
know, we’re not bound by terms, we’re not bound by returns on the investment, we can 
think in the long-term. 
 
It is worth noting, however, that grant cycles are typically only several years at most, at 
which point foundations will assess whether additional funding is warranted or not (but 
see Grady et al., 2018).  
This affords them a particular “luxury,” as a longtime program officer at a private 
foundation remarks, “of dealing with not only the ‘what if’ – if I fund A, B, C, it will get 
me X, Y, Z…We have the luxury of being able to say, ‘I know that, but this hasn’t been 
tried before. What if we funded D, E, F to get to the end? Or included D, E, F? Or took a 
bet on this?’” A grants manager14 at a smaller, private Californian foundation states, “I 
would say we definitely have a lot more flexibility than the government, and we can be 
more nimble than the government, and sometimes we have the luxury to fail and then to 
try it again in a quick period of time.” These statements, however, reflect a privileged 
                                                        
14 As noted in Chapter 1, a grants manager is a similar position to program officer, but tends to focus more 
explicitly on the processing and reporting aspects of grantmaking (Philanthropy New York, 2018). 
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position and one that continues to hound the philanthropic sector; namely, who are 
foundations to say what should or should not be tried? What constitutes failure? Which 
goals are or are not worthy of pursuit?  
To be sure, these questions do circulate in discussions across the international 
grantmaking field, and my respondents were typically quite cognizant of the relations of 
power in which they and their grantees are embedded, which result largely from unequal 
amounts of financial capital (Chapter 4 discusses this in greater detail). For example, the 
director of an affinity group – not “organized around shared interests,” he states, but 
around “shared values” oriented toward social change – describes the task of 
philanthropy as employing “the enclosed wealth and power in foundations…and 
deploy[ing] them to expand the benefits of this system a bit more widely than they are.” 
As he notes, “philanthropy is itself embedded within processes of extraction. That money 
didn’t come from nowhere. It came from exploiting workers and the environment 
somewhere down the road. Sometimes yesterday. Sometimes a hundred years ago.” That 
is, because the wealth underlying the creation of foundations is itself the product of an 
unequal capitalist system (Tompkins-Stange, 2016), those philanthropic actors 
stewarding such financial prowess carry an obligation, many contend, to employ it 
toward more equitable ends.  
One “comparative advantage” foundations claim to exhibit is a proximity to the 
“ground,” or local communities of beneficiaries, that other institutions do not have and 
that is assumed to improve their work (Ashman, 2001; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004). 
This emphasizes their place on the global aid chain (Watkins et al., 2012) through which 
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aid flows internationally. The aid chain relies heavily upon brokers, employees of NGOs 
typically located overseas, who make connections between actors (Burt, 2004) to enable 
faraway donors to realize their altruistic ambitions (Swidler & Waktins, 2017; Tvedt, 
2006). Often, public charities – which are frequently headquartered in the United States 
with 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status and which channel funds overseas – contain vast 
networks of so called “in-country” consultants or advisors. These individuals mediate 
between the NGOs in the U.S. and smaller, grassroots organizations in their country or 
region. Relative to corporations and large bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, 
foundations either directly – or indirectly, via brokers – draw upon a purported proximity 
to the ultimate beneficiaries of their grants. For example, one representative of a public 
charity says, “what I really value is that being able to [know] what’s going on really 
locally, like sometimes hyper-locally.” A consultant in the Midwest who advises a 
number of large foundations offers praise for their ability to dig deep into important 
issues, noting:  
I know that people and institutions…like USAID…they do their research but they often 
do research on their projects. If it’s a large-scale development program then they’re 
looking more at systems, and they’re still missing what’s close to the ground. If you’re 
really going to try to be helping internationally, unless you really are committed to large-
scale industrial development… [then] how do you get close enough to the ground to 
understand the real dynamics so that your money really makes the biggest difference? 
  
That American foundations may be able to do so renders them uniquely positioned vis-à-
vis other actors to identify and create greater impact. At the same time, as I discuss in 
later chapters, these philanthropic institutions are at times critiqued for not listening to or 
consulting with the local actors whom their funding is intended to benefit (Delfin & 
Tang, 2006; Stuckler, Basu, & McKee, 2011).  
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Relative Resource Constraints 
Foundations, even the largest among them, perceive themselves to be constrained 
by their limited resources – particularly relative to state, federal, and foreign government 
budgets, as well as multilateral and development donors. To the average person, that 
many millions of dollars is considered “limited” is perhaps laughable. To be sure, though, 
this is not simply a perception on foundations’ part: USAID’s annual budget for fiscal 
year 2016 was $27.2 billion, the World Health Organization’s was about $4.4 billion, the 
World Bank made loans of $4.6 billion, and the United Nations Development Program’s 
budget in 2017 clocked in at nearly $5 billion. Meanwhile, large U.S. foundations 
typically make grants totaling in the hundreds of millions each year. The MacArthur 
Foundation, for example, made roughly $250 million in grants last year, while the Ford 
Foundation dispersed about $535 million in grants. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, a 
smaller foundation, made $46 million in grants last year, and many other foundations – 
corporate, independent, or otherwise – fall into the ‘$25 million or less in annual grants’ 
category. Though of course, the largest foundation – Gates – enjoyed a grantmaking 
budget in 2017 on par with the WHO and World Bank, with nearly $4.7 billion awarded 
to grantees.15 Given this reality, foundation representatives recognize that their coffers 
will never equate to those of governments’ or development institutions’, which further 
reinforces their notion of serving as society’s “risk capital,” as foundation representatives 
                                                        
15 Foundations must legally dispense at least 5% of their endowments annually through grantmaking, and 
most choose not to give away any more than this – though they could (Villanueva, 2018).  
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and consultants often refer to it, to fund innovative programs to be taken up by larger 
funders. Their funding tolerates risk because it does not demand a particular return. 
Foundation representatives and consultants alike espouse this sentiment. In 
conversation with two philanthropic consultants at a firm in Philadelphia, one respondent 
notes, “I think we see the role of philanthropic dollars to often fill the gaps where there 
are needs that aren’t currently being supported or funded through government or public 
funding.” And yet, she continues, because governments are better resourced and have a 
broader reach than many foundations, the latter are “able to innovate or pilot or incubate 
certain projects on a smaller scale, and then if those are really effective ways of 
addressing an issue, it gives an opportunity to have the government scale up those 
projects in a later day.” Another philanthropic consultant in Boston echoes this sentiment 
while arguing that it demands attention to how foundations can best “leverage” their 
funds to maximize impact. She explains: 
They have the potential to play this really interesting role...they can fund innovation, or 
they can kind of step in between places...At the same time [philanthropic funding] is a 
drop in the bucket compared to the budgets of these global institutions, the global aids 
budgets, etc. So just thinking about how [funders] can apply those scarce but flexible 
resources with leverage…[to] get to a point of arrival where philanthropy exits and then 
either there’s some innovation that’s able to sustain itself or government funding comes 
in to sustain it or you’ve eradicated something so there’s no more need for funding.  
 
In a similar vein, a longtime program officer notes her foundation’s grantmaking strategy 
around the development of policy, as opposed to service delivery, for which their funds 
are inadequate.  
Sometimes, however, a spirit of innovation cannot outweigh the reality of 
resource constraints. I spoke at length with a former strategist in a large foundation based 
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in New York, which had several in-country offices around the world, some of which have 
closed, while others have opened. When I asked him about what kinds of considerations 
go into closing and opening offices, he gave an example of a Southeast Asia office where 
“we just felt that the issues were too big for us to really have an impact on. These were 
issues that you needed like a World Bank or a big development agency.” Although the 
foundation had invested hundreds of thousands – if not millions – of dollars in that 
country, he characterizes that funding as “literally a drop in the bucket, and I think we 
just felt like, ‘Let’s put that money to work in countries where we felt like a few million 
dollars a year investment could really have [an] impact.’” His statement implies that field 
density – that is, the extent to which a particular substantive issue area or geographic 
region is occupied by other funding agencies – matters, which I explore in much greater 
detail in the Chapter 3. In the meantime, it is worth mentioning that in the particular case 
of an office closing, perhaps the foundation’s efforts were not “scalable,” whereby the 
foreign country’s government or even a large international NGO would adopt its 
programs and diffuse them across a wider scale.  
The issue of relative resource constraints, and the consequent need for 
foundations to “leverage” what funding they do have, is especially salient in light of 
continuing decreases in state spending, a trademark of neoliberalism in which private, 
non-state actors are called upon to provide the goods and services traditionally associated 
with governments (Watkins et al., 2012; Werker & Ahmed, 2008). This includes 
President Trump’s proposed cuts to the State Department and USAID, in response to 
which a program officer at a large foundation on the West Coast opines: 
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I don’t think it’s the role of a foundation to say, “Okay, [these agencies will] get cut by 
20 billion dollars, so all foundations contribute a billion dollars each.”…If that was our 
role, then we’d all run out of money fast, underserved groups may not get funding, and 
our expertise would go to waste. So I think that the role of philanthropy is really to just 
innovate, to draw attention to areas or populations or geographies that are underserved 
and that are just not getting the attention they need, or the funding that they need. 
 
She continues, “We’re never going to have the size [of] funding that governments have, 
and we shouldn’t, but [there] are things that we can do.” At the same time, however, 
another consultant at a prominent advisory firm notes that foundations increasingly do 
step in to fill the gaps:  
Well, right now there’s a certain amount of attention and funneling going into some of 
the places that are gaps in…potential U.S. policy. So some funders who…care about 
issues like reproductive health and particularly women’s issues and environmental issues. 
They’re seeing where there [are] gaps in the priorities of this administration and starting 
to fill [them] in. 
 
This anecdotal evidence suggests foundations are to play a supplementary or 
complementary role (e.g., Tremblay-Boire, 2016), despite their perceived independence 
and autonomy. And representatives of trade associations and infrastructure organizations 
agree, as one notes: 
A lot of what I talk about when we talk about this issue is really the complementarity. 
Even if you just think about the scale of the development, of ODA [Official Development 
Assistance] around the world, and the amount of international giving by U.S. foundations 
or even U.S. and European foundations, there’s no comparison. Gates included, there’s 
no comparison. So philanthropy fills a very specific niche in the international 
development space…being willing to invest and take risks in things that governments 
can’t fund.  
 
In a similar vein, a respondent that advises large foundations recommends they “find and 
fund the creation of innovation” and encourage other actors to “get at the problem 
differently. That can – the endorsement of the World Bank or USAID and I’ve seen it – is 
substantial.”  
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 Maintaining the analytical distinctions between different sectors, claiming a sense 
of autonomy and independence, and emphasizing foundations’ role as society’s “R&D” 
or “risk capital” because they lack the resources of a bilateral donor or multilateral 
development institution that are often necessary in creating widespread change does not 
mean that foundations are averse to working with other actors from other sectors, but it is 
clear that large, independent foundations in the U.S. set themselves apart from these 
actors in multiple ways. This relational understanding of their role in global development 
frames which issues they choose to tackle and in what ways. But the relationship here is 
tenuous. In seeking to produce impact – a unique, measurable contribution to social 
change – foundations are often sensitive to being seen as pawns of others’ agendas. To 
understand why foundations assert their innovativeness, independence, and autonomy, it 
is imperative to examine the perennial questions surroundings the philanthropic sector’s 
legitimacy about both their domestic and international work.  
Philanthropic Legitimacy: Questions and Regulatory Frameworks 
U.S. foundations that grant internationally face persistent questions about the 
legitimacy of their philanthropic gifts abroad. They may have acted in meaningful ways, 
“as first responders, conveners, and social entrepreneurs…[and] institution builders” 
(Benjamin & Quigley, 2010, p. 238), but their international contributions exacerbate the 
tensions about legitimacy, accountability, and authority that they face domestically. 
These questions are significant, as they speak to the power and privilege of foundations 
to define social problems in particular ways and to devise and implement solutions as 
they see appropriate. Precisely because foundations are private entities with a purportedly 
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public purpose, the legitimacy of their grantmaking behavior has been called into 
question since the earliest days of institutional philanthropy (Hall, 2006; Karl & Katz, 
1981; Zunz, 2011).  
For foundations, legitimacy is multifaceted. The notion is widely understood as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 574), and scholars of the philanthropic sector often 
question how legitimacy is not only best defined, but also assessed (Heydemann & 
Toepler, 2006; Prewitt, 2006). Is legitimacy produced through foundations’ maximization 
of resources and the most sizeable contribution to social change? Or does foundations’ 
legitimacy lie in preserving its endowments, so as to address societal challenges 
generation after generation? Should foundations have the privilege to define their 
priorities (they are private entities, after all), or should their tax-exemption render them 
subject to public opinion and input? Foundations’ endowments would otherwise be 
taxable wealth, put to use at the state’s discretion, yet debate continues over the extent to 
which philanthropic entities are (or should be) quasi-public or genuinely private entities 
(Reid, 2018). While the American public typically disregards how private wealth is spent 
(think consumer goods, such as expensive cars and immense mansions), we may consider 
foundation assets qualitatively different – and potentially illegitimate – given their public 
influence (Frumkin, 2006).  
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These many dimensions16 suggest the legitimacy of the U.S. philanthropic sector is 
a product of both legal regulation (that the government grants foundations a legal right to 
operate) and normative standards (that foundation grantmaking is both appropriate and 
fair). Yet competing normative understandings about philanthropy condition alternative 
assessments of legitimacy. For example, foundations that are more “outcome-oriented” 
and seek to achieve policy goals, should be “effective, efficient problem solvers that can 
circumvent bureaucratic blockages and catalyze innovation” (Tompkins-Stange, 2016, p. 
127), whereas “field-oriented” foundations that seek to empower citizens’ democratic 
engagement should focus on encouraging and bolstering political participation. Similarly, 
“the pursuit of legitimacy via efficiency-based measures of accountability,” Heydemann 
and Toepler (2006) write, “may not fit easily with mission-based sources of legitimacy, 
or with the view that foundations exist, in part, to provide an innovation function for 
societies” (p. 17). In other words, how the state and public understand the role of 
philanthropy in society defines the realm of legitimate behavior in which foundations can 
engage. Yet the diversity of these understandings forms a minefield foundations must 
navigate, whether by being more open about their work (Reid, 2018), professionalizing 
their organizations (Frumkin, 1999), evaluating their grantmaking activities to articulate 
their societal contributions (Hall, 2004), or funding institutions whose legitimacy 
foundations may absorb (Aksartova, 2003; Botetzagias & Kourtiva, 2014).  
                                                        
16 Some also suggest the legitimacy of foundations is a product of foundation leaders’ charisma (Adloff, 
2015; Harman, 2016).  
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Even so, “from the perspective of legitimacy,” Prewitt (2006, p. 41) contends, 
“the foundation need not do its job well.” Because foundations are embedded within the 
broader nonprofit sector (Barman, 2013), they are afforded a privileged position by 
association: “The public see foundations much the same way they do the nonprofit sector 
more generally – not always efficient, maybe elitist, sometimes tempted by self-dealing, 
but solidly in the American tradition of using private resources for public benefit” 
(Prewitt, 2006, p. 41). This sectoral position, as illustrated above, is one that foundations 
both reify and extend, by carving out their distinct niche in society, yet it does not render 
them immune to either the continued contestation over philanthropic institutions’ 
legitimacy or the escalating calls for accountability across the public and nonprofit 
sectors (Barman, 2016a; Woolford & Curran, 2013) that I discuss in subsequent chapters.  
To be sure, issues of legitimacy are highly context-specific, such that challenges 
to philanthropic legitimacy will vary across time and space, dependent in part upon the 
types of stakeholders foundations seek to satisfy. For those operating on a global scale, 
Heydemann and Kinsey (2010, p. 16) argue, “legitimacy challenges are transnational. 
The demands of securing the legitimacy of the Ford Foundation’s work in both Israel and 
Palestine differ significantly from the demands it faces in Russia or in South Africa.” In 
other words, the legitimacy of foundations whose grantmaking spans borders stems from 
the question of to whom they are (or should be) accountable, whether to the governments 
of foreign countries in which they make grants, or the communities where their intended 
beneficiaries reside (e.g., Uhlin, 2010). For many U.S. foundations, they are subject to 
multiple mechanisms of accountability from different sets of actors (Ebrahim, 2003; 
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Stuckler et al., 2011), but it is often the foreign governments of countries in which 
grantees work that hold sway in determining whether foundations are granted the 
legitimacy to operate – however directly or indirectly – in their country by erecting 
regulatory statutes that define the parameters of international giving by foreign funders 
(Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire, & Prakash, 2014; Carothers, 2016; Rutzen, 2015). For 
transnational non-state actors, including American foundations, “the state system is the 
defining context” of their work (Uhlin, 2010, p. 17), and it is this system – in which 
geopolitics, legal frameworks, and political developments are embedded – that dictates 
the contours of philanthropic activity.  
To this end, scholars have noted growing constraints on international 
philanthropic activity (Carothers, 2016; Rutzen, 2015) as part of a broader effort to “close 
civil society.” The narrative of reduced civic space circulates widely across the 
international grantmaking field, and I discuss it in greater depth in later chapters. For 
now, it is worth noting that it is qualitatively more severe than it has been in past decades. 
These restrictions target not only domestic nongovernmental organizations, but also the 
foreign foundations that support them (Bloodgood et al., 2014). In Russia, for example, a 
foreign funder must be approved by the government in order to make a tax-exempt grant 
to an organization in that country. It likely goes without saying that no private 
foundations are included on this approved list. In other instances, countries require that 
foreign funding go through government-controlled banks, thus affording governments 
(such as in Uzbekistan and Uganda) the ability to exert control over the inflow of funding 
(Rutzen, 2015). Not only does this throw a wrench into foundations’ grantmaking 
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aspirations, but it significantly hinders the work of “groups working on sensitive topics 
for which domestic funding is scarce, such as human rights advocacy, anti-corruption 
work, or election monitoring” and for whom “external funding can be a lifeline” 
(Carothers, 2016, p. 362-363).  
While rising authoritarian states have captured greatest attention, the United 
States also has a hand in contributing to this so-called “clampdown.” Since the September 
11th terrorist attacks, the U.S. has instituted various protective measures to curtail terrorist 
activity (Benjamin & Quigley, 2010). Former President George W. Bush’s issuance of 
Executive Order 13224 granted greater oversight to the federal government for 
monitoring financial flows to potential terrorist-linked individuals and organizations 
(Ramos, Lyman, Canavan, & Nichols, 2004). The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
an inter-governmental body created in 1989 that promotes policies combatting money 
laundering and terrorist financing (Treasury Department, 2005), has documented various 
cases of nonprofit organization exploitation by terrorist organizations (FATF, 2014). As a 
consequence, program officers and other actors within foundations and public charities 
must conduct adequate due diligence to ensure the political legitimacy of their grantees. 
How this is best achieved was a topic of substantial discussion at several conferences I 
attended, one of which focused exclusively on the mechanisms of international giving, 
whereby foundations were educated about the laws regulating foreign funding and what 
they must do to avoid scrutiny (including checking the names of individuals employed by 
organizations against the terrorist watch list).  
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The U.S. also requires that private foundations abide by IRS regulations for the 
distribution of grants to organizations in other countries. If private foundations in 
America wish to grant directly to an overseas grantee – and, crucially, for that grant to be 
treated as a qualifying distribution (i.e., tax-exempt, according to Internal Revenue Code 
4942, established by the Tax Reform Act of 1969), they must ensure that the grantee is 
the equivalent of a U.S. 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, a procedure set forth in 1992 
(IRS Rev. Proc. 1992; IRC 4942). Their contributions are tax-exempt only if the grant is 
used for charitable purposes by an organization that demonstrates equivalency to a U.S. 
public charity. In 2015, the Department of the Treasury released a set of regulations for 
private foundations to make “good faith determinations,” which rely upon an affidavit of 
the grantee or an opinion of a counsel (typically the foundation’s) to affirm this based on 
the documentation provided by the grantee. In the following chapters, I will discuss the 
implications of these regulatory schemes on foundation behavior and the types of 
grantees and activities funded. For now, laying out the framework within which 
foundations navigate international grantmaking helps situate the following discussion of 
philanthropic legitimacy in relation to the state.   
Precarity As Partners in Development 
The discourse of “cross-sector partnerships” – in which actors across the state, 
private, and civil society sectors join forces to achieve a particular goal – is deafening,17 
circulating at conferences, during interviews, and in philanthropic literature. It is 
                                                        
17 To date, much of the focus on “partnerships” has been between NGOs in the global North and global 
South, rather than across societal sectors (e.g., Ashman, 2001; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004; Fowler, 
1998).  
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impossible to gather knowledge about the field of international grantmaking without 
finding oneself swept up in conversation about the urgent demand for efficient, effective 
partnership to address the myriad global challenges facing the contemporary world. This 
discourse of “partnerships” portrays coordination across donors as not only desirable, but 
necessary (Cornwall & Brock, 2005), and while it is increasingly salient, its underlying 
assumptions have lingered for years below the surface in some grantmaking circles. For 
example, take how the authors of a 2007 California Environmental Associates report 
entitled “Design to win: Philanthropy’s role in the fight against global warming” frame 
the dire circumstances of climate change efforts. “Never before have donors, foundations, 
policymakers and the general public confronted such a complex, far-reaching 
crisis…Global, collective action is paramount. The stakes – and hurdles – could not be 
any higher.” Though more than a decade later, this sentiment looms large over many 
conversations about how foundations should distribute their philanthropic gifts and, 
ultimately, create the largest impact with their funds.  
Historically, foundations have worked in collaboration with other actors in times 
past, both in concert and in contrast to the U.S. government’s international dealings 
(Berman, 1983; Curti, 1988; Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010; Micinski, 2017; Zunz, 2011), 
though increasingly with NGOs as opposed to foreign government bodies (Benjamin & 
Quigley, 2010). What is unique about this discussion now is that state and multilateral 
actors are actively pursuing the support of U.S. foundations, as well as the private sector, 
particularly around the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 
SDGs, part of a larger focus on the ecological and economic sustainability of the 
  
 
82 
development project (McMichael, 2012), are an encompassing global anti-poverty 
agenda, a “development blueprint” (Cornwall & Brock, 2005), adopted in 2015 for all 
nations to achieve by 2030. To meet the SDGs and other development objectives, world 
leaders are pushing a related agenda: “Financing for Development” (FFD). In a MOOC 
on the subject created by the World Bank Group, I was informed about “the increasing 
need for public resources to be used to mobilize and leverage the large and growing pools 
of private finance.” While the FFD agenda primarily targets private sector actors in 
development partnership (to be leveraged by the public sector), it reflects an engagement 
among more and different actors (Zimmerman & Smith, 2011). In this context, 
foundations are encouraged to contribute their unique skillset in support of an 
exceedingly expensive global development agenda (Lundsgaarde et al., 2012; Person et 
al., 2009) that is estimated to cost trillions per year. 
The basic premise of the FFD agenda is that the current funds available for 
achieving the SDGs are woefully inadequate. Increasingly, the private and philanthropic 
sectors are called upon to help make up the difference and address, as a representative of 
a national philanthropic infrastructure describes and as scholars have noted (e.g., 
Srivastava & Oh, 2010), “resource scarcity at all levels within the development 
ecosystem [and] within government ecosystems.” Over the hustle and bustle of a national 
grantmaking conference, I sat down with a researcher from a different infrastructure 
organization, one that provides the foundation sector with access to information and 
knowledge crucial to their grantmaking. She suggests that the FFD conversation “may be 
something that in a little way philanthropy is being forced into.” But, she continues, 
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given the present resource challenges facing those pushing the SDG agenda, “whether 
philanthropy likes it or not, they are part of that financing development conversation. 
And it’s ingrained in the work that they do anyway; it’s just looking at it through a 
slightly different lens.” Indeed, the aforementioned infrastructure organization 
representative mentions her frequent engagement with “actors like the State Department 
or USAID or the World Bank because their programs have an inherent impact on our 
members. [Our members] often work in complementary ways or…are asked to pick up, 
to fill gaps if there are significant funding changes.” In this way, the U.S. philanthropic 
sector is necessarily shaped by ongoing global economic and political dynamics.  
Importantly, the discourse of partnership extends well beyond this material 
dilemma to encompass the pursuit of solutions needed to address the global challenges 
identified in the 17 SDGs. For example, a philanthropic advisor states, “there’s much 
more awareness of trying to come up with cross-sector solutions, so philanthropy can be 
sort of a neutral trust convener to bring together government and the private sector and 
the NGO sector to work on a solution together.” Partnerships are perceived as more 
efficient and effective because they – ideally – prevent redundancy. Says another 
philanthropic advisor, “when [multilaterals and foundations and the private sector] are 
working in isolation, and we’ve seen this before, that there’s a lack of efficiency, there’s 
a duplication of efforts.” The logic is that working in concert has historically proven 
beneficial. As a respondent whose organization helps facilitate cross-sector partnerships 
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states, “when we look at problems like the small pox program,18 when we look 
[historically] at problems that were successfully solved, if we really take those apart, we 
can actually see that there was really complex partnership at the heart of it.”19 Therefore, 
to create and maximize impact, U.S. foundations are to actively enroll themselves in 
cross-sector partnerships if they are willing to walk the talk on instigating global change.  
The resource constraints faced by bilateral and multilateral institutions – a partial 
product of global neoliberal governance (Levich, 2015) – have rendered American 
philanthropic foundations an attractive partner in not only financing a global 
development agenda, but also in crafting and implementing solutions to the challenges 
the agenda seeks to address. As illustrated earlier in this chapter, U.S. foundations exhibit 
an “impartiality, diffidence and non-interventionism [that] are highly valued traits of the 
traditional grant-making foundation” (Moran, 2014, p. 12). That foundations understand 
themselves as independent, autonomous, and innovative actors in the global development 
arena implies a sense of legitimacy – by virtue of their disinterestedness (in other words, 
that their grantmaking is not self-interested or otherwise motivated by organizational 
gain) and their claims of neutrality – that multilateral actors in particular are eager to 
capitalize on. This was quite evident in conversations I had with government and UN 
representatives, as well as at the conferences I attended. At all three sites of ethnographic 
                                                        
18 This respondent became known to me as one of the presenters at the intensive workshop I attended. In 
extolling the value of cross-sector partnerships, she played a grainy, black and white video about small pox 
eradication. Some audience members were rather put off by its content; another attendee I later interviewed 
was dismayed by what she perceived as its condescension and paternalism.  
19 While little empirical work has examined cross-sector or “multi-stakeholder” partnerships, success is 
believed to be a product of the actors involved, the processes by which they abide (e.g., setting goals and 
monitoring progress), and the contexts of the issues to be addressed (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016).  
  
 
85 
observation, I witnessed structured sessions of “selling,” panels and presentations in 
which those affiliated with organizations including the UN, USAID, and others attempted 
to persuade audience members (representatives of American foundations) to join their 
development agenda.  
However, these sales pitches collide with the perceived autonomy that is held dear 
by many foundations representatives I interviewed. This tension is emblematic of 
Bourdieusian fields, which the field of international grantmaking represents. I describe 
the framework of a Bourdieusian analysis in Chapter 1, but here I engage another 
constitutive aspect of such fields: their autonomous poles and their heteronomous poles 
(Bourdieu, 1983; 1996; Speller, 2011). On the “pure” autonomous side is a concentration 
of field-specific resources, with few resources from other fields. In our case, this is 
reflected in the qualities and practices of foundations derived by the forbearers of 
contemporary philanthropy, such as a longstanding commitment to addressing the root 
causes of social ills, the development of deep expertise about a particular issue, humility 
in learning, and long-term investment in grantees as institutions (Adloff, 2015; Anheier & 
Toepler, 1999). When resources from other fields – such as the private sector by what is 
known as philanthropic capitalism or the California Consensus (Edwards, 2009; 
Morvaridi, 2012), in which business principles dictate foundation giving (McGoey, 2014) 
and so privilege project outcomes, short-term results, and “donor-driven” strategies20 – 
enter the philanthropic sector, the field becomes splintered by some members’ aversion to 
                                                        
20 These qualities also characterize some elements of strategic philanthropy (Brest & Harvey, 2008; Porter & 
Kramer, 1999) that I discuss in subsequent chapters.  
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outside influence. In other instances, proximity to the U.S. government – often bolstering 
the indictments of foundations as pawns of U.S. hegemony (Berman, 1983; Levich, 2015; 
Stone, 2010) – can lead foundations away from the public sector, as when the Ford 
Foundation of the 1960s and 1970s feared its international work would become a tool of 
U.S. foreign policy (Micinski, 2017). 
 On the other side of the field is a space governed by the heteronomous principle, 
characterized by greater connections to – and resources from – other fields, be they 
government or business. Philanthropic capitalists, for example, and foundations working 
closely with state bodies are positioned in opposition to their “pure” counterparts. In this 
context, cross-sector arrangements are perceived as “ideologically neutral and 
procedurally effective and efficient” (Srivastava & Oh, 2010, p. 460). Foundations 
operating under this assumption, then, would not bat an eye at collaborating with public 
and private sector actors, but their proximity to other fields can be seen as pollution by 
those positioned near the autonomous pole of the field (Krause, 2014; Speller, 2011).  
In what follows, I analyze the field of international grantmaking through this lens, 
which reveals two sets of foundations with different approaches to supporting global 
development. One set sees itself as a traditional development partner, willing to embrace 
partnerships with American and foreign governments as crucial to maximizing the impact 
of their philanthropic contribution, while another set is reluctant to work alongside these 
actors, favoring instead support for civil society organizations (CSOs) working to hold 
foreign governments accountable to their citizenry. These fissures are clearest in the 
context of the Sustainable Development Goals, and analyzing this tension provides a 
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critical understanding of why foundations distribute their gifts in particular ways but not 
others. How foundations define their role relative to these other actors in global 
development orients them to how their philanthropic impact can be produced and 
maximized.  
 
Philanthropic Actors in Achieving the SDGs 
As noted, there is an active contingent of SDG supporters seeking to enroll 
American philanthropic actors in their global development agenda. To them, the SDGs 
are perceived as exceedingly legitimate: they are universally applicable, a set of 
expectations to which all nations are subject and held accountable. This stands in contrast 
to their predecessor, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were perceived 
by many in the global South (and North) as prescriptive and paternalistic. It is precisely 
this universalism that, supporters argue, infuses the SDGs with legitimacy (Barcena, 
2016). This is particularly so because negotiating the SDGs was an involved, multi-year 
process, the goals for which were borne of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development, known as Rio+20. According to one of my respondents, who had a 
prominent role in the U.S. side of SDG negotiations, the discussions unfolded first across 
many informal groups of several countries, and then coalesced in formal inter-
governmental negotiations throughout 2015. Some input from the private and civil 
society sectors was solicitated, and a handful of foundations in the U.S. kept a close eye 
on the emergent development agenda. Several of those foundations have provided 
funding for various aspects of the SDG agenda, from the SDG Philanthropy Platform, 
  
 
88 
which urges foundations globally to connect their work to the Goals, to netFWD, a 
network of foundations advocating for greater dialogue between foundations and 
governments (one may read their “Guidelines for effective philanthropic engagement” to 
sharpen their negotiating skills).  
There is an ongoing, concerted effort to encourage foundations to frame their 
grantmaking around the SDGs. If, for example, your foundation boasts programmatic 
specialty in women’s rights, perhaps consider how your grantmaking can contribute to 
the targets embodied in Goal 5: “Achieve gender equality and empower all women and 
girls.” Each target, nested within each of the 17 Goals, links to indicator(s) to ensure 
outcomes are assessed and measurable progress is made. “Selling” the SDGs was the 
subject of a panel I attended at a large, national grantmaking conference in the Spring of 
2017, in which corporate philanthropic funders and a representative from the UN 
Foundation sought to enroll foundations in the SDG pursuit. The panel focused on how 
the impact of philanthropic activity can not only be maximized and sustained, but also 
given credibility and recognition, when aligned with the Goals. One panelist, a high-
ranking corporate foundation leader, went so far as to call the SDGs a “new social 
compact for humanity,” contending that the Goals “offer a North Star” toward which 
actors across sectors can pursue development objectives in an environment of uncertainty 
and change. In other words, they offer “a feeling of togetherness and purposefulness, of a 
visionary goal toward which to strive,” as Cornwall and Brock (2005, p. 1055) write of 
their predecessor, the MDGs.  
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These foundations represent one group of philanthropic actors that view 
“international development cooperation” (Fejerskov, 2015) through partnerships with 
other development actors as not only preferable, but necessary to maximize their impact 
globally. They count private, independent foundations among their ranks, but also 
corporate foundations, as well (which already draw upon the capital of the private sector), 
and they pride themselves on “their ability to foster collaboration among diverse publics” 
(Delfin & Tang, 2006, p. 421). Because of their proximity to other actors and sectors – 
the UN, USAID, and foreign governments, as well as the private sector with respect to 
corporate funders – these foundations occupy space governed by a heteronomous 
principle. They remain receptive to state and multilateral encouragement for them to join 
the SDGs because it affords them legitimacy “through [foundations’] problem-solving 
capacity and ability to deliver public goods that states [have] failed to provide” (Vogel, 
2010, p. 68). The aforementioned respondent who aided negotiations recognizes the 
increasingly explicit focus on fostering cross-sectoral partnerships: 
One of the main…strategic pushes we made as an administration in…getting outcomes at 
the scale that we wanted was to push on partnerships with the private sector…to bring 
other partners to the table and for new ideas and innovations and also to leverage our 
funds to the extent possible…Philanthropy was an important part and an important 
element of that particular strategy. 
 
In other words, to achieve the large-scale development outcomes outlined by the SDGs, it 
was (and is still) necessary to entice others in creating substantial changes worldwide.  
U.S. foundations are thus crucial components of facilitating global development 
outcomes because they are seen as contributing “added value to what others are already 
doing,” as a prominent philanthropic consultant and former foundation program officer 
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states, such as by supporting innovation, filling gaps in government support, or “calling 
attention to those who are not getting the deal they deserve from society.” Encouraging 
these actors to engage in such partnerships is framed in foundations’ best interest and 
under the umbrella of maximizing impact. For example, a multilateral institution 
representative suggests, “if a foundation has an appetite and an aspiration to effect a 
systemic change, then collaboration with the traditional development actors, governments 
and so forth, is indispensable.” An advisor at a prominent philanthropic consulting firm 
echoes this sentiment, describing the “independent streak in the philanthropy sector,” 
such that foundations display an aversion to funding in accordance with an overarching 
framework. Others suggest their aversion stems from excessive ego. While “it’s their 
right” to do so, this consultant and others say, “I think the pity of that is they’re going to 
have less impact if they go it alone.” 
Some foundations have very much taken this sentiment to heart, recognizing the 
limitations of working in isolation (or “silos,” in the sector’s jargon). Fejerskov (2015) 
notes, for instance, that Melinda Gates herself has acknowledged the Gates Foundation’s 
reluctance to work alongside other actors in its earlier days, only later realizing the 
importance of partnerships. In this case, it was because “foundation leadership perceived 
of the MDGs as fundamentally constraining towards the organization’s grant-making and 
strategic ambitions” (p. 1105). That the Gates Foundation ultimately embraced 
partnerships, says one philanthropic consultant who works with large, independent 
foundations, was a “game changer” because “they’ve been able to pressure and 
incentivize governments in different ways and put certain conditions on their funding to 
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get governments to adopt policies and even procedures that they feel like need to be 
adopted.” This allows the Foundation to further the outcomes of its grantmaking.  
Impact through isolation is largely frowned upon by this group of foundations, as 
well as by consultants, state, and multilateral actors. As the former SDG negotiator notes: 
Part of U.S. philanthropy’s main strategy is around sort of engaging in partner[ship]s, 
especially when they’re funding globally, to be engaging with governments…I think they 
think that government leadership is what’s necessary to continue to sustain whatever 
impact that they have seeded through what their funding is. 
 
Echoing this sentiment, a leader in the UN division spearheading the enrollment effort, 
discusses “selling” the SDGs as a matter of maximizing impact, which she understands as 
what many foundations typically set out to do. Because of this, she says, “we say 
collaboration does leverage resources and it maximizes impact, or at least enlarges 
impact.” For this institution, philanthropy not only brings additional resources to bear, 
but also an attractive partnership for other sectors (who also have desired resources). 
Because the underlying assumption of the SDGs is that coordination is the most 
efficient and effective way to enact change, it is imperative that philanthropic actors 
coordinate with existing development efforts within the countries they fund. “If I’m a 
foundation and I want to fund family planning in a country, that’s great,” notes the UN 
representative, “but if these efforts are not linked to local indigenous democratic 
institutions, it’s not supervised by parliamentarians, that’s not so good because this 
funding is outside of the political conversations,” and therefore less sustainable. She 
contends that funding without collaboration with in-country governments “creates a lot of 
duplications; it creates very often [a] lack of sustainability.” Foundations should research 
and connect their grantmaking to other countries’ national development plans. Which 
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Goals are those countries pursuing? How can foundations link their work more closely to 
those Goals to increase their impact? This can prove challenging, as some of my 
respondents noted, if the countries where they work have not been explicit or 
forthcoming about which SDGs they are pursuing and in what ways.  
Nonetheless, asking these questions is what many philanthropic advisors and 
consultants recommend of their clients. One Boston-based advisor contends “It’s really 
important to be working together with the [foreign] government and having their 
coordinated efforts…[for] a long-term impact that is part of the system.” Another 
consultant, one representing a different firm with expertise in cross-sector partnerships, 
describes working with a large, independent foundation to “look at who are the 
stakeholders locally in a specific country that they need to engage with…Who are the 
organizations and the players within the [foreign government] who are already doing this 
work?” Once that understanding is achieved, the question becomes, “then how can we 
support and engage them in more kind of effectively implementing the strategies that 
they’ve come up with?” This inquiry – embodied in organizational practices such as 
“landscape analysis” that are detailed in the coming chapters – allows foundations to 
understand where their grantmaking and programmatic expertise fit into institutionalized 
development frameworks and, ultimately, where their impact can be maximized.  
This endeavor is illustrated in an interview, from which I quote at some length, 
with the vice president of programs at a private foundation in California. He remains a 
staunch advocate of philanthropy’s role in achieving the SDGs and strongly encourages 
his peer foundations to work toward the same ends. (I sat a few seats away from him at 
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the panel described above in which corporate foundation and UN actors made their pitch 
to foundations; he nodded emphatically in agreement with presenters for the session’s 
duration.) As he explains:  
Just to give you an indication of how significant those Goals are to helping leverage what 
we do, and give greater focus and potentially impact [to] what we do, the sixth Goal is 
universal access to safe water and sanitation by 2030…Just to dramatize how important 
having that overarching vision, the government [of a particular African country]…still 
doesn’t have universal access to safe water and they’re nowhere close to having universal 
access to sanitation in their country, yet we’ve been investing there for [decades]. Now, 
that country has committed itself…to achieving Sustainable Development Goals. I’ll be 
meeting with the water minister [where] we’re saying, “We will work with you, and we 
realize – and pardon the labored metaphor – we may be only a drop in the bucket in this 
pursuit. The fact is that we want to be a part of your overarching vision.” 
 
In a similar vein, I spoke with other foundation representations for whom governments 
and development agencies are implementing partners, working with foundations that 
have aligned their grantmaking within a broader framework. This is how and why such 
foundations pursue what are seen as indispensable partnerships.  
In other instances, receiving the support of foreign governments is what the 
success of certain grantmaking programs hinges upon. Says one grants manager at a 
smaller private foundation based in California, “We don’t want to go into a country 
unless there is key buy-in from the high levels of government.” Foreign governments can 
also provide the funds to “scale up” projects or even sustain ongoing projects and so can 
be crucial actors in ensuring the maximal impact of foundations projects. Working with 
governments is thus critical, according to these funders, to further their impact. But, as 
one program officer, representing a foundation on the West Coast that does engage 
government actors, notes, “Many other foundations…very explicitly do not work with or 
want to work with government.” In her foundation’s case, they are sufficiently well 
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known so as to have access to some higher level actors within the global development 
field, and they take advantage of that position to further their grantmaking goals. In 
contrast, she notes, “there are a lot of other foundations who, either as a matter of 
principal, won’t do that, or they don’t have the access to do that, or don’t have the interest 
to do that.” Her sentiment reflects the foundation’s location, along with many others, near 
the heteronomous pole of the international grantmaking field, where collaboration with 
non-foundation actors is not only of interest, but actively cultivated. As a colleague of 
hers noted – a panelist on a session discussing the changing geopolitical contexts of 
international grantmaking at a conference I attended several months prior – their 
foundation encouraged grantees to reframe their work in relation to national security, 
acquiescing to the Trump Administration’s relentless focus on it.  
Often, as well, grantees of foundations maintain or forge relationships with the 
governments in their countries. One respondent whom I interviewed had spent his career 
as a program officer for a private foundation in New York. He travelled the world over 
the decades and committed his time and effort – and the foundation’s money – to 
supporting the work of grantees. During our conversation, he mentions that sometimes 
his grantees, particularly those in Eastern Europe, requested his presence at discussions 
with the government. He happily obliged, but reflects feeling “a certain caution because 
we were foreigners. Having said that, there were many challenges that we face[d] that 
were tough because the governments were the problem.” Yet it was still a means of 
influencing policymaking abroad and assisting grantees.  
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Policymakers in both the U.S. and foreign countries are the target of some 
grantmaking activities, as well. Though foundations cannot engage in political lobbying 
or in supporting election campaigns – doing so jeopardizes their 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
status – they can support grantees working to influence policy around particular 
substantive issues, which a number of respondents described doing. Many representatives 
of public charities with whom I spoke employ a similar strategy, whereby they extend the 
impact of their work by gathering research and data about the beneficiaries of their 
programs to inform decision-making within governments or, for example, the UN. For 
these organizations, publicizing issues and helping pass legislation relevant to their 
beneficiaries are considered important victories (Watkins et al., 2012).  
In response to heightened expectations for the philanthropic sector in helping 
foreign governments and multilateral development institutions achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals, a cadre of prominent private foundations in the U.S. have responded 
favorably, ready to contribute their innovative spirit and to employ their neutrality by 
bringing diverse actors to the negotiating table. While corporate foundations have jumped 
on the bandwagon more recently, many private foundations – such as those supporting 
the online platforms for SDG engagement – have long seen themselves as more 
traditional development partners. This set of foundations may still emphasize its 
independence and autonomy, but these are traits brought to bear on their international 
giving as a means of maximizing their potential impact. Positioned near the 
heteronomous pole of the international grantmaking field, this group draws upon its 
proximity to states and markets (particularly so for corporate foundations) to further its 
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grantmaking goals. How these foundations see themselves and understand their role in 
global development, then, provides an overarching framework for how they distribute 
their gifts. In this case, it means they are more likely to work in coordination with the 
U.S. government, organizations like USAID and the UN, and foreign governments as 
each pursues their own ends toward a collective development agenda. They may orient 
their giving to align with other countries’ national development plans, for example, or 
work with large development institutions to implement programs abroad.  
 
Maintaining Autonomy and Holding Governments Accountable 
In stark contrast to this group of foundations is a second set that similarly asserts 
its independence and autonomy, not as a means of justifying collaboration in cross-sector 
partnerships, but rather as the precise reason such partnerships should be avoided or, at 
least, approached with great caution. This group of philanthropic actors sits closest to the 
autonomous pole of the international grantmaking field, where there is little “pollution” 
from other sectors. Here, the autonomous pole reflects a sense of purity, such that 
foundation representatives pride themselves on a grantmaking approach inspired by the 
earliest U.S. philanthropists. This is constituted by efforts to learn, understand, and target 
the root causes of social ills, as well as by listening closely to the needs and ideas of 
grantees (I discuss these strategies in later chapters). Rather than fund short-term, results-
oriented projects, funders invested for long periods of time to build and strengthen 
institutions (Adloff, 2015; Zunz, 2011). The purity of their philanthropic practice 
necessarily rests upon the institutional history of the field and on the nonprofit sectors’ 
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(analytical) distinction from the public and private sectors, such that foundations are fully 
independent actors, not beholden to the whims of politicians or the profit-seeking aims of 
corporations. They are instead disinterested and autonomous entities designed, as they 
see it, to support other organizations in the civil society sector (Stacey & Aksartova, 
2002) and thus practice a form of “social movement philanthropy” (Jenkins, 1998) by 
promoting the interests and inclusion of marginalized and underrepresented voices.  
As such, these philanthropic institutions exhibit a fundamental aversion to 
working with or alongside the same global development actors with whom their 
counterparts positioned near the heteronomous pole actively cultivate collaborative 
relationships. Collaborating with state or large multilateral actors is perceived as 
polluting the purity of their disinterested stance; doing so can afford foundations a sense 
of power (Roelofs, 2007) that this group is not only cognizant of, but also cautious about 
wielding. More so, this set of foundations recognizes that any proximity to the U.S. 
government can threaten its credibility and reputation, as those development actors are 
sometimes seen as the source of the very marginalization foundations seek to address. 
Such a sentiment is clearly illustrated in my conversation with a program officer at a New 
York-based private foundation. When I inquired about his thoughts on the role of 
American foundations in global development, he states:  
If you are going to be really working in these contexts in Africa and Middle East and so 
on, you have to ensure that you are pretty independent from the state. That you are not an 
instrument or extension of the mission of the U.S. State Department. Because you will 
have no credibility…I’m not saying…you should not accept support from USAID or the 
State Department, but you hope foundations’ agendas are not identical to [those 
actors’]…So I think you have to worry about and safeguard your autonomy and your 
independence…[because your] legitimacy depends on demonstrating that you are not part 
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of some state agenda or, for that matter, corporate agenda…You have to be clear why 
you are in particular countries in the global South. 
 
His statement suggests that proximity to government risks foundations’ valued and 
valuable independence and autonomy (e.g., Micinski, 2017). Echoing his critique of 
development agencies’ motives is the director of a Midwest-based philanthropic 
infrastructure association, who bemoans that “a government development agency kind of 
carries with it whatever baggage, for better or for worse, that the government that they 
represent carries with them.” This “baggage,” then, is similarly carried by U.S. 
foundations, even if, as a longtime program officer states, “private foundations have the 
ability to not be beholden to a particular government.”  
Comprising the qualities of independence and autonomy not only jeopardizes 
their global work – particularly by being seen as handmaids to U.S. foreign policy, for 
which large American foundations have previously come under attack (Arnove, 1980; 
Berman, 1983) – but also complicates the efficacy of state and multilateral efforts to 
enroll U.S. foundations in working toward the Sustainable Development Goals. This is 
also in part because the SDGs, despite rhetoric boasting their universality and legitimacy 
(Barcena, 2016), maintain geopolitical “business as usual.” The “values-based” affinity 
group director mentioned above tells me he encourages the group’s philanthropic 
members to “think about and plan for and move towards a deeper systemic change than 
an international development agenda really allows for” and to “advance an alternative 
philanthropy” not based upon an extractive colonial history (Villanueva, 2018). One 
would be hard-pressed to disrupt vested interests in reifying global economic and 
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political arrangements by peddling collaboration and participating in cross-sector 
partnerships.  
Because public charities possess diversified funding streams (whereas private 
foundations draw only from their endowment), they frequently receive funding not only 
from private foundations, but also from the U.S. government and foreign governments. 
One representative I spoke with notes receiving funding from various European 
development institutions, but, she stresses, “We don’t take money from the U.S. 
government.” For other foundations with whom I spoke, which are themselves U.S. 
government agencies (and so receive the bulk of their funding from Congress), they may 
sit closer to the heteronomous pole in the international grantmaking field, but they 
sometimes wish for additional autonomy when proximity to the U.S. government risks 
compromising their relationship with grantees. For example, Trump announced the 
“global gag rule” shortly after taking office in 2016; because the policy bans the use of 
federal dollars for abortion-related activities, it required the such foundation to sever its 
relationships with grantees engaged in that area. 
This set of foundations is, to varying degrees of reluctance, against the Trump 
Administration. The particular character of American politics in this historical moment 
presents something of a dilemma for these funders. On the one hand, they share a distaste 
for America’s current leader and the global ramifications of his rhetoric and behavior. On 
the other hand, their faith in the liberal world order endures. Whereas Trump has 
threatened withdrawing (or actually withdrawn) from multilateral agreements like the 
Paris Agreement or from membership in UN bodies like the Human Rights Council, these 
  
 
100 
foundations maintain the benefit of these global frameworks and the liberal values 
contained therein. As a veteran program officer at a private foundation in the Midwest 
states, “Whereas our current president- sorry, I can’t avoid not being political here. 
Cutting foreign aid, which in itself is, okay, that’s money, but also retreating from things 
like democracy matters, human rights matters.” What then for the role of U.S. 
foundations? “Foundations,” he continues, “can be one of those things that say, ‘No. 
America really does stand for these values, even though our government seems to be- our 
executive branch is signaling otherwise.’” In this way, that foundations maintain their 
independence and autonomy from the state can enrich the impact they hope to have 
globally.  
This impact is primarily realized through their funding for CSOs worldwide 
whose activities include grassroots activism.21 That these institutional funders understand 
their role as disinterested (i.e., not motivated by organizational self-interest) and 
autonomous frames their work; they seek to create spaces for similar types of 
organizations to flourish on a global scale, particularly those organizations engaged in 
advocacy and rights work to hold their governments accountable. In this way, “By giving 
resources to social movement organizations that represent the underrepresented and 
promote broader citizen participation, these foundations are seen as creating a more open 
and democratic political and social system” (Jenkins, 1998, p. 206). This is certainly how 
                                                        
21 Amid a wider turn toward local development (Mohan & Stokke, 2000; van Billerbeck, 2017), in which 
power and resources are cultivated among local civil society actors, this approach to “participatory 
development” is organic, in that it is led by local activists seeking social change. In contrast, induced 
participation is, to a greater extent, imposed through large-scale efforts to engineer participation at the local 
level (Mansuri & Rao, 2013).  
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they see themselves, and while this ambition is institutionalized in the mission of some 
private foundations and public charities, it extends well beyond them, echoed repeatedly 
in my conversations with respondents and reflective of the notion that legitimacy is 
continuously cultivated through the communities that foundations support (Gronbjerg, 
2006; Seibert, 2017). Thus, funding the nongovernmental and civil society sectors in 
other countries, one retired program officer states, “can really help encourage 
government to do things that the governments don’t necessarily do enough of.” Says 
another veteran program officer of a smaller foundation in New York, philanthropic 
support from the U.S. is “very important for strengthening democracy in countries where 
there may not be an opposition party or helping local press or local advocacy 
organizations or citizen groups to try to hold their government accountable.” Critics, 
however, argue U.S. foundations’ support for civil society (particularly at the grassroots 
level) promotes their professionalization and the of moderation of social movements 
(Jenkins, 1998; Stacey & Aksartova, 2002), thereby decreasing their radical change 
agendas that may threaten existing global power relations. But for respondents, only by 
maintaining a critical distance from other actors can American foundations serve their 
intended purpose across the global development landscape. This purpose – their 
normative understanding of their role as governed by an autonomous principle of 
disinterestedness – is to serve as a counterweight to state and market power. As one 
respondent representing a large, globe-spanning foundation states, “the value added of 
foundations is to be able to support sort of initiatives which are controversial, which may 
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be groundbreaking.” To work within state-led development agendas (including the 
SDGs) stands at odds with this understanding.  
While the Trump era has sounded alarm bells across the international 
grantmaking field, his brand of populism and nationalism is an outgrowth of rising anti-
globalism on a much wider scale. This trend increases the urgency of foundations’ work 
and, many respondents feel, the importance of their existence. The aforementioned retried 
program office notes, “with the way governments are functioning all over the world, it is 
really important to have respected, honest institutions like foundations…they have to be 
encouraged and supported and more of them created just for healthy, open societies to 
flourish.” In his reasoning, the philanthropic sector’s autonomy – which has, of course, 
been called into question many times – is something to be preserved and defended, as 
well as employed to stem the rising tide of authoritarianism.  
 One way in which their task is rendered difficult is by the tightening restrictions 
foreign governments place on funding from other countries, as well as the “clampdown” 
on civil society organizations worldwide (Carothers, 2016; Rutzen, 2015). As noted 
above, restrictions on foreign funding (including from U.S. foundations) have increased 
in recent years, and they bear significantly on how foundations fund organizations in 
other countries. NGOs and CSOs working on issues critical of their governments are 
frequently the target of these restrictions, and the narrowing space in which they are 
permitted to operate is what motivates the work of many respondents with whom I spoke.  
 To this end, many private foundations and public charities feel compelled to 
support grassroots organizations for whom their funding is vital (Carothers, 2016) and to 
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elevate the voices of the marginalized. In conversation with one public charity program 
officer, she first mentions her reservations about philanthropy stepping up its funding to 
assume more of what have traditionally been governments’ responsibilities, and then 
discusses her concern about the rise of nationalist and populist governments, contending, 
“I think now it’s even more pertinent that foundations think about the grassroots than 
ever because it’s really the grassroots that are mobilizing to address some of the injustice 
of these populist governments.” A representative of a funders’ affinity group echoes her 
concern, suggesting the importance of foundations “supporting organizations maybe to 
build up their capacity, supporting advocacy campaigns that will ensure more 
consultative processes on a higher level…trying to craft a system in which affected 
communities will have a voice.” These statements indicate a fervent belief in the need for 
foundations to help curtail what they see as the problematic power of foreign 
governments.22 
 These foundations’ focus on civil society is both a partial product of, as well as a 
reason for governments’ restrictions on their international giving. I interviewed a research 
expert on this subject, who reflects on the motivations of other countries: “We started to 
see greater restrictions on cross-border philanthropy…sometimes in the name of 
development effectiveness, that [governments] didn’t want these freelancing foundations 
and donors to be funding what they think the development priorities are.” Governments 
are essentially asserting their sovereignty over development in their country; to the extent 
                                                        
22 This is somewhat true to philanthropists’ form. As discussed in Chapter 1, the earliest foundations 
emerged in part as a means of curtailing the power and reach of the U.S. government during the 
Progressive Era (Karl & Katz, 1981).   
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this occurs in practice reflects decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) between their 
commitment to the SDGs and actual development activities. Yet the goals for instituting 
funding restrictions vary across governments. In one panel I observed, entitled 
“International grantmaking in the Trump era,” at the national grantmaking conference I 
attended, a legal scholar described how China, for example, is molding civil society as 
much as it is curtailing it. He elaborated on this point in his presentation at a different 
conference I attended several months later. There, he described how things like service 
provision (of education, of food, etc.) are acceptable, but advocacy or support for 
dissidents, for instance, are not. These kinds of restrictions on philanthropic activity 
frustrate foundations, but they also motivate their continued efforts.  
At the “Trump era” session, an organizer asked the audience if it felt “chilled” 
making grants internationally, given emboldened regulatory frameworks. One-third of the 
audience raised its hand. In this instance and others, members of the field noted the 
challenges of their work, but also the importance of the funding U.S. foundations provide 
organizations around the world whose efforts to improve their communities and create 
social change warrant sustained philanthropic support. As a respondent representing a 
large operating foundation contends, “for some foundations there will be a need to, if 
they’re committed to still supporting independent civil society…to really rethink the 
approaches and how, and the types of organizations which they’re working with.”  
Against this backdrop, how are foundations to proceed while keeping their 
autonomy and independence intact? The aforementioned researcher offers some ideas, 
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some of which may pull foundations closer to the heteronomous pole than they may 
prefer. One might imagine that, as a foundation, he suggests:  
You want to be engaged in X country, and it’s a really, really complex country and the 
government has the right to throw you out because you’re a foreign organization. And 
your staff and your board and your partners say, “Stay, we want you to stay in this 
country.” And you realize, maybe your best approach is to lay low. You know, be friends 
with the government. Or if you’re not friends with them…I guess that would be two 
things: one is lay low, keep a low profile, the other is you can have a profile but just…on 
things you think the government likes. 
  
This is a strategy, of course, but one that somewhat constrains foundations’ giving, as it 
requires abiding by governments’ (perhaps unjustified) wishes and so threatens their 
autonomy and independence. 
 In various panels at the national conference for grantmakers, foundation 
representatives grappled with whether and how to revise their grantmaking strategies, in 
response to both these kinds of restrictions, as well as to Trump’s presidency, which 
began only several months prior. For large, private foundations working internationally, 
geopolitical changes necessarily affect their grantmaking operations, whether in the form 
of shifting their priorities, altering how their work is framed, or creating different 
environments in which they fund. (In the following chapter, I illustrate in greater detail 
how this guides the distribution of their gifts.) One panel addressing this topic featured 
high-level decision-makers of private foundations, one of whom provided several 
examples of how her foundation was navigating the changing contexts of where they 
work. In its grantmaking to Eastern Europe, for example, they are providing greater 
support to build democratic institutions and curtail growing Russian influence. She and 
other panelists encouraged peers to support local foundations within different countries, 
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thus situating her foundation near the autonomous pole of the field. Working closely with 
local civil society represented not only the role of U.S. foundations abroad, but also the 
means by which funders can employ their autonomy and independence to productive 
ends. To these foundations, the value of philanthropy’s disinterestedness and distinction 
is not what renders it a suitable development partner, but rather that which holds other 
development actors accountable.  
 To be sure, however, some philanthropic actors contend that American 
foundations can (and should) do both: collaborate with large-scale development 
institutions and foreign governments, while also keeping those foreign governments 
accountable to their citizenry. I did not speak with many respondents who maintained this 
middle ground. One, however, the aforementioned vice president of programs in 
California, mentions this:   
Not to get too political, but when you look at climate change, and you look at the 
questioning of [the] Paris [Agreement], and you look at the claims of norms, values, 
principals that I believe are imbued in the Sustainable Development Goals…Who’s going 
to be the custodian that oversees, that speaks out on these universal norms, values and 
principles that we should all aspire to achieve? I think philanthropy, in the absence of any 
state-led leadership. Even if state-led leadership was there, philanthropy should still have 
been in position to complement and reinforce it. 
 
But, he continues, “philanthropy may even have a bigger role, to empower civil society 
and other actors who can take up the mantle of these very important norms, values and 
principles that are being eroded before our very eyes.” As members of an empowered 
civil society, American foundations near the autonomous pole of the field therefore 
understand their role in global development as emboldening actors within civil societies 
worldwide.  
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Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
Though large American philanthropic foundations have seen their international 
grantmaking scrutinized by critics imputing philanthropy as an exercise in the 
reproduction of class-based hegemonic arrangements (Levich, 2015; Parmar, 2012; 
Roelofs, 2007), there has been scant attention paid to their self-conception as evaluators 
(Lamont, 2012) of grantmaking strategies, causes, and organizations. Myriad works 
examine the roles, legitimacy, and consequences of transnational actors in global 
governance and development (e.g., Erman & Uhlin, 2010), but philanthropic foundations 
in the U.S. are often afforded only a cursory glance – a small subset of more influential 
actors, such as multilaterals and international NGOs, which have received more sustained 
scholarly analysis (Moran, 2014). Yet the American philanthropic sector carries a 
particular institutional history and faces relative resource constraints compared to these 
other subgroups. How these actors understand themselves in this setting bears greatly on 
how they distribute their philanthropic gifts and can enhance scholarly understandings of 
the global development and aid landscape.  
This chapter has sought to investigate how foundations see themselves as non-
state actors in the realm of global development, but also as actors whose work is 
necessarily conditioned by geopolitical tensions and regulated by legal frameworks in the 
U.S. and elsewhere. Foundation representatives characterize themselves and the 
philanthropic sector as marked by an innovative spirit, distinct from (and so 
unencumbered by the associated pressures and mechanisms of accountability that govern) 
the state and private sector. They draw distinctions between themselves and other actors 
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that are frequently bundled together in wide-ranging discussions of “donors” in the global 
aid chain (Watkins et al., 2012). These distinctions are important, however, because they 
help illuminate the context of foundations’ grantmaking decisions. In particular, painting 
themselves in a largely disinterested, autonomous, and independent light partially 
accounts for why they are seen as attractive development partners to work alongside the 
United Nations and foreign governments; they are perceived as possessing a certain 
legitimacy that other entities seek. Yet there is a precarity to foundations’ legitimacy, and 
where they are positioned in the field provides insight into how they broach the question 
of legitimacy and the appropriate measures to enhance it. In the context of the SDGs 
specifically, and development partnerships more broadly, two sides to American 
foundations’ international engagement become evident in a field governed by both 
autonomous (“pure”) and heteronomous (“polluted”) principles (Bourdieu, 1983; 1996; 
Speller, 2011). While one set of foundations endeavors to work alongside state and 
private sector actors to pursue this UN development agenda, the other seeks to maintain 
its autonomy and independence by serving as a counterweight to state and market power 
through its support for CSOs holding their governments accountable. 
Examining the fissures within the international grantmaking field that have been 
rendered salient as a result of efforts to enroll philanthropic actors in the SDGs indicates 
the diversity of foundation approaches to their international giving. The contestation 
surrounding the SDGs stems largely from questions of philanthropic legitimacy and the 
proper role U.S. foundations should play in supporting efforts to ameliorate suffering. 
What underlies the field is a consensus regarding philanthropy’s role as innovator and as 
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society’s R&D, as well as the shared sense of resource scarcity relative to other 
development actors. But where foundations are located within the field, whether nearer 
the autonomous pole or heteronomous pole, conditions how they distribute their gifts 
worldwide. These positions frame which global challenges to intervene in and which 
approaches – along with which actors to work beside – they pursue in producing impact 
through their grantmaking, as particular strategies are perceived as more legitimate and 
more likely to create impact than others. And yet, regardless of approach, issues 
surrounding the legitimacy of American philanthropic institutions remain, as they 
conceptualize global challenges in particular ways and so allocate their financial 
resources toward certain ends but not others. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MAKING A UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIAL CHANGE: 
OPERATIONALIZING IMPACT THROUGH GRANTEE SELECTION 
Introduction 
Across the field of international grantmaking, representatives of foundations, 
charities, and consulting firms share a commitment, a “tremendous responsibility,” as an 
experienced program officer at a private foundation in New York states, “to make the 
highest and best use of our limited assets” to the benefit of society. This, of course, can 
mean many things to many individuals within and across organizations, but it speaks to 
the commitment to creating impact globally that undergirds the aspirations and 
grantmaking approaches of foundations. In its broadest sense, and that to which members 
of the field collectively aspire, impact is about how much “inputs and outputs have 
actually changed society, creating viable new institutions, generating knowledge, creating 
opportunities, and improving human welfare generally” (Fleishman, 2007, p. 89). In other 
words, it is not simply that foundations distribute their philanthropic gifts in certain ways, 
but that those gifts produce a marked, measurable improvement in the lives of the 
beneficiaries foundations seek to assist.  
In this chapter, I examine how foundations understand and operationalize the 
concept of impact. While the previous chapter explored foundations’ self-concept as a 
product of field position and understandings in relation to other actors across the global 
development landscape, this chapter unpacks the process by which impact is 
operationalized in relation to potential grantmaking opportunities and grantee 
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organizations. Though large independent and corporate foundations occasionally exhibit 
competing understandings about their role in global development (i.e., whether to work in 
concert and collaboration with behemoth development institutions and foreign 
governments or to hold those foreign governments accountable by supporting CSOs), 
they also demonstrate a collective orientation to the production of impact and employ 
shared practices that allow them to identify – within the wider scope of their international 
orientation – how to maximize the outcomes of their contributions.  
Specifically, this assessment is constituted by three evaluative considerations: 
first, identifying issue areas and geographies where additional funding for grantees is 
needed; second, analyzing windows of geopolitical opportunity, as well as constraints, 
that allow funders to support certain grantees but hinder their support of others; and 
finally, ensuring an adequate infrastructure of potential grantees to carry out work in 
particular issue areas or geographies. The practices employed in these considerations 
include landscape analysis, conferring with peers in affinity groups, and extended 
discussions with potential grantees before funding is awarded. That foundations are 
oriented toward impact does not mean they identify and pursue only those opportunities 
that allow them to realize their altruistic missions or their class-bases self-interest. Rather, 
they grapple with how to create positive change for others in ways that produce 
substantive, measurable results but that do not overlap excessively with existing 
grantmaking activities. Unfortunately, some issue areas that reflect high need and align 
with their programmatic missions may not receive funding if they are in fields with too 
much or too little funding, in countries that restrict the workings of civil society, and 
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where few “qualified” NGOs are available and able to carry out foundations’ desired 
work. Examining how foundations evaluate potential grantmaking approaches allows us 
to see how foundations valorize – or add value to – the causes and organizations they 
support, which are not always those of highest need.  
“Impact” in Perspective 
The pursuit of impact has consumed different societal sectors for the past several 
decades. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, the public and nonprofit sectors have been 
subject to new standards of accountability (Woolford & Curran, 2012). In the “New 
Public Management” era of the 1990s, government offices at the federal level faced new 
requirements for planning their work through the Government Performance and Results 
Act of 1993 (implemented in 1997; Barman, 2016a), including the development of 
program goals and performances indicators (Carman, 2009). The resulting focus on 
performance measurement – in which programs are monitored in an ongoing fashion – 
provided a way for governments to “improve cost efficiency and government planning 
but also as a way to demonstrate accountability to external actors” (Barman, 2016a, p. 
45). Accountability and performance management became expected not only of 
government bodies, but also of the public charities that are contracted by the public sector 
(Salamon, 2002). Across both arenas, then, organizations felt pressure to demonstrate 
their (what many see as unique) value to stakeholders by monitoring and measuring the 
outcomes of their work (Flynn & Hodgkinson, 2001).  
Outcome measurement has become the dominant means by which nonprofits 
assess their work, though its implementation varies (Barman & MacIndoe, 2012) and 
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other methods of performance measurement also exist (Lee & Nowell, 2015). It provides 
organizations a way to quantify the impact of their programming and its benefit to clients, 
and it is a “widespread institutional expectation” (Barman & MacIndoe, 2012, p. 77) 
whose presence is often tied to the receipt of funding. Many have argued that funding 
agencies – whether public or philanthropic, such as foundations or the United Way – 
favor nonprofit organizations that practice outcome measurement (Benjamin, 2010; 
Carson, 2000; Thomson, 2010).23 Demands for accountability in this context have 
contributed to a broader professionalization phenomenon in the nonprofit sector (Hwang 
& Powell, 2009). In addition, the focus on measuring outcomes reflects a qualitative shift 
in how evaluations had previously been conducted. Performance would no longer be 
measured through quantitative counts of outputs, annual reports, or in-depth and intensive 
program evaluations; rather, it became a question of financial efficiency and the 
allocation of resources to programs versus organizational overhead expenses (Barman, 
2016a; Barman & MacIndoe, 2012; Lecy & Searing, 2015).  
 Foundations have long engaged in evaluations of their grantees and the effects of 
their grantmaking. Historically, these assessments have provided a way for foundations 
not only to avoid strong government oversight or accusations of tax-avoidance abuses 
(Hall, 2004), but also to legitimize their contributions to society, advance their missions 
(Greenwald, 2013), and assess the quality of the programs they support. As Chelimsky 
(2001, p. 22) contends, “grantee effectiveness contributes heavily to foundation 
                                                        
23 Carman (2009), however, finds that nonprofits receiving funding from the federal government and United 
Way are more likely to engage in performance evaluation and outcome measurement relative to those 
whose funding comes from foundations and lower levels of government.  
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effectiveness.” In the decades since, there have been what Hall (2004, p. 30) calls 
“episodic demands for organizational accountability” on the part of large philanthropic 
foundations, thus rendering efforts to assess the impact of their services and demonstrate 
their value to society more salient at certain times, particularly in recent decades. For 
example, the post-WWII era featured skepticism toward foundations (Brilliant, 2000) and 
so prompted efforts to evaluate their grantmaking. Later, when foundations became part 
of the nonprofit sector in the late 1960s – itself a classificatory struggle (Barman, 2013) – 
they “had enfolded themselves in the warm blanket of public approval enjoyed by other 
charities…[and] no longer felt the need to prove their right to exist” (Hall, 2004, p. 35). 
In the contemporary era, however, foundations find themselves under increased scrutiny 
amid disconcerting concentrations of wealth (Callahan, 2017; Wu, 2018). 
 In recent years, foundations began practicing “strategic philanthropy” (Brest & 
Harvey, 2008), a reflection of the wider turn toward accountability and calls for 
foundations to “create real value for society” by funding effective and impactful grantees 
(Porter & Kramer, 1999, p. 122). Strategic philanthropy espouses the value of 
foundations having clear goals, evidence-based strategies, and a focus on measuring the 
performance of grantees. This approach also calls for “donor-driven” theories of change. 
Theories of change (in nonprofit and philanthropic sector parlance) are causal 
mechanisms by which social change occurs and so define the appropriate means to reach 
a given end (Kim, Lethem, & Lee, 2017). As I discuss later in this chapter, and more 
extensively in the next, there is widespread debate about which actors and organizations – 
in our case, whether nonprofits and NGOs or foundations – should have the capacity to 
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articulate, advocate, and implement their theory of change. To be sure, the notion of 
strategic philanthropy has been critiqued (even Hal Harvey, one of its longest standing 
proponents, issued a mea culpa in 2016 for strategic philanthropy’s role in undercutting 
grantees’ efforts and expertise), yet it remains the dominant approach across the sector 
(see Kania, Kramer, & Russell, 2014).  
Strategic philanthropy ushered in other shifts in philanthropic practice, such as 
those exemplified by the so-called California Consensus, a shared, agreed-upon approach 
to fighting poverty and creating social change as developed by philanthropists whose 
wealth resulted from Silicon Valley start-ups and the dot.com boom (Edwards, 2009; 
Morvaridi, 2012). (Recall from the previous chapter that this private sector influence can 
be seen as “polluting” the philanthropic sphere depending on a foundation’s location 
within the field.) In its application of business principles to the philanthropic sector, 
advocates of strategic philanthropy and the California Consensus exhibit a relentless 
pursuit of impact. This notion of impact, however, is quite narrowly operationalized; it 
relies upon quantitative measures of outcome; efficiency and efficacy of grantees; a short 
time span within which impact should be realized; and – as a product of the 
accountability movement – a preference to fund projects and programs instead of 
organizational overhead (Gregory & Howard, 2009; Lecy & Searing, 2015) or capacity-
building to ensure grantees can effectively serve their communities and targeted 
beneficiaries (Despard, 2017; Spires, 2012). Apart from this, however, little is known 
about how foundations work to operationalize the pursuit of impact. In this chapter and 
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next, my respondents push back on some elements of strategic philanthropy as they 
espouse a broader understanding of the ingredients needed for social change.  
Shared Orientation to the Maximization of Impact 
Following this wider turn in the nonprofit sector, philanthropic foundations 
possess and demonstrate a shared orientation toward impact – what one funder describes 
as her organization’s “true north.” For the foundations in this study, impact is widely 
understood as their unique contribution to a given issue in pursuit of sizable social 
change, or “moving the needle,” as it is often framed by respondents. This suggests that 
the distribution of foundations’ gifts ought to make a positive, measurable difference in 
the world in some capacity. This can mean that foundations narrow the scope of their 
giving to produce more substantial outcomes in fewer areas (Benjamin & Quigley, 2010; 
Krause, 2014), which some of my respondents noted doing: “If we were to consolidate 
and bring more resources to bear on a smaller number of things, could we make a bigger 
difference?” More so, it demonstrates a concern for concentrating resources to produce 
greater outcomes. A foundation president tells me, “that means we have to focus not on 
the inputs or the outputs. It means we have to shift our focus to say, ‘OK, yes we made 
grants. So what we made grants? What were the outcomes of those grants? What was the 
impact of those grants?’” In his understanding, the act of distributing gifts by itself does 
not guarantee the creation of impact, but pursuing impact is what should drive that 
distribution. As Krause (2014, p. 31) notes of the humanitarian NGO workers in her 
study, “The point…is not to spend money as though this was an end in itself. The point 
is, rather, to actually achieve something. It is very hard to argue with that.”   
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The foundation president’s sentiment here is far from unique; rather, it reflects an 
overarching sentiment across the international grantmaking field. In session after session 
at the conferences I attended, and in interview after interview, participants and 
respondents discussed myriad approaches to producing and maximizing impact. Every 
single interview I conducted with representatives of foundations and public charities – 
and a majority of those I conducted overall – featured an overarching concern (largely 
unprompted by me) with the consequences of their funding and how best to maximize 
those effects in a positive way. That the pursuit of impact – to do good with “do good 
money,” as a veteran program officer notes – underlies the collective behavior of the 
international grantmaking sector reflects the extent to which it is taken for granted (that 
is, it reflects the field’s “doxa,” according to Bourdieu, 1977).  
Almost across the board, that philanthropic actors are oriented toward impact is 
largely a product of their perceived resource constraints. As described in the previous 
chapter, even the largest U.S. foundations feel their funding is dwarfed by the budgets of 
multilateral development institutions and state actors. Foundations are acutely aware of 
these relative resource constraints and so demonstrate a certain care with which funding 
is allocated, particularly given the size and scope of pressing global challenges. An 
experienced program officer at a smaller private foundation with a long history of giving 
internationally frames the issue in this way: “We have a limited budget…[it] sounds like 
a lot of money, but it’s actually not, because the problems that we’re working on are 
these really big, complicated problems on a global scale. So we have to try to find the key 
areas where we can try to make a difference.” Others echo the sentiment: “We just don’t 
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have enough money to touch the whole world,” laments a private foundation program 
officer in the Midwest. And a program officer in New York notes, “The needs are always 
greater than the resources that are available.” Underlying the international grantmaking 
field, as these respondents emphasize, is a constant concern about the constraints of 
foundations’ resources. 
What this translates to is a collective focus on maximizing the impact of what 
resources foundations do have. For many foundations, creating impact involves 
identifying, as a veteran program officer explains, “the intersection of where the 
foundation has experience, where the particular program director has added value and 
knowledge, and what the needs are there…to decide on strategies for grantmaking that 
would make the biggest difference.” This requires funders, as one program officer of a 
large West Coast foundation states, to be “very strategic on where you think you can 
unlock a lot more resources based on the tool box that you have, whether it’s money, 
whether it’s your voice, [or] advocacy.” These respondents make clear the profound 
importance of impact to their grantmaking.  
To be sure, the pursuit of impact is perhaps more salient within some foundations 
than others, typically corresponding to a foundation’s status as endowed or not. Endowed 
foundations are designed to exist in perpetuity (Reich, 2016), whereas foundations 
without endowments anticipate operating for a limited number of years and so “spend 
down” their assets more rapidly. A representative of the latter emphasizes in her 
interview that, “We don’t have perpetual assets that could let us exist forever, and so 
there’s always an imminent end date to our work and our resources. So we wanted to 
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make sure that we take advantage of creating a strategy that allows us to make the biggest 
impact in the shortest amount of time.” Though efforts to maximize impact may be felt 
more acutely at a foundation like the one she represents, it remains on the minds of every 
foundation representative with whom I spoke. If it is not a time constraint that incites a 
sense of urgency, it is the magnitude of the social, economic, and environmental 
challenges that foundations endeavor to address (Gelles, 2015).  
In spite of this urgency, however, that foundations perceive their philanthropic 
budgets to be limited means that addressing certain issue areas and geographic regions 
may be beyond the scope of their ability. In a follow up exchange with one veteran 
program officer at a private foundation in the Midwest, he notes that “there are many 
places/countries where we will not be able to go for no other reason than we don’t want 
to stretch the resources too thin so as to not have an impact.” The imperative of impact 
leads foundations to ask a “but for” question, summarized by the director of a U.S. 
foundation’s Central American office:  
The idea is that if it weren’t for [us], if it weren’t for our funds, what would happen? We 
want to make sure that the difference we make, in terms of where the funds are allocated 
and what we put our effort into, is going to make a difference. So that’s the clincher 
question that we ask.  
 
Answering the “but for” question is thus central to foundations’ understanding of how to 
put their funds to best use, and it relies upon a relational approach to their distribution of 
philanthropic gifts.  
In deciding how to distribute these gifts so as to maximize their potential 
contribution to social change, foundations select issue areas and geographic 
concentrations based on three salient processes of evaluation that are made in reference to 
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potential grantees. To be sure, respondents frequently describe the multitude of factors 
that influence their funding decisions. As the director of a corporate foundation notes, for 
example, “[If] all we have is money to bring to the problem, it’s probably not what we 
should address.” Similarly, a corporate foundation strategist states, “[It’s] looking at 
what’s going to differentiate us as a foundation. Looking at where the need is. I mean, it’s 
a combination of things. Looking at where still the need is and where still we can make 
impact.” It is worth noting that these statements alone challenge the notion that motives 
by themselves necessarily determine the distribution of foundation funding. Instead, as I 
describe below, the selection criteria that large, private foundations frequently employ in 
determining how best to maximize the potential impact of their funds are three-fold, as 
they look for: areas in which gaps in needed funding are apparent; windows of 
opportunity for funders to support grantees; and sufficient grantees to carry out social 
change efforts. These organizational practices are processes of evaluation that ultimately 
add value to, and so valorize (Vatin, 2013), particular approaches by supporting certain 
causes and organizations instead of others.  
Identifying Needs and Funding Gaps 
Landscape Analysis 
When large, private foundations are oriented to the pursuit of impact, they must 
examine the broader context of particular issue areas or geographies in which they are 
interested. To do so requires conducting the philanthropic equivalent of a literature 
review, such that one must determine what is known about a given space, who else is 
working within it, and what areas remain unknown or, for foundations, unsupported. A 
  
 
121 
literature review is known among actors in the philanthropic sector as a “landscape 
analysis.” Like any good academic producing knowledge, this relational approach is both 
intuitive and expected. As an experienced program officer states, “I think every 
foundation does this. You see yourself against a community of foundations and you have 
a sense of what foundation tends to fund what thing or tends to fund in what ways.” 
Actively conducting landscape analyses therefore reveals gaps in other actors’ funding 
that, if addressed, could maximize the impact of a single foundation’s support.  
Landscape analysis or “mapping” exercises may be done in-house when program 
officers have expertise in an area of interest (they are often hired because of this area 
expertise; in fact, program directors with whom I spoke often actively cultivate this in-
house expertise24) or through the assistance of philanthropic consultants. One consultant at 
a prominent strategic consulting firm describes the process as “that mapping of what are 
the issues, where are the gaps, and what are the kind of assets, or strengths of the 
organization, whether it’s a corporation or a private funder, and how can they best fill 
those gaps.” In a similar vein, an advisor working primarily with corporate funders 
engages his clients in the same kind of activity, which: 
Helps them make better decisions on when they’re looking at resource allocation around 
the world to see a map of where they have resources on the ground and where the needs 
are and where the overlap is, because again the company can make the biggest impact 
where that overlap exists, where they have the resources on the ground and where the 
needs are.  
 
                                                        
24 A vice president of programs in California, for instance, notes of this active cultivation, “Because of the 
team we have been able to assemble, others in philanthropy have increasingly looked to us for guidance 
on…their grantmaking.” 
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Foundation program officers characterize this approach in much the same way. A 
corporate foundation strategist describes this process as follows: “I’ll look at what’s out 
there in terms of what other organizations are doing, what nonprofits are doing, what 
research has been produced, what research is coming out.” In a similar vein, one longtime 
representative of a large private foundation in New York lauds his foundation’s skill in 
assessing and working within particular strategies by “really honing in on what are some 
core issues in a particular country or region that we can have an impact on and that fall 
within our mission of what we’re trying to accomplish in our program areas?” An 
aforementioned corporate foundation representative describes her foundation’s 
preference for strategies where the company itself “has a lot of leverage.” In examining 
various global challenges, she describes a process where:  
We put the issue in the center, we really try to understand what’s going on, and what are 
the dynamics and solutions. We then put all of the assets as spokes around it to say, 
“Okay, we could do this, we can do this,” and we say, “Would that be enough?” And is 
there a gap that requires philanthropy or can this just be a market solution? And if there’s 
a gap that requires philanthropy…it makes sense for us. 
 
By researching and analyzing all facets of an issue, foundations uncover the potential 
oversights of other funders or areas in which the needs of nongovernmental organizations 
globally may still be unmet. Landscape analyses answer the following questions, as 
outlined by a West Coast-based foundation program officer: “What is the best way for us 
to approach that? Should we even be working in this space, A? B, who else is working in 
this space? How would we be most impactful? How can we make the greatest 
contribution?” Getting the lay of the land, then, reveals potentially promising 
opportunities for maximizing foundations’ impact.  
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However, it is not enough for foundations to understand a particular context and 
unmet needs; in many cases, these philanthropic actors prefer to support grantees 
working on issues that are not heavily supported by foundations’ peers. In addition to 
landscape analyses, foundations learn about what other foundations are doing – and, just 
as importantly, not doing – through membership in affinity groups. These groups may be 
organized around values (as referenced in the previous chapter), but are more frequently 
formed around substantive issue areas or geographic regions. Examples include the 
International Funders for Indigenous Peoples, Grantmakers in Health, and the 
Environmental Grantmakers Association. Affinity groups abound across the 
philanthropic sector, some of which maintain a more international focus than others, and 
some of whose philanthropic membership spans national boundaries (e.g., Worldwide 
Initiatives for Grantmaker Support). These communities facilitate knowledge-sharing 
among foundations, particularly regarding new grantmaking approaches to a given issue 
and potential grantees foundations may wish to support (Edge Research & 
Harder+Company, 2017; Soskis & Katz, 2016).  
In a sense, affinity groups provide a collective landscape analysis. For example, a 
representative of a Californian public charity focused on environmental issues reflects on 
working with a group of major foundations supporting her organization’s work who 
“confidentially gather together and…lay out what they call the ‘funding landscape’ [to] 
try and see who’s making grants for what and where, and then try to coordinate their 
efforts so that there’s not double-funding in some areas, and a gap elsewhere.” Similarly, 
a grants manager of a smaller private foundation also in California states that, while some 
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program areas of the institution “pool our funds together [with other donors] to fund a 
specific project together,” other areas do not. For the latter, networking with others is 
“more of a way to knowledge-share between the foundations, to understand…what 
approaches are working, what we’re doing, and what others are doing, to make sure we 
collaborate and coordinate our resources.” Pooling funding might dilute the impact 
attributable to a single foundation, whereas coordinating resources and approaching 
issues from different, but complementary angles, respondents contend, offer a greater 
chance for producing impact. (This is also a central assumption of the SDGs discussed in 
the previous chapter.) Echoing this sentiment, the director of an affinity group on the East 
Coast describes her organization’s benefit to foundations, which is “to weave the network 
together, to make sure that people are collaborating, not leaving stones unturned, [and] 
not piling all the money into one thing and ignoring a different strategy or initiative.” 
Conducting landscape analyses in-house or with consultants and participating in affinity 
groups thus provide foundations with the opportunity to reduce duplications in 
grantmaking, which is understood as a means of maximizing the impact any one 
foundation endeavors to produce.  
 The presence of affinity groups can also prove beneficial for existing grantees. 
When foundations gather together to share information about grantmaking agendas and 
grantees, it reveals gaps in support for grantees. Says the director of a U.S.-based 
foundation’s in-country office of such gatherings, “this piece of their work is uncovered 
[so] who can cover that?” In other cases, foundations confer directly with grantees to 
determine gaps in funding. A program officer of a corporate foundation describes 
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conversations with current and potential grantees in which the following questions are 
asked: “What are the trends? What is happening? What do you see down the road that 
you want to address and no one’s supporting you to do that?” Surveying a field therefore 
indicates to foundations where additional funding for grantees is needed and how their 
contribution of funding is meaningful not only for specific grantees, but also for the 
broader effort to create impact.  
 
Field Density 
Once foundations understand the landscape (or context) of the issue they are 
interested in addressing, as well as who else is funding or not funding around that topic, 
they consider the density of other actors present in relation to their contribution to 
potential grantees. This assessment is operationalized by preferring grantees working on 
issue areas or in geographies where few other foundations have declared an interest. In 
other words, many foundations display an interest in funding where others are not 
because it allows them to create an outsize impact on the grantees they select for funding 
and the issue areas those grantees are working on.  
There are myriad instances respondents offered that signaled this preference. For 
example, in conversation with the grants manager at a smaller private foundation on the 
West Coast, she mentions not wanting to fund a field “that’s quite vibrant, that has a lot 
of players in [it].” She continues, “we didn't want to play in the field because others have 
already done much work around it.” Similarly, a program officer of a smaller East Coast 
foundation states:  
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We try to co-fund things with other donors. But when we’re choosing a field, we don’t 
want a field which is saturated with donors. So we look for areas where our money will 
make a difference and then we’re trying to encourage other donors to look at those issues 
as well.  
 
The latter’s indication that philanthropic funding can go further when a given area is less 
densely populated with funding speaks to the salience of this consideration and the 
importance of maximizing impact.  
This is frequently the case for very large foundations, as well. During my 
interview with a program officer at one of the largest U.S. foundations, she notes that if 
an area is “pretty saturated,” then “Maybe there’s something that we are involved in 
[that] would tip it over the edge, and maybe we would do that, but it really depends on 
that particular topic, and where we [are] uniquely positioned to contribute.” As a program 
director for a large private foundation in the Midwest asks of grantmaking strategy 
assessments, wherein foundations consider which issue areas to pursue, “Do we have a 
comparative advantage in supporting it? Do we have something distinct to bring to bear 
on that issue?” In this way, foundations first identify a gap and then carve out a distinct 
funding niche in support of a particular topic and the grantees working on it.  
To this end, a Midwest-based program officer with decades of philanthropic 
experience explains his foundation’s shifting focus within an overarching topic. “Not that 
[one issue] isn’t important,” he says. “It’s just that there are a lot of organizations, a lot of 
foundations focusing on that, which is great. But there’s a gap on those who are focusing 
on the [the other issue], we believe.” In this case, identifying a gap in funding provides 
the foundation with the opportunity to contribute uniquely. Much the same way, a 
corporate foundation strategist describes increasing the foundation’s focus toward a new 
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issue “because we felt that there was a gap there. There was not a lot of work being done 
by other foundations. But also because of the need” they had identified. Consistently, 
then, foundations work to reveal – and subsequently fill – gaps in support. An absence of 
support renders their financial contributions “more valuable,” according to a multilateral 
institution representative.  
That the extent to which a field is dense with existing support shapes how 
foundations distribute their gifts is readily apparent when issue areas are either highly 
dense or excessively empty. In either setting, foundations describe their efforts to 
maximize impact as largely futile. Issue areas or geographies in which grantees already 
receive substantial support often lead foundations, notes a researcher at an affinity group, 
to “allocate their resources elsewhere in the field given the number of actors already 
working in that [particular] area.” In other words, if there is already a lot of money 
flowing toward addressing a particular topic, foundations feel their impact would be 
diluted. A representative of a Boston-based philanthropic consulting firm, for instances, 
discusses how a family foundation he works with has shifted its focus because of larger, 
better resourced actors entering their field of interest (see also Heydemann & Kinsey, 
2010; Micinski, 2017): 
When [the foundation] started, not a lot of people were working on family planning and 
reproductive health...And since that time, we’ve got Rockefeller Foundation, we’ve got 
Gates Foundation…who’ve begun to emphasize that. So the role of this…family 
foundation has begun to shift and be more challenging because those are big tidal waves 
of funding initiatives that make [their] money less urgent or strategic.  
 
Echoing this sentiment, a program officer at a private foundation in New York recounts 
previously funding organizations in Eastern Europe and other regions, but with the onset 
  
 
128 
of “other major donors like Soros” working in the same area, the foundation “prioritize[d] 
support in other regions and countries” because “Eastern Europe could be taken care of in 
different ways.” When I asked if it is appealing to fund where others are not, he said no, 
because his foundation currently funds organizations already receiving support from 
other major grantmakers. “But,” he states, “they may be funding in certain areas, while 
[we] are focusing on other areas,” which allows both “complementarity between donors,” 
as well as preservation of his foundation’s unique contribution.  
 Pursuing a unique contribution fosters collaboration with other foundations, but 
primarily when done so in complementary ways. Duplication is highly frowned upon, and 
many respondents reject the notion of a single, even unified approach to targeting a 
particular issue. The director of an affinity group emphasizes that the central issue her 
organization’s philanthropic members address has “different ways to get to [it]” and 
“different things that [it] includes.” In other words, there is an advantage to addressing a 
given challenge from “lots of different, helpful angles,” as she says. Similarly, an 
experienced private foundation program officer states, “…our mission is very specific 
and we live that mission every day in our grantmaking. You might take an organization 
that is dealing with the very same issues we are...but they’re dealing with them in a very 
different way.” Respondents therefore maintain efforts to maximize impact by funding a 
piece of an issue, while other foundations pursue solutions to the same challenges 
through different means or approaches.  
Others have noted the idiosyncratic character of foundation priorities and 
preferences, as well as the occasional instability of program areas (Bob, 2010; Carson, 
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2000). However, shifts in grantmaking strategies are not simply the product of a founder 
or foundation leader changing their mind. Rather, it concerns the dynamism of complex 
global challenges and the support from other funders that those challenges receive.25 A 
public charity representative references “times when we have to say goodbye to some 
[grantee] organization because maybe they’ve gotten really big, and our funding is just a 
drop in the bucket…and better served elsewhere.” In a similar vein, the retired private 
foundation program officer with whom I spoke extensively describes his foundation 
periodically “looking at how things evolved in certain fields in which we were involved 
[which] may be well enough supported now by others or the problems are solved that we 
should look fresh at other challenges.” Thus, as the nature of pressing issues evolves, 
foundations may shift their attention to spaces where their desire to maximize impact is 
more likely to be realized.  
At the other end of the spectrum, where issue areas and geographies receive little 
to no support from other actors, foundations demonstrate a reluctance to distribute their 
funding toward those causes and organizations. A number of consultants and 
representatives of philanthropic trade associations or infrastructure organizations whom I 
interviewed expressed some distress that foundations generally avoid areas of high need, 
despite their rhetorical emphasis on impact. When I sat down with a researcher of a trade 
association at a large national conference I attended in the Spring of 2017, we discussed 
some trends she had observed and the findings from ongoing research that seeks to map 
                                                        
25 In some cases, foundations stay in regions even after other institutions, like USAID, have departed, as in 
the case of South Africa in the 1990s (Stacey & Aksartova, 2002).  
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the global distribution of philanthropic funding. She notes, “There was almost nothing 
going towards Pakistan, which really concerns me...Why isn’t philanthropy playing a role 
there? And there are a very large number of local NGOs and foundations in Pakistan that 
essentially need this support.” This lack of funding reflects how the operationalization of 
impact largely determines who and what is funded, which is not always those in greatest 
need. To this end, a consultant at a prominent philanthropic consulting firm says, “Yemen 
has this enormous crisis. If you really wanted to make a difference, you should put your 
money in Yemen.” The issue, however, is that foundations perceive their resources to 
these geographic regions as stunted by the sheer enormity of challenges and fear their 
contribution would be lost in the chaos.  
In addition, channeling resources into areas where few charitable projects already 
exist can put program officers and directors in a precarious position with higher-ups. A 
program director in the Midwest summarizes this issue: 
If you’re doing something that other funders aren’t doing, you can be challenged…that 
you’re not passing the market test: if nobody else is interested in this, why are we doing 
it? And then if you have other funders doing it with you, [then the question becomes] are 
we being innovative, or are we part of a pack? 
 
Foundations frequently focus on pursuing fields that are satisfactorily dense with existing 
charitable projects and funding for grantees. These are fields that are not so dense with 
resources that their funding won’t have an impact, and yet not so empty as to render their 
philanthropic gifts seemingly inconsequential. 
While the pursuit of impact may orient funders away from areas of high need, it 
also shifts attention from “contribution” to “attribution,” as a foundation president 
contends. In other words, foundations are potentially more interested in being associated 
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with positive impact than the means required to produce said change. To remedy this, he 
suggests, foundations “need to tell everyone else about those organizations [they support] 
so that they can also attract other funding.” And they do. While the following chapter 
deals more explicitly with these different forms of philanthropic support, it is worth 
noting here that numerous respondents discuss supporting grantees “beyond the grant,” as 
a corporate foundation strategist frames it, whether this involves building grantee 
organizational capacity (Barman & MacIndoe, 2012; Despard, 2017), convening grantees 
for discussion, or encouraging other foundations to support existing grantees (Bartley, 
2007; Delfin & Tang, 2006; Porter & Kramer, 1999; Powell et al., 2017).26 The latter 
strategy enables foundations not only to make an initial unique contribution, but also 
magnify their impact. As a retired program officer states, “we may have started a project 
and helped our grantee encourage other foundations to take a look at what these grantees 
and projects were [doing].” In this way, foundations can be both “innovative” and 
encourage others to become “part of a pack.”  
Windows of Opportunities and Geopolitical Constraints 
In addition to assessing the density of support within particular issue areas or 
geographies of interest and identifying other funders’ oversights and gaps in funding, 
foundations examine the broader geopolitical context surrounding that issue or place. 
This is information that landscape analyses provide, but it also draws upon the knowledge 
and networks of program officers and existing grantees with whom foundations work. 
                                                        
26 This is a potentially ineffective tactic, however, as a recent study found that only 22% of foundation 
leaders consider the funding a grantee receives from other donors in deciding whether or not to support the 
organization (Buteau, Charis, & Ilegbusi, 2018).  
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Foundations remain vigilant for two phenomena: first, emerging windows of opportunity 
that will enable them to fund certain causes and organizations and create greater impact; 
and second, burgeoning constraints on civil society organizations that may threaten their 
ability to provide funding for other causes and organizations and so hinder their potential 
impact (Carothers, 2016; Rutzen, 2015). As a veteran program officer explains, the goal 
is to locate critical geographic places “that have a disproportionate impact outside of 
those specific spaces...It could be a country, it could be part of a country or a region. But 
we’re trying to have a global footprint with a modest budget.” Surveying these ongoing 
dynamics and developments shapes how foundations distribute their philanthropic gifts 
because funding grantees in some places promises outsize impact. This also means that 
funding grantees in other places threatens the production of impact. While an 
organization, “may have a great idea,” an experienced program officer in the Midwest 
states, “we may say, ‘Yeah, but it’s just unrealistic’” given “the external conditions” and 
environmental constraints. As illustrated in the previous chapter, geopolitical 
considerations bear greatly on foundations’ allocation of resources; these ever-changing 
dynamics present new governmental and development actors with whom foundations can 
work, as well as new actors about whom some foundations remain wary. 
 
Windows of Opportunity 
On a number of occasions, respondents – primarily from large, independent 
foundations, but also some public charities – described their entry into new grantmaking 
areas to me as a product of foreign governments’ changing policies that created 
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opportunities for them to act. Foundations may already be supporting grantees in a 
particular country, or they may be conducting landscape analyses to identify new 
geographic regions of interest, such as when the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in U.S. 
foundation support for CSOs in Eastern Europe (Aksartova, 2009; Benjamin & Quigley, 
2010). Either way, changes within governments – newly elected political officials, new 
initiatives within government, etc. – provide greater attention to, and so enable greater 
traction for, issues of foundations’ interest.  
The practice of surveying and taking advantage of windows of opportunities by 
funding grantees in those places is perceived as a crucial way of maximizing impact. The 
director of the Central American office of a private U.S. foundation, for example, reflects 
on the decision to open an office in that country: 
We saw an opportunity, an opening [here] toward [a particular issue]…So we started 
developing [that] program for that reason. You could think of it in the parallel way in 
terms of why we worked in [a different issue area here]…a response to an opportunity 
that we saw…because of the interest of the government, at that time…Our entry [here], 
as well as the other countries where we started in that program, had to do with an analysis 
of the country and the opportunities there. 
 
In another case, a foundation’s previous work in an African country paved the way for 
them to seize upon a newly elected official with a relevant political agenda, which the 
program director describes as “a window of opportunity to support big change.” 
Similarly, a public charity representative notes a political development that her 
organization provided funding for grantees to take advantage of. While interviewing a 
longtime employee of a large private, independent foundation, he discusses the 
foundation’s foray into some countries – actions that were shaped, in part, by where the 
foundation felt its resources could create greatest change. The two countries it began 
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supporting were “in huge transition…we felt like we had a real opportunity to help have 
an impact.” In other words, the foundation perceived its resources as most valuable and 
consequential in geographies with windows of opportunity for more substantial change. 
These statements suggest that one way foundations work to operationalize their pursuit of 
impact is to capitalize upon geopolitical developments in order to maximize the social 
change their support for grantees can create. Interestingly, this is often an observation 
made frequently of NGOs, for whom shifts in donor preferences lead to the development 
of new program areas or integrating donor interests into their existing work (AbouAssi, 
2012; Bob, 2010; Elbers & Arts, 2011; Meyer, 1995; Morfit, 2011), but it has not been 
documented for the funders of NGOs.  
 At the same time, changing dynamics within countries where foundations work 
can lead them to focus their attention elsewhere when it appears that windows of 
opportunity are narrowing. This longtime employee also discusses the foundation’s 
retreat from some countries. He describes leaving one country in Southeast Asia while 
entering another, based on, he says:  
very much a sense of where each of those countries were in their evolution…I think we 
felt like [one country] had actually gotten to a point where it was maybe still a developing 
nation, but in some ways it was a much more developed nation than when we first opened 
the office. It had actually come a long way economically and developmentally. 
 
Such changes render foundations’ gifts less urgent, though they do not discount the needs 
foundations may also overlook in the process. This crowding out effect reflects normative 
understandings of the role of the Third Sector: to step in during instances of government 
failure (Salamon, 1987; Young, 1998a), such that foundations no longer feel their 
resources are needed. It also leaves them with different options (and best practices; 
  
 
135 
Gienapp, Reisman, Shorr, & Arbreton, 2017) for discontinuing their support in a 
particular country, whether tying it off after several years or establishing a smaller 
foundation to continue operating for a longer period of time.  
 
Narrowing Opportunities to Support Grantees 
Just as foundations survey opportunities to support grantees in new locations, so 
too do they remain vigilant for government changes that narrow civil society and hinder 
their ability to support some grantees in some places. These constraints on civil society, 
which I introduced in the previous chapter, bear on where foundations fund, which 
grantees they fund, and how they fund those grantees. They “will definitely be a factor 
under consideration” in determining resource allocation, as a Midwest-based program 
officer remarks, as such considerations are situated within “the context of feasibility,” a 
program director describes. It is, of course, not only CSOs abroad that face constraints, 
but also those organizations (including American foundations and public charities) that 
provide them with financial support (Bloodgood et al., 2014; Rutzen, 2015). The very 
existence of some NGOs is threatened when their funding is closely monitored and 
restricted (Carothers, 2016). As such, strengthening regulatory frameworks that govern 
foreign funding and cross-border international grantmaking can limit foundations’ ability 
to distribute their philanthropic gifts in desired ways and so achieve the impact they seek.  
Scholarship tracing the development and extent of restrictions argues the 
phenomenon reflects a rejection of the liberal world order (Bromley, Longhofer, & 
Schofer, 2018), particularly as the constraints are so wide-ranging, from advanced 
government approval for organizations to receive foreign funding (as is the case in 
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Egypt) to limiting how much foreign funding an organization can receive, a restriction 
Ethiopia imposed in 2009 (Rutzen, 2015). In addition to this scholarship, the popular 
press has also taken notice and documented additional efforts to constrain the space in 
which civil society operates. In 2017, for example, two dozen NGOs in India lost their 
licenses required to receive international funding, and thousands more lost theirs by 
failing to renew them. While the government claimed these organizations did not meet 
the legal requirements to operate, NGO leaders said they were not warned that they may 
be violating any law (Doshi, 2016). In Hungary, parliament recently passed a law 
requiring NGOs that receive international funding to register and display (online and in 
publications) receipt of those foreign funds (Economist, 2017; Global Philanthropy 
Project, 2016). Referencing a spokesperson for the German foreign ministry, the 
Economist (2017) writes, “Hungary had joined the rank of countries like Russia and 
China whose governments see NGOs which accept foreign funds as enemies.” Chinese 
law, especially, has proven challenging for foreign NGOs and foundations to navigate. 
That law, in effect since the start of 2017, places foreign organizations under “close 
government scrutiny with stringent registration and reporting requirements and gives the 
police broad powers to question their workers, inspect their offices, look into their 
documents, and even seal off their premises and assets” (Gan, 2017). Needless to say, 
organizations addressing issues surrounding human rights, among other topics, have been 
unable to successfully register (the Gates Foundation, however, has).   
The philanthropic actors with whom I spoke and those in attendance at the various 
conferences I observed are deeply concerned about these developments and lament the 
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consequences of their overseas funding on grantees and for the safety of their grantees 
and other CSOs globally. For example, a program officer of a public charity in the 
Western U.S. that makes grants to organizations overseas notes: 
I would say that there are specific regions within the world where it’s becoming 
extremely difficult to channel money because the governments are targeting local 
organizations that are getting international funding and putting them on anti-government 
target lists basically. 
  
She contends that the central challenge is ensuring the safety of grantees: “That’s a real 
problem because we don’t want to put any group in danger but those are the groups that 
need it the most.” This is an instance in which the pursuit of impact may shift resources 
away from grantees in greatest need to those that are easier to support (Krause, 2014).  
To be sure, there is growing resistance to governments’ restrictions, as myriad 
initiatives by state and non-state actors are attempting to reclaim civic space around the 
world (Baldus, Poppe, & Wolff, 2017), and philanthropic and nonprofit consortia offer 
advice to funders about working strategically within these frameworks (e.g., Global 
Philanthropy Project, 2016; Mendelson, 2015). An aforementioned program officer 
writes in a follow-up email exchange that the oft-described “clampdown” on civil society 
“does not mean that we will absolutely not go where legal environments might be 
somewhat restrictive.” But, he cautions, “certainly we won’t go where they are so 
restrictive as to make it very expensive or legally (or otherwise) risky.” In that case, 
foundations may withdraw their funding if they feel they cannot produce their desired 
change. One private foundation’s grantmaking strategist, for instance, bemoans this 
development in Russia: “Putin and others just made it so difficult for foundations and 
civil society to operate there that it…was just...not worth having to spend all, every day 
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climbing a hill that you never get to the top of,” he chuckled. For many foundations 
(especially those larger, private institutions), these geopolitical considerations factor 
prominently in their resource allocation decision-making. Though some may retreat from 
supporting grantees in certain countries, others opt to channel funding through 
intermediaries. Notes the director of a smaller foundation: 
As the public sector has evolved [in some Asian countries]…we decided not to pursue 
grantmaking in that region anymore [because] we could not comply with the 
government’s financial regulations or carry out the appropriate due diligence on our 
grants. 
 
Though they still support organizations in the region, they work through an intermediary 
better positioned to comply with burgeoning regulatory constraints. Moreover, in other 
cases, foundations draw upon the advice of peers and experts, as well as create work-
arounds to challenge governments through their funding. 
To this end, at each of the conferences I attended, the discourse of closing civic 
space permeated a great many conversations and discussions. Across the three gathering, 
panels featured scholarly experts or experienced practitioners offering insight and advice 
to funders. In one case, the majority of a conference was organized around the topic of 
how best to combat civil society restrictions through support for grantees. Often, this 
centered on the role of foundations in constructing and promoting an “enabling 
environment” for cross-border philanthropy and global civil society; in other words, 
helping to establish and promulgate the regulatory frameworks that facilitate the flow of 
funding across borders. One particular morning session at a large conference in the 
Summer of 2017 sought to enroll foundations in this effort. A spokeswoman for a 
relatively new funders’ initiative representing a collective donor response to civil society 
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restrictions described the group’s purpose to (as jotted down in my fieldnotes) “give 
funders the tools for using their agency to enact change.” Though the details for doing so 
were sparse (the initiative was in its early stages), she emphasized the importance of 
understanding the historical context behind the resurgence of restrictions. Much like 
scholarship attributing the “clampdown” to anti-liberalism and anti-globalism (e.g., 
Bromley et al., 2018), conference panelists and attendees similarly ascribed it to the 
escalating waves of nationalism and anti-imperialism. Framed in this way, authoritarian 
leaders, several speakers at this morning session contended, justify their restrictions 
under the guise of resisting Western influence in domestic affairs.  
At another conference, a two-day symposium designed primarily for international 
grantmaking practitioners, speakers sought to give funders the tools needed to both 
understand and work within constraints on philanthropic giving overseas. The first 
presentation of the morning featured a representative of the organization facilitating this 
intensive workshop who offered a novel approach – a “trial” of his framework – to 
conceptualizing world leaders. After providing a broad historical overview – including 
statistics from the International Center for Non-for-Profit Law, a premiere resource for 
understanding the global legal environment for all things nonprofits, that document more 
than 50 countries having considered or enacted measures to restrict civil society between 
2004 and 2010 and even more since 2012 (Rutzen, 2015) – he introduced his eight 
“regime personality types” and the strategies that funders and grantees might employ in 
each case. The typology ranged from the populist aggressor (in which anything foreign is 
perceived as counterrevolutionary and threatening, and vague laws force nonprofits to 
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pursue conservative, moderated work, as the Indian and Hungarian cases above reflect) to 
the two-faced friend (such as China, where philanthropy is acceptable if contributing to 
certain areas of work – and thus augmenting state-sponsored programs – but not others) 
and the “dear leader,” an extreme case in which no civil society or legal framework for it 
exist. Unfortunately, time did not permit a full discussion of strategies (this drew the ire 
of a few other attendees with whom I later spoke), but he did suggest that for the populist 
aggressor, funders should work to earn the trust of leaders, to press for legal clarity and 
certainty, and to encourage grassroots democratic participation. Relative to the findings 
presented in the previous chapter, this strategy may pull foundations positioned near the 
autonomous pole of the international grantmaking field (already supporting grassroots 
efforts) toward the heteronomous side if “playing nice” with foreign governments.   
 
Assessing and Addressing Constraints 
 There are several organizational practices that enable foundations not only to 
apprise themselves of new opportunities, but also to work around growing constraints in 
the countries in which their grantees operate. These primarily revolve around some kind 
of in-country presence, whether an office overseas or a trusted network of grantees, 
advisors, and brokers (Swidler & Watkins, 2017), individuals who, among other roles I 
describe in the next section, are expected to keep funders informed and aware, to be their 
“eyes and ears.” Not all foundations maintain offices in other countries; they can be 
financially and logistically daunting, though they do provide a unique vantage point from 
which funders can immerse themselves in local happenings and learn about changing 
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local dynamics. One respondent I interviewed represents a foundation that has long 
maintained offices abroad; in countries where foreign foundations’ operations become 
increasingly unwelcome, he says, the foundation “had an uncanny knack for closing 
[offices], moving out of places just before the political situation got really bad. [Partly] 
because we had a local presence, we could see when trouble was coming down the pike.” 
For other foundations and public charities, maintaining close relationships with grantees 
can provide this kind of information. As a representative of an international public charity 
that works closely with smaller organizations in different countries notes, “Our ear’s 
pretty close to the ground because we have local program advisors who are really familiar 
and keyed in with all the partners we’re working with.” Drawing upon local knowledge 
and expertise (Ashman, 2001; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004; Swidler & Watkins, 
2017) – whether through a physical presence or a trusted broker – thus provides a way for 
foundations to examine where their efforts to create impact may be either leveraged or 
jeopardized.  
 There are other workarounds foundations employ to maximize the impact of their 
philanthropic gifts by continuing to support grantees in spite of increasingly restrictive 
legal environments. One strategy is to fund grantees in other countries that work on the 
same issue area of interest. A representative of a California-based public charity notes, 
with equal parts dismay and fortitude, “Yeah, we continue not to be able to make grants 
directly in India. Despite never having received official notification that that was the 
case...We continue to fund U.S.[-based] and…organizations outside of India for work in 
India. Which is fine.” In other cases, especially those in which grantees are working on 
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particularly contentious issues, foundations must exercise immense caution in initiating 
or maintaining support and so find “creative ways” to communicate and transfer funding. 
In fact, an entire session at a conference I attended centered on what these alternative 
means might be, as primarily public charity representatives shared their strategies for 
working with grantees in difficult contexts. However, out of concern for the privacy of 
attendees and the welfare of their grantees, I hesitate to provide additional details from 
this discussion. What I will share is the genuine dismay of a great many respondents and 
conference attendees at the thought of their inability to support highly valued grantees 
and the potential for their funding to inadvertently threaten grantees’ work. Says one 
program officer, “We take it case by case, we take it country by country because we are 
doing some bold stuff…We don’t highlight it…because of the organizations’ situation 
and of course we want to keep them safe.” She echoes the advice of one conference 
speaker, who cautioned a room full of funders about how much they promote their 
support for grantees or vocalize grantees’ activities. He asked them whether any sort of 
publicity would pass the “New York Times litmus test.” In other words, if information 
about grantees and their work were plastered across the front page of the Times, would it 
put those grantees in danger? Some workarounds are therefore easier and safer for 
foundations to employ in continuing to support grantees. In all cases, funders confront the 
reality of geopolitical constraints that actively challenge their efforts to maximize impact.  
 A final salient alternative for foundations is to support umbrella organizations or 
intermediary public charities whose knowledge and resources for beneficiaries (such as 
travel to conferences or helping produce knowledge through research and reports) allow 
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funders to indirectly support grantees and issue areas of interest. As one public charity 
program officer notes somewhat bluntly: 
As civil society has been closing, a lot of those private foundations [that had previously 
funded foreign organizations directly] have turned around and been like, “Oh [expletive]! 
Our profiles are way too high to be doing this kind of grantmaking. A, we’re going to get 
our grantees in a lot of trouble, and B, we ourselves are being actually like blacklisted in 
the countries that we’re trying to do this grantmaking in.”  
 
She finds that private foundations are increasingly channeling their funds internationally 
via public charities like the one she represents. Because they are perceived as “closer to 
the ground” (Swidler & Watkins, 2017; Werker & Ahmed, 2008), they afford 
foundations a proximity to beneficiaries that may otherwise be challenging to develop.   
Foundations do not always opt for this, though, due to the administrative fees 
associated with channeling funding from organization to organization, which dilute the 
amount of money grantees ultimately receive. However, given the equivalency 
determination and expenditure responsibility IRS requirements by which private U.S. 
foundations must abide (I discuss these more below), funding through intermediaries is a 
simpler task (Spires, 2011) and one that allows them to support a wider array of grantees 
because U.S. public charities are not subject to the same stringent regulations (New York 
Community Trust, 2002). Using intermediary public charities means funding typically 
travels from donors to public charities in the U.S. to NGOs in other countries to yet 
smaller organizations and ultimately to grantees and their beneficiaries. At each level of 
the global aid chain (Watkins et al., 2012), respondents told me, administrative fees are 
withdrawn so that less and less money reaches intended beneficiaries. It is, as one public 
charity executive describes it, an inverted pyramid, with substantial funding at the top 
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that dwindles with each transaction. As research finds (e.g., Needles et al., 2018; Petersen 
& McClure, 2011), U.S. foundations give very little money directly to organizations in 
other countries; as a result, there is less correlation between civil society constraints and 
direct overseas giving than we might otherwise anticipate, perhaps because other options 
for giving are extensive.27  
In all, staying abreast of windows of opportunity, as well as emerging constraints 
resulting from geopolitical shifts and political developments, enables foundations to 
pursue support for certain grantees in certain places, but not necessarily other grantees in 
other places. Choosing to – or withdrawing from – support for particular grantee 
organizations in particular locations illustrates the consequences of impact maximization 
on how foundations distribute their gifts. Despite the presence of ongoing grantee needs 
and, for many foundations near the autonomous pole as described in the previous chapter, 
a desire to hold foreign governments accountable, there are situations in which large, 
independent foundations cease supporting organizations abroad when circumstances 
prove too difficult to create meaningful social change.   
Availability and Ability of NGOs 
Foundations rely upon their grantees to carry out important work on a wide 
variety of subjects. U.S. foundations would have little role to play domestically or 
globally were it not for their support to “implementing partners,” as one corporate 
                                                        
27 Needles and her co-authors (2018) show that several countries receiving the most funding directly from 
U.S. foundations are also ones that have relatively restrictive environments for cross-border philanthropy 
(e.g., India, South Africa, and Nigeria). But these restrictions appear not to have deterred foundations’ 
giving.  
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foundation program officer notes, because “We can’t do it without them.” In assessing 
where to distribute their philanthropic gifts, funders examine another crucial element 
revealed by landscape analyses; that is, which NGOs are already working on issue areas 
of interest to foundations in places where they are easily supported and can readily 
receive grants to undertake programming as identified by funders’ theories of change. As 
noted above, advocates of strategic philanthropy encourage funders to development and 
implement their own theory of change, or the “specific causal linkage between their 
actions and the intended results” (Kim et al., 2017, p. 15). This reflects the particular 
approach a foundation pursues to intervene in an issue, in addition to helping define the 
scope of their philanthropic ambitions and the grantees they seek to support.  
An available infrastructure of qualified organizations is, for the most part, a 
necessity for foundations and public charities to realize their theories of change (but see 
Aksartova, 2009). For example, a representative of a public charity working globally 
describes the process of selecting which geographies to support, which must have “a 
setting in which we feel there may be significant enough civil society for [our program] 
to be relevant and to work well, because it is quite dependent on connecting with local 
NGOs.” Another respondent, an in-country office director, notes pursuing a new strategy 
in part because there was “strong capacity in civil society around [the] issue.” However, 
there are times when theories of change do not coincide with an existing NGO presence. 
In some cases, foundations will merge their funds to create one, as was the case for some 
public charities whose representatives I interviewed. Sometimes, as a former program 
officer describes, a foundation may develop an elaborate theory of change, but then 
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cannot find organizations to carry out the work. In still other cases, a lack of NGOs 
means funders cannot address pressing needs, such as those from a humanitarian disaster, 
because they do not maintain relationships with local organizations. These shortcomings 
point to the importance of available and capable organizations to serve as grantees and 
work alongside foundations in pursuing social change.  
 
Locating Grantees 
Landscape analyses often involve identifying potential grantees whose missions 
and programs align with foundations’ theories of change, and it is often the theory of 
change that serves as a critical benchmark against which foundations assess 
organizations. As a program director in the Midwest states, “We have embraced a 
strategic approach to philanthropy so that we have identified, in our theory of change, 
what we think the levers are that will make change happen in the world. And our grantees 
are part of a highly leveraged strategy in that way.” In a similar vein, a representative of a 
longstanding foundation on the East Coast describes program officers approaching new 
areas: 
…with a kind of rough, loosely defined theory of change about what are the issues, then 
they would test [that theory] against the realities on the ground. And then they would 
decide who are the organizations [that] are central to being able to put a dent in tackling a 
particular issue. 
 
The ideal grantee organization(s) are therefore crucial to realizing the social change 
foundations seek, but it is also the group of grantees foundations purposefully support 
that can maximize their impact collectively. Says the aforementioned Midwest-based 
program director, “We have meetings [with] grantees where we talk about our theory of 
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change and make what our intentions are transparent to them, and so they understand the 
way in which they’re part of this thing that we hope to be additive.” In other words, 
funding multiple grantees working on different elements of the same issue is thought to 
facilitate greater change and maximize the foundation’s impact.  
Having a particular theory about the nature of social change is valuable for 
foundations because it allows them to define and articulate the scope of their grantmaking 
efforts, as the theory “dictates how much of something, how much of a kind of work, is 
necessary to achieve that desired impact,” notes a program director. One Midwest-based 
consultant who works with many large, prominent foundations states: 
I often tell people…if you’re a family foundation and you’re only going to give away 
twenty thousand, a hundred thousand, and you’re only going to be there for two years, 
don’t get yourself wrapped up into systemic solutions. You need to be there ten years. 
But…if what you want to do is provide immediate assistance to try to mop up in a 
community after Ebola, or to rebuild schools after a conflict, or whatever, fine, you can 
be in for two years, five years…  
 
Similarly, an advisor at a prominent philanthropic consulting firm suggests foundations 
consider:  
how much money is at stake over what time period and how big are the grants you want 
to make?...Do you want to grant to small organizations that work at the grassroots 
community level? Do you want to work at a larger system level? Do you want to work in 
advocacy? 
  
Answering these questions and taking these concerns into consideration enables 
foundations to assess what kind of impact they want to have and which actors can help 
them achieve it. 
The presence of a theory of change as a means of maximizing impact therefore 
prompts foundations to proactively identify potential grantees who will be tasked with 
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carrying out the efforts foundations wish to support. A representative of a prominent 
foundation in New York proposes the following:  
If you were putting ten million dollars a year into a particular program for ten 
years…What impact would you want to have?...What are the activities that would lead to 
that?...Who are the organizations that are best positioned or that we can position to…do 
that? 
 
Searching for those organizations often means drawing upon the expertise of program 
officers and working with highly networked in-country consultants or advisors. For 
example, an experienced program officer explains: 
We work within a particular strategy and a particular set of goals and objectives. Knowing 
those goals and objectives as they exist, in our program areas, we talent scout for people 
who can bring about that social change…We’re always looking, we’re at meetings, we’re 
reading, we’re interacting, we’re talking, we’re always looking for projects. 
 
Says another program officer, “It’s networking very broadly. It means going out into the 
field wherever you’re working…attending conferences, meeting with other donors on a 
regular basis, participating in affinity groups of donors on particular topics to share 
lessons learned.” Finding organizations to support, as these respondents and many others 
suggest, often draws substantially on the in-house expertise of program officers or 
program directors, who, as noted in a previous section, are often hired for their subject-
area expertise and relationships with organizations working on those topics. Doing so 
means foundations can “narrow in and target and have meaningful dialogues with those 
[organizations] who [we] feel are…addressing the kind of issues that we’ve made a 
priority,” suggests a programs vice president. Foundations thus have greater access to 
potential grantees through their purposeful cultivation of in-house expertise and the 
affiliations program officers carry with them.  
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 In addition, program officers with knowledge and networks also serve to reduce 
various administration burdens associated with grantmaking. One West Coast-based 
program officer describes searching for a new grantee whereby she opted not to invite a 
request for proposals (an RFP, in which foundations receive grant proposals from 
interested and capable organizations) and instead relied upon her colleagues to introduce 
her to a qualified organization. She “ended up trusting my network,” she says. If 
foundations are more active in solicitating grantee proposals through invite-only requests, 
they reduce the time and effort spent reviewing – and ultimately rejecting – a large 
number of applications. As a program director suggests, “we really always think about 
how we can minimize the burden on grant seekers in the application process. And also we 
try very hard to minimize the number of requests that are rejected.” Being proactive and 
selective in who to support thus relieves this burden, and it also offers what some suggest 
is a more effective approach to creating change because, as one respondent notes, 
foundations are “not just sort of passively waiting for ideas to come in.”  
 The issue, of course, with identifying potential grantees through networks is that, 
as a former program officer tells me, “it’s really hard to spot those [organizations] that 
are not affiliated [with] networks.” Foundation representatives acknowledge this 
challenge. One respondent who previously worked for a large, independent foundation 
and now works for a public charity reflects on the “standard decline letter” at her 
previous employer, which read, she says, “‘We mainly work with people we know,’ 
pretty much.” She notes, “So I [once] got this letter back going, ‘Well, how do I get on 
that list?’ It’s like, you’re right, it’s a really stupid thing to say in a decline letter.” Public 
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charities employ this practice, as well; in conversation with one representative, she 
mentions their application process as currently invite-only, and then wryly quipped, 
“Remember how I was talking about power dynamics [between funders and grantees]?” 
Despite these downsides, though, most foundations frame it as a cost-benefit issue. It may 
be less democratic to employ invite-only practices (Kallman, 2017), but it also relieves 
administrative duties that (and this is my interpretation) prevent program officers from 
concentrating on more relevant tasks.  
That said, foundations generally allow space for new-to-them grantees, provided 
program officers “make the case for why you think [the foundation] should be funding a 
new organization,” one explains. Usually, foundations will make a smaller grant to a new 
organization to “test it out,” a program officer states of the relationship, before 
committing themselves more substantially. It can, however, be risky for foundation to 
fund grantees with whom they’re unfamiliar (Gronbjerg et al., 2000), particularly at the 
grassroots level, “unless [the potential grantees] come really highly recommended from 
an expert,” a philanthropic consultant notes. When I inquired about the estimated 
percentage of new grantees each year, some private foundation respondents approximated 
20-40% as new, with the rest being renewals to existing grantees, or “going back to the 
people you know are reliable,” as one respondent states. Many thus describe their 
“grantmaking portfolios” as “a mix,” as an experienced program officer describes: “It’s 
like having a stock portfolio. You want to have your blue chips, you want to invest in 
your IBMs and your AT&Ts. But then you want the risky investments…[to] be able to 
bet on something that you feel is going to be successful.” Maintaining relationships with 
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existing grantees while cultivating relationships with potential grantees enables this 
“mix” and the opportunity to maximize impact in previously unrealized ways (in other 
words, by funding new grantees). 
Sometimes, however, the networks through which foundations locate potential 
grantees have less to do with their peers and more to do with existing contacts in different 
countries. These contacts go by various names and occupy a variety of roles: they may be 
referred to as “in-country advisors” or “brokers” (Swidler & Watkins, 2017). For 
corporate foundations with offices overseas, they are already employees. These 
individuals work to find (or “source,” in philanthropic sector parlance) and vet smaller 
NGOs to recommend to funders. A program officer of a corporate foundation in the 
Midwest, for example, says she draws upon “employees that we have on the ground to be 
able to source new partners that they know of. If it’s [a new focus area] and we don’t 
have a lot of current partners [in that area], throwing that back to them to say, ‘This is the 
new focus area. Who do you know working in this space?’” Public charities and 
philanthropic consulting firms also rely heavily on these actors because, as one consultant 
states, they “make a lot of the recommendations and…point us towards organizations to 
check out.” These individuals are greatly beneficial to foundations and charities in the 
U.S. and elsewhere because of their local expertise and networks with organizations in 
the geographies foundations wish to support (Swidler & Watkins, 2017). Yet despite 
being prized for their cultural knowledge and social capital, questions remain about the 
extent to which brokers and other local actors have a meaningful role in donors’ decision-
making (Elbers & Schulpen, 2011).  
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It can be quite difficult for large, independent foundations to find organizations 
(particularly smaller ones) in foreign countries without the assistance of these individuals 
– which renders their brokerage role invaluable (Burt, 2004). As Swidler and Watkins 
(2017, p. 5) contend, international donors “are profoundly dependent on brokers to reach 
down into the grassroots.” Reaching “down to the grassroots” often occurs through U.S.-
based public charities, whose local connections are typically quite extensive, so “NGOs 
sell their proposals to potential donors by emphasizing that they have contacts with 
beneficiaries in the villages or urban slums” (Swidler & Watkins, 2017, p. 5). Indeed, that 
public charities know and work with such actors is a central reason larger philanthropic 
entities will fund their programs or their ability to re-grant funding in smaller amounts. A 
public charity executive director with whom I spoke notes, “We [have] certain funders 
who love our model…[and] the connection that we have with the grantees….They don’t 
have the capacity to do what we do in the field.” Similarly, a program officer of another 
public charity emphasizes, “None of our funders, our donors, have the type of access to 
grassroots organizations that we do, or the networks that we do... And they don’t have the 
time or the capacity or the resources to go out and find those, so we become their go-to 
for that.” Reliance on existing in-country networks thus provides a means for larger 
foundations in the U.S. to learn about and support potential grantees.  
 
Assessing Potential Grantees 
Once potential grantees are located via the aforementioned practices, foundations 
undertake various kinds of assessments to determine an organization’s capacity to 
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implement agreed-upon activities. In so doing, foundations firmly assert that, as a 
program director in the Midwest states, “It depends on the nature of the work that they’re 
doing. So in some cases…we would look for access, we would look for the reputation 
and the prominence of the recipient...In other kinds of work, we would be looking for 
capacity to conduct trainings.” Others are a bit more vague: “We look for organizations 
that we think are going to get the job done…We fund projects that we sense will 
succeed,” says one veteran program officer. Notes another, “basically it’s betting on good 
people.” What constitutes a grantee with promise varies, of course, by the type of work 
they do and the goals foundations possess. But in all cases, a grantee with promise must 
first meet foundations’ “due diligence” standards. The aforementioned program director 
in the Midwest states, “Once we’ve identified a potential partner, we do really rigorous 
due diligence on them to make sure that the scope of the work is feasible for them and 
they have good internal processes and procedures.” Similarly, a veteran program officer 
in the same region describes these considerations as follows:  
[First,] is what they’re going to do…aligned with what [our] foundation says that we are 
funding, and what we want to do? The second is, is it realistic to expect that they’d be 
able to accomplish what they’re setting out to do? And then the third thing is does the 
organization have really the ability, capacity, to be able to do that? 
 
These are crucial questions that help foundations determine the capacity of potential 
grantees and whether they should distribute their philanthropic gifts to one organization 
or to another. Particularly when there is not this kind of alignment – even if, as a 
corporate foundation strategist asserts, “It might be a great program” – funders are likely 
to pursue alternative recipients. Indeed, their proactive search for potential grantees is 
thought to reduce these instances of mismatch. 
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 Assessing the capacity of potential grantees entails considering not only 
programmatic alignment, but myriad other elements, as well. For some, it is a question of 
expertise and longstanding reputation versus innovation, but frequently with some 
evidence of existing success. The corporate foundation strategist, for example, asks of 
grantees, “Is there an innovation element? If there’s no innovation, is it tried-and-true 
tested model that we know is going to work?” He and others note often supporting 
organizations with “a long history. A good track record.” Another corporate foundation 
program officer similarly describes funding “bellwether” organizations or, as a vice 
president of programs calls them, “workhorses.” In other words, these are reliable 
grantees whose reputation and capacity more or less speak for themselves. As the former 
director of a U.S. foundation’s in-country office writes in a follow up email exchange, the 
assessment process entails a multitude of considerations:  
It is important to look at the body of work that the NGO has undertaken, such as reports 
written, reputation in the field, relations with other actors in the same field. Together, all 
of these factors are important for determining whether an organization will be able to 
carry out impactful work. 
  
Sometimes, though, a grantee’s reputation may garner foundations’ support even if their 
grant application is less sophisticated than others, indicating a greater level of investment 
and commitment from foundations (Aksartova, 2009; Tassie et al., 1996). Multiple 
respondents echoed the following statement from an in-country office director: “We can 
see an organization has good ideas…but we might receive a subpar proposal from them. 
So in those cases, where we’re interested in pursuing support for them, we will provide 
technical assistance for developing proposals.” Though foundations are sometimes 
criticized for an addiction to innovation (Edwards, 2009; Morvaridi, 2012) or, 
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alternatively, for a stubborn refusal to support new grantees (Kallman, 2017), these 
respondents illustrate the diversity of considerations that shape grantmaking and the 
various axes of value along which potential grantees are assessed.   
 For other potential grantees, foundations may enquire not about expertise or an 
innovative approach, but rather the organization’s ability to network with other actors in 
their field, often perceived by foundations as vital to their ability to create measurable 
and meaningful change. The program director of a Central American office mentions: 
One of the things we look at [in a potential grantee] is networking impact. So an 
organization that is looked to by others who are in the field shows that it has leadership, 
or clout, or legitimacy…You might have that quality in a small grassroots organization, 
just as you might have it in a large think tank. 
 
Similarly, the aforementioned grants manager in California asks of potential grantees: 
“Do they have the capacity locally? Do they have the network or the potential connection 
with the government?” These questions therefore allow foundations to assess whether a 
given issue area is comprised of qualified NGOs able to meaningfully “move the needle.” 
 In part because there are many “subjectivities and imponderables that go into 
deciding whether a particular proposal is worth the investment” (Ylvisaker, 1987, p. 365), 
one strategy foundations employ in their assessments is frequent communication with 
peers (Gronbjerg et al., 2000; Kallman, 2017), consultants, and infrastructure 
organizations like the Council on Foundations to gather insight into the reputation of 
grantees. Some program officers utilize tools created by the Foundation Center – an 
infrastructure organization for the philanthropic sector dating back to the 1950s – such as 
Foundation Maps. This tool visually represents domestic and international philanthropic 
flows, allowing funders to search among grant records, foundations, and recipients, with 
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the ultimate goal of providing “the knowledge you need to understand your field, make 
strategic choices, and strengthen your impact,” according to its website. This may lead 
program officers to contact peers funding in certain areas, while others draw upon the 
expertise of members of affinity groups. Indeed, a researcher at a large affinity group 
notes that funders often request information when considering a new funding direction. 
She states, “If a funder reaches out to us and asks about working on [a given topic] in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, we can easily look through our database of…grantmaking and pull a 
list for them and share who else is supporting this work.” Drawing upon the knowledge 
and experiences of other foundations can help sway funders toward particular grantees.  
 Another strategy foundations employ is conducting site visits and engaging in 
extensive conversation with grantees before awarding funding (practices that Frumkin 
and Kim, 2001 argue reflect heightened donor expectations that nonprofits must meet). In 
addition to knowing “this [is] actually a viable organization just from a management and 
administration point of view,” the former director of a foundation’s in-country office 
states, “[You] maybe do some site visits with them to see where they’ve worked and what 
they’ve done and just talk to others in the field to see what’s the reputation of this 
organization.” As a program officer in the Midwest emphasizes, “We like to get to know 
the people we’re working with. We’ll visit, we’ll invite, we’ll meet them in various 
meetings. We’ll talk rather than just this idea of we’re going to get a piece of paper and 
we’ll decide from there whether we’re going to send a check or not.” This informal 
vetting process not only informs foundations of a grantee’s reputation in a community of 
philanthropic actors (Aksartova, 2003), but it also allows them to evaluate the capacity 
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(Despard, 2017; Lee & Nowell, 2015) of NGOs to ensure their philanthropic 
contributions make a sizeable change. And while getting to know potential grantees in 
this manner is quite involved for both parties, if it results in a grant, then it ideally lays 
the groundwork for a trusting and committed funder-grantee relationship.  
 
Absorptive Capacity and Sustainability 
A critical component of an organization’s capacity is its ability to absorb a 
particular amount of grant funding and to demonstrate the ability to manage funding28 
(Aksartova, 2009). As one program officer asks, “Do we trust this grantee to be a 
responsible steward of these resources?” Buteau and her co-authors (2018), for example, 
report that a full 81% of foundation leaders consider “the readiness” of potential grantees 
to receive funding in determining whether to dispense a philanthropic gift or not. Says an 
experienced program officer in the Midwest, “We may say, ‘God, these are good people. 
They have a great idea, but it doesn’t look like they’ll be able to raise the money 
sufficiently’” beyond what the foundation provides. In other words, despite the promising 
work of potential grantees, foundations seek assurance that organizations are “ready” to 
receive their philanthropic gifts so that this funding maximizes impact. The longevity of 
grantee organizations and their programming yields greater impact, according to 
foundations and others in the field (e.g., Hardner, Gullison, & O’Neill, 2017), so 
examining the extent to which potential grantees are not only “responsible stewards” of 
                                                        
28 Some argue that demonstrating responsible management of funds requires a level of professionalization 
that not all NGOs – particularly smaller, grassroots organizations – exhibit (Matsuzawa, 2016; Spires, 
2011).  
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existing resources, but also embedded within their communities of beneficiaries helps 
funders determine whether to support an organization or not.  
This concern reflects a highly salient discourse circulating across the field, one 
that focuses on the “local ownership” of grantees’ work (Srivasta & Oh, 2010; Stevens & 
Morris, 2001; Uphoff, 1993). Across the development and humanitarian fields more 
broadly, donors and NGOs are turning their attention “downward,” toward local civil 
society actors, as they seek to cultivate community participation in global development 
efforts (Mansuri & Rao, 2013; Mohan & Stokke, 2000). International actors see “local 
ownership” as affording projects greater legitimacy and sustainability (von Billerbeck, 
2017). While “sustainability” originally meant “ecologically durable forms of economic 
development,” it has taken on a much broader meaning as “Donors seek projects that they 
hope recipients will be able and willing to sustain after the donor – and the donor’s 
funding – departs” (Swidler & Watkins, 2017, p. 91). Indeed, one retired program officer 
emphasizes the “whole sustainability dynamic of grantmaking…to really help the 
recipient in a more fundamental way” that ensures its continued operation.  
Foundations therefore laud grantees with “deep ties” to their communities of 
beneficiaries; says one foundation president, “our projects and our programs and the 
organizations we support are typically more sustainable because there’s so much local 
ownership of the work.” Similarly, a program officer in Washington, D.C. asks of 
potential grantees, “Does this entity truly have legitimacy and standing in their 
community, and will they be successful in carrying out this project?” This sense of local 
ownership as a means of sustainability affords foundations a sense of confidence that the 
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efforts of grantee organizations will create more meaningful change in this environment. 
Moreover, having access to in-country advisors or brokers, as described above, offers 
foundations “some good local partnerships to provide intel and to help them to capture 
the local dynamics,” as a multilateral representative states. Connections with local actors 
are thus thought to provide foundations with insight into the longevity, sustainability, and 
financial solvency of potential grantees.  
In addition to assessing an organization’s capacity to implement agreed-upon 
projects or programs, foundations – particularly large, private, independent ones – must 
take an organization’s size into consideration. In general, the greater a foundation’s 
budget (and endowment), the larger the size any grant awarded will be, which is 
primarily a product of time and administrative expense. In an insightful interview with an 
experienced program officer in the Midwest, he sheds light on this pattern, explaining, 
“There [are] only so many grants I can make. Because whether it’s a $20,000 grant or 
$200,000 grant, it takes up pretty much the same amount of time.” Part of a program 
officer’s duties include not only finding and assessing potential grantees (sometimes 
including site visits), but also checking in with existing grantees through frequent 
communication, monitoring their progress, and presenting reports to higher-ups that 
describe how the grantees that program officer has chosen will help the foundation 
achieve its broader objectives. This particular foundation representative estimates 
overseeing roughly 50 grantees, describing it as “either a juggling act or a punching bag, 
or both.” Program officers are therefore quite busy! And as a result, he says, “we will 
look for [an organization] that we can make the $100,000 grant to rather than $25,000 
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grant. And often it’s a re-granting agency [abroad]…who then distributes $5,000 grants 
to others in that country.” To this end, notes a corporate foundation strategist, “We don’t 
want to necessarily create a burden on an organization that may not necessarily have the 
capacity to run the programs that we’re looking for.” Therefore, funding through public 
charities either in the U.S. or overseas allows foundations to support smaller 
organizations – with perhaps greater local ownership and for whom philanthropic gifts 
can more or less “go farther,” as some respondents describe it – without overwhelming 
those organizations with an enormous grant. To be sure, this reduces the administrative 
burden for both parties, but it also enables foundations to feel (on some level) that their 
time is used more effectively. If they spend too much time processing grants, so the 
thinking goes, are they necessarily getting a positive return on their funding?  
While channeling funding through public charities reduces the administrative 
burdens on foundations, it also increases the administrative fees associated with each 
level of the global aid chain (Watkins et al., 2012), as noted above, such that less and less 
money ultimately reaches foundations’ intended beneficiaries. The reason that many 
foundations – some more reluctantly than others – fund public charities in the U.S. as 
opposed to sending their philanthropic gifts overseas (Needles et al., 2018; Petersen & 
McClure, 2011) stems from the IRS requirements to which the philanthropic sector has 
been subject since 1969, when Congress passed the Tax Reform Act, stipulating a set of 
regulations by which foundations would abide. This was borne of an era greatly 
suspicious of foundations’ behavior, fueled by distrust of elite institutions and fears of 
philanthropic support for communism (Brilliant, 2000; Hall, 1992). Among new 
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reporting requirements, foundations became subject to a 5% payout rate, whereby they 
must make grants equating to at least 5% of their endowment each year. This largely 
accounts for why foundations with more substantial assets are also those that award the 
highest levels of funding. Echoing the program officer’s concerns above, a philanthropic 
consultant tells me that for foundations looking to support international NGOs, it is 
typically a question of “the amount of funding that they’re looking to give and the 
absorption capacity [of an organization].” So, she continues, “if a foundation needs to 
give a higher amount of money that year, they’re likely looking for a larger organization 
that can absorb it and provide projects within that timeframe.” In this way, foundations 
are highly dependent upon the availability of larger organizations with the capacity to 
absorb the level of funding they provide. On occasion, however, foundations help build 
the capacity of organizations to increase their absorptive capacity (e.g., Aksartova, 2009).   
 Importantly, private foundations also encounter challenges in funding overseas 
grantees directly. International grantmaking is already fraught with myriad uncertainties 
(Nichols & Mackinnon, 2004; Renz & Samson-Atienza, 1997), some of which include 
the capacity of organizations to manage funds, execute programs accordingly, and avoid 
“mission drift” (Renz & Samson-Atienza, 1997). Foundations experience greater 
difficulty monitoring faraway organizations and, ultimately (as far as the IRS is 
concerned), ensuring their grants are used for charitable purposes. As I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, for private foundations in the U.S. to make a grant directly to an 
overseas grantee – and for it to be treated as a qualifying distribution that is tax-exempt – 
the foundation must demonstrate that the grantee is equivalent to a U.S. 501(c)(3) 
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nonprofit organization. This is to ensure that grants are used for charitable purposes, 
which is the only way philanthropic gifts can qualify as tax-exempt.  
Assessing the equivalency of a foreign organization is known as equivalency 
determination. In 2015, the Department of the Treasury released a set of regulations for 
private foundations to make “good faith determinations” based on documentation 
provided by the grantee, including descriptions of past and future charitable activities; 
copies of charters, bylaws, and governing documents; information about its financials; 
and statements confirming its charitable purpose (New York Community Trust, 2002). 
Given these logistical burdens for both foundations and grantees, private foundations are 
increasingly contracting this work to service providers who solicit information from 
grantees on their behalf (Reis & Warren, 2016). However, a determination as equivalent 
(particularly by an intermediary organization; Smith Maguire & Matthews, 2012) imbues 
grantees with a legitimacy that can be appealing to other funders. One program officer at 
a private foundation states, “We do encourage the equivalency determination for the 
prospective grantee because once they get it, they have it for a while…[which] can be 
taken into consideration by the next funding organization and the next and the next.” 
While it may be administratively burdensome to acquire this status, it legitimizes 
grantees in the eyes of other foundations (e.g., Zuckerman, 1999).  
In some cases, however, potential grantee organizations are unable to demonstrate 
their equivalency. Perhaps they do not meet the “public support test” – that most of their 
funding comes from publicly supported organizations or the public – or they cannot 
provide adequate financial documentation. In these situations, private foundations may 
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exercise what is known as expenditure responsibility, which entails grantmaking for a 
specific project, essentially treats the grantee as another private foundation (New York 
Community Trust, 2002), and allows the foundation to avoid taxation on its expenditure. 
The monitoring and reporting requirements are more extensive for exercising expenditure 
responsibility, however; the IRS (CFR 53.4945-5) requires foundations to “see that the 
grant is spent solely for the purpose for which [it is] made, [and] to obtain full and 
complete reports from the grantee on how the funds are spent,” as well as to make 
detailed reports to the IRS about such grants. Thus, as a former in-country office director 
reflects, “It’s always your goal to try to work with an organization that would be 
considered equivalent because then the reporting requirements for them and the oversight 
requirements are just less burdensome.”  
Sometimes (but not always!) foundations have an aversion to performing 
equivalency determinations and especially expenditure responsibilities because they can 
be time-consuming, burdensome for both parties, and a potentially ineffective use of 
foundation funds – which are understood as always insufficient and so to be leveraged 
thoughtfully. Making grants to public charities in the U.S., however, gives foundations 
greater access to smaller recipient organizations and a simpler means of abiding by IRS 
regulations. Moreover, because public charities do not face these same constraints (New 
York Community Trust, 2002), they have greater leeway in selecting funding recipients, 
providing large, private foundations with a wider array of potential grantees. In other 
words, public charities instill confidence in foundations that philanthropic gifts can be 
absorbed properly and will be used to meaningful ends and for maximal impact. 
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Many program officers of large foundations with whom I spoke often lamented 
their foundations’ difficulty funding smaller, in-country NGOs, particularly as these 
philanthropic actors espouse the importance of local ownership and grassroots support 
(Mansuri & Rao, 2013; Stevens & Morris, 2001; Uphoff, 1993). For example, a vice 
president of programs in California states, “we’re heavily focused on international NGOs, 
INGOs…mainly because we don’t have a field presence and we haven’t figured out kind 
of an accountability and checks and balances mechanism to give locally.” But, he 
continues, “our heart and our inclination is we’ve got to find ways to capacitate and help 
grow some of these indigenous [organizations].” Similarly, a private foundation program 
officer notes: 
We want to see more grassroots organization[s]…but we’re not set up to do that 
ourselves too well…We don’t have boots on the ground all the time. We don’t have 
offices in these countries where we work. So it’s difficult to get too granular, so therefore 
we often will work with larger organizations or intermediaries…[ideally] that are in those 
countries. 
 
For these larger private foundations, then, public charities readily provide the availability 
and ability of NGOs that funders seek in determining the allocation of their philanthropic 
gifts. Some critics, however, contend this reflects homophily in grantmaking (Aksartova, 
2009; Gronbjerg et al., 2000; Kallman, 2017), such that foundations prefer making grants 
to highly bureaucratic and professionalized organizations like themselves. This, Spires 
(2011, p. 309) argues, is a partial product of U.S. tax law, which “structures donors’ 
options so that they are strongly averse to funding non-professionalized foreign grantees 
that cannot readily produce the sort of charter, financial statements, and proof of legal 
registration as a charity that the IRS expects.” As illustrated in respondents’ statements, 
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however, their inclination is to support smaller organizations for whom their funding is 
thought to be more meaningful (or more impactful because it can “go farther”). While 
IRS requirements impose constraints on both private foundations and grantees, they need 
not prevent foundations from supporting the organizations they have identified (through 
peers, in-country advisors, and others) as capable of carrying out the important social 
change work they desire.  
Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
Across the international grantmaking field, actors exhibit a shared orientation to 
the pursuit of impact via their ability to create meaningful social change and a marked, 
measurable contribution to alleviating the “distant suffering” of others (Boltanski, 1999). 
Because foundations feel their funds are always inadequate to meet the global demand by 
NGOs for funding (Bob, 2010), they distribute their philanthropic gifts with great care 
and thoughtfulness. Though there exists substantial diversity in foundations’ missions, 
interests, approaches, and positions across the field, they employ shared practices in 
identifying how to maximize the impact of their funds. As illustrated throughout, these 
organizational practices include landscape analysis, tactics to “source” and assess 
potential grantees (such as conferring with peers in affinity groups, speaking with in-
country consultants, and engaging in extensive discussion with organizations), and 
strategies to support different kinds of grantee organizations, regardless of size or 
location.   
Whereas the previous chapter examined how the field position of foundations 
bears on their decision-making, this chapter further complicates narratives that attribute 
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grantmaking to foundations’ other-oriented missions (Comte, 1973; Titmuss, 1997; 
Whitman, 2008) or to their class-based self-interest (Arnove, 1980; Berman, 1983; 
Levich, 2015). The representatives that I interviewed and the conversations at 
conferences that I observed suggest, instead, that foundations are more oriented to the 
pursuit of impact, which they operationalize through their selection of, and so in relation 
to, grantees. This finding complicates extant understandings of grantmaking decisions 
because it requires that foundations take other factors into account as they weigh which 
course of action will have the greatest consequence. To make the most of their 
contribution, foundations’ pursuit of impact rests upon the presence of areas of need (i.e., 
gaps in funding) where existing charitable activities and levels of funding are not too 
concentrated; geopolitical windows of opportunity and an “enabling environment” for 
civil society organizations that they can support; and a sufficient infrastructure of NGOs 
that can implement foundations’ theories of change. The challenge, of course, is that 
these evaluative assessments of issue areas and grantees ultimately valorize – by adding 
value to (Bessy & Chauvin, 2013; Vatin, 2013) – support for certain recipients over 
others, as the process “excludes and even marginalizes issues and organizations that find 
themselves screened out by foundation filters” (Heydemann & Kinsey, 2010, p. 211). The 
most sought-after funding recipients are those that do not overlap excessively with 
existing charitable projects and are rife with geopolitical opportunities and qualified 
NGOs that allow foundations to carve out a distinct funding niche. Privileging these 
grantees, however, means that some issue areas of high need may not receive necessary 
support (Delfin & Tang, 2006) – even if their programmatic missions align with 
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foundations – when they occupy fields with too much or too little funding, are in 
countries that constrain civil society to a great degree, or where the infrastructure of 
NGOs capable of carrying out foundations’ desired activities is limited.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GRANTEES AND GRANTS:  
THE LIMITS OF FLEXIBILITY IN EVALUATING IMPACT 
Introduction 
“Please, if you do one thing as a donor,” Lindsay Louie, a former nonprofit 
director and current Hewlett Foundation program officer, writes, “give flexible funding to 
a nonprofit and do not look at overhead rates or ratios as a proxy for effectiveness.” This 
blogpost for the Center for Effective Philanthropy came on the heels of its recent report 
entitled, “Donors: 5 things nonprofits want you to know.” Her appeal to funders 
illustrates the kinds of debates unfolding across the international grantmaking field. Such 
tensions are part and parcel of how foundations work to create impact as they permeate 
the environments in which decisions are made.  
In the previous chapter, I examined foundations’ operationalization of impact in 
relation to their grantees, whereby their ability to create impact based on the issue areas 
and geographies they support relies heavily on the presence of – and foundations’ access 
to – qualified NGOs to implement social change work. But what happens once those 
grantees have been selected to receive philanthropic gifts? How do foundations navigate 
the challenges around grantmaking to ensure their funds serve the purpose of maximizing 
impact? Instead of the decisions surrounding which issue areas and grantees to fund, I 
now examine decisions about how to fund those selected grantees. I investigate how these 
decisions are made in relation to – and shaped relative to the behavior of – their 
philanthropic peers, who provide a benchmark against which foundations consider their 
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own practices. In this sense, the debates encompassing the international grantmaking 
field help shape how foundations distribute their gifts as they work to distance 
themselves from the philanthropic practices in which they see little value.  
Against the backdrop of strategic philanthropy’s influence and consequent field-
level contestations surrounding how support for grantees can most effectively create 
impact, I find large, independent foundations push back against the heavy-handedness 
advocated by this approach and call for an almost renewed “scientific approach to 
philanthropy” that their forebears articulated a century prior (Adloff, 2015). Proponents 
of a strategic approach (e.g., Brest & Harvey, 2008; Porter & Kramer, 1999) argue that 
creating impact requires foundations to implement their own theory of change, fund 
short-term projects instead of organizational overhead, and assess impact in quantitative 
terms. Relative to their peers that embody this approach, respondents claim to afford 
grantees flexibility in each of those categories, by deferring to the expertise of grantees 
and demonstrating humility and responsiveness; by placing full trust in grantees to use 
philanthropic gifts as they see fit; and by lessening reporting requirements. However, 
because this level of flexibility can thwart the creation of unique, measurable social 
change and because foundations must comply with IRS regulatory and reporting 
standards, foundations cannot necessarily be as responsive to their grantees’ needs as 
their sentiments and admirable intentions might otherwise prefer.  
Questioning Strategic Philanthropy? 
Since Porter and Kramer’s persuasive call to arms for the philanthropic sector to 
“create real value for society” in a 1999 issue of the Harvard Business Review, 
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foundations large and small have embraced the doctrine of “strategic philanthropy” 
(Brest & Harvey, 2008). As mentioned in the above chapters, the rise of strategic 
philanthropy reflects a wider turn across other societal sectors toward accountability, 
efficiency, and efficacy.29 Its proponents contend that “Not enough foundations think 
strategically about how they can create the most value for society with the resources they 
have at their disposal,” and that “Little effort is devoted to measuring results” (Porter & 
Kramer, 1999, p. 122), with which others agree (e.g., Ostrower, 2004). The remedy to 
these oversights is derisively described by critics as “donor-driven” grantmaking. That is 
to say, donors know best: donors know best how to create social change and how to 
improve grantees’ performance; they select grantees that are most effective; they tie their 
funding to grantee performance as a form of incentive; and they inject themselves into 
nonprofits’ operations. As one respondent tells me, strategic philanthropy is critiqued as 
“being filled with hubris, that you can engineer change through grantmaking.” The 
perhaps less savory aspects of this approach have undergone some reform in practitioner 
circles (Harvey, 2016; Kania et al., 2014), though it still remains the dominant method of 
grantmaking (e.g., Hardner et al., 2017, but see Grady et al., 2017). 
The so-called California Consensus, as referenced in the previous chapter, is 
arguably strategic philanthropy on steroids. The media has criticized Facebook founder 
Mark Zuckerberg and Amazon founder Jeff Bezos (Giridharadas, 2018) for their 
supposed “quick-fix” philanthropic approaches that fail to address the root causes of 
                                                        
29 What constitutes “effective” can vary greatly within and across foundations, whether referring to treating 
grantees well, having a particular kind of impact, or attaining a foundation’s goals (Ostrower, 2004).  
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social ills – which the earliest philanthropists (Carnegie, Rockefeller, and the like) had 
sought to remedy (Adloff, 2015; Karl & Katz, 1981; Prewitt, 2006). As Edwards (2009, 
p. 39) argues of the Gates Foundation, “The oft-repeated equation of ‘technology plus 
science plus the market brings results’ may produce new vaccines against malaria and 
HIV, but there is no vaccine against poverty and inequality.” Despite the rhetoric of 
lasting impact, the California Consensus faces criticism for its neglect of the social and 
political context of global challenges and its obfuscation of “the crucial issue of how 
poverty is created and produced” (Morvaridi, 2012, p. 1199; Wilkens & Enghel, 2013). 
With its distrust of government bureaucracy and a belief in the superiority of private aid, 
scholars argue that these philanthropists simply serve to reproduce the hegemonic 
structures already benefiting the global elite (Harman, 2016; Levich, 2015).  
Relative to the California Consensus, strategic philanthropy appears rather 
benign, yet the two share some characteristics. In both cases (much more so for the 
California Consensus), funders exhibit a preference for implementing their own theory of 
change (Kim et al., 2017), or understanding of which inputs are required to produce 
desired outputs; for projects, or discrete, time-bound philanthropic interventions that 
produce clear outcomes and reveal impact via before and after metrics; for quantitative 
measures of impact (e.g., number of children attending school or the number of people 
receiving vaccines) over qualitative measures (such as anecdotes and narratives from 
beneficiaries); and for a heavy-handed approach to working with – or managing the work 
of – grantees. Overall, these tactics render donors largely unaccountable to beneficiaries 
(Edwards, 2009). These approaches to grantmaking, especially in the international 
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context, are widely discussed and heavily debated in the shared spaces foundations 
inhabit (see Delfin and Tang, 2006 on strategic philanthropic practices potentially 
undermining foundations’ goals). What foundations’ peers do or do not do with respect to 
their support for grantees shapes their own giving practices. In this way, foundations 
operationalize impact in particular ways relative to the behavior of other foundations.  
Responsive and Flexible Theories of Change 
When it comes to theories of change, the tenets of strategic philanthropy call for 
donors to develop and dictate their own understanding of an issue and the approach they 
perceive as most effective for addressing it. One way foundations do this is by cultivating 
in-house expertise through the program officers they hire (as discussed in the previous 
chapter). In other cases, program officers draw upon the subject-area expertise of 
individuals outside the foundation who can provide feedback on various philanthropic 
initiatives and their likelihood of success. These “donor-driven” theories of change tend 
to assume that the parties most knowledgeable are not necessarily the grantees 
themselves, but the donors that provide funding.  
Increasingly, however, members of the international grantmaking field readily 
acknowledge and critique the hubris of this approach. In conversation with a consultant at 
an elite firm, she laments this strategic philanthropic prescription:  
Most of us [here] really feel bad about…strategic philanthropy in the sense [that] it 
basically said our grantees don’t necessarily know what they’re doing but we know a lot 
[as] foundations, so we have to create our own goals and then tell the grantees how to fit 
into our programming. 
 
This transformed grantee organizations, she contends, into “the means, not the end, of the 
work,” and therefore risks, as a foundation representative argues, “actually turn[ing] 
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organizations into sub-contractors of donors” (see Elbers & Arts, 2011). That is to say, 
foundations are only interested in supporting grantees to the extent that they can deliver 
on their promises of implementing certain projects, and as discussed in the previous 
chapter, this is an important factor that foundations take into account when evaluating 
whether or not to fund a potential grantee.  
In addition to treating grantees as “the means, not the end” of foundations’ pursuit 
of impact, that theories of change are donor-driven presents three challenges for grantees, 
which in turn render the maximization of impact that much more elusive for funders. 
First, theories of change themselves change. In the previous chapter, I noted the range of 
factors that may account for shifts in foundations’ priorities and preferences; these may 
be idiosyncratic, as some suggest (Bob, 2010; Carson, 2000), or they may be responses to 
the dynamism of complex global challenges. The frequency of those shifts, however, can 
be greatly problematic for grantees: one program officer at a private foundation in the 
Midwest, for example, notes that when strategic plans and theories of change are revised 
every few years, it can be quite confusing for grantees. Similarly, as an in-country office 
director states, “It’s not that [the funder] can adjust every month…I’ve seen how that 
affects organizations.” To be sure, some respondents assert their commitment to long-
term strategies, such that any “new” theory of change “builds on something that we’ve 
done in the past.” Often, acquiescing to donor preferences not only makes grantees’ long-
term planning more difficult (what happens, for instance, when an organization working 
on HIV/AIDS outreach is suddenly asked to explicitly frame its work around gender?), 
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but it can also lead grantees farther from their original organizational mandates30 or 
displace their work addressing local priorities (Elbers & Arts, 2011; Morfit, 2011; 
Swidler & Watkins, 2017; but see Delfin & Tang, 2006; Kanter & Summers, 1987).  
Second, foundations’ theories of change are problematic if and when they clash 
with one another (Delfin & Tang, 2006). Though common for different donors to pursue 
different approaches to the same problem, it “can cause a lot of confusion for the 
[grantee] organization trying to respond to the problem,” says a former grantmaker turned 
consultant. He notes that a grantee may encounter: 
…a social entrepreneurship approach from Skoll, and an invention approach from 
Lemelson, and a whatever approach from Ford, and a different approach from Gates. The 
more you have opinionated funders that believe that the world should change according 
to their approach, those don’t all line up…and that can be confusing in the space.  
 
Another consultant at a prominent firm echoes this sentiment, stating that because 
foundations are increasingly “trying to be strategic and coming up with their own 
strategies,” when one strategy “doesn’t necessarily align with the other funders in the 
space and what their strategies are…you get a lot of fragmented funding with specific 
strategies.” And, she notes, dismayed by that challenge, “then those strategies change!” 
Thus, when theories of change are both ever-changing and rigidly donor-specific, the 
extent to which impact can be maximized is called into question.  
Finally, when donors construct their theories of change, they may underestimate 
the extent to which various issues are intertwined, ultimately producing a fractured, rather 
than holistic, approach that fails to account for contextual nuances. Large, international 
                                                        
30 Catering to donors in this way, however, may be more symbolic in nature, rather than a reflection of 
mission drift and altered organizational practices (Elbers & Arts, 2011), and so suggests a process of 
decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
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grantmaking foundations often have multiple program areas with specific objectives. Say, 
for example, one such foundation has articulated a theory of change for its gender 
equality program and a separate theory of change for its environmental conservation 
program. It is likely that program officers in each area will intentionally locate different 
organizations to address what are understood as distinct issues. But what does this mean 
for the organizations that address both issue areas, particularly because the challenges are 
often so tightly interconnected? This is precisely the challenge some grantees face when 
foundations are perceived as stuck within programmatic “silos,” as they are often 
described. At a conference I attended in the Spring of 2017, several sessions featured 
panelists encouraging funders to break out of their “silos” and expand what traditionally 
have been narrow understandings of complex global challenges. One session, in 
particular, stands out for its appeal to foundations to move beyond “silo’ed” grantmaking. 
The moderator, who later became a respondent, facilitated a panel of three women to 
discuss how foundations can “fund across silos” in the areas of food, water, and gender. 
In the context of a changing climate, the panelists made a compelling argument that 
issues of food and water security, global inequality, and gender are so deeply intertwined 
that foundations are naïve to attempt to programmatically separate them and to develop 
theories of change for each distinct area. Warns one consultant, “you [as the funder] lose 
track of how- of the larger ecosystem, systems lens.”31 Thus, when theories of change 
                                                        
31 The Sustainable Development Goals also emphasize the interconnectedness of global issues and, in 
encouraging foundations to pursue particular Goals, call for them to acknowledge this complexity.  
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remain excessively narrow, the potential for impact may be jeopardized in the complexity 
of the challenges foundations work to address.  
 
Toward Faith in Grantee Expertise 
Importantly, the existence of a donor’s theory of change need not forcibly dictate 
the agendas of grantees, nor must it be developed without input from grantees. In part of 
a much wider trend toward “localization” in development and humanitarianism (Mansuri 
& Rao, 2013; Mohan & Stokke, 2000; von Billerbeck, 2017) – with its focus on 
cultivating the inclusion of more individuals, as well as respecting and fostering local 
capacity, rather than dictating decision-making from above (Polito, Ingabire, 
Mosselmans, Noyes, & Singh, 2018) – large foundations are increasingly turning to 
organizations in places where the beneficiaries they seek to support reside. In many 
cases, foundations are skeptical of the efficacy of donor-driven change and are critical of 
their peers who practice it. Rather than drawing solely or primarily upon the expertise of 
program officers or consultants – both of whom, it is worth noting, often have ties to said 
organizations – they endeavor to confer closely with in-country NGOs, perceived as “the 
voices of the poor, the grassroots, democratic forces” (Tvedt, 2006, p. 686). These 
NGOs’ employees serve as brokers, representing a critical link in providing faraway 
funders with insights into the needs and desires of their ultimate beneficiaries (Swidler & 
Watkins, 2017). Foundations claim, therefore, to purposefully defer to local actors in 
crafting and revising their theories of change. This effort is steeped in the assumption that 
local actors bring an invaluable cultural knowledge and contextual understanding to the 
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table (Ashman, 2001; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004; Reith, 2010); if donors discount 
this information, they risk implementing theories of change that are irrelevant to intended 
beneficiaries or even counter to what local actors deem necessary. Respondents note their 
efforts to discover beneficiaries’ understandings of social change because, as one 
program officer notes, “[We have] a firm belief in our partners, that they know their 
community and [that] their agenda…is the best way forward for their community” toward 
making lasting change (Elbers & Arts, 2011). 
Acknowledging and incorporating this philosophy, however, requires a certain 
level of humility on the part of funders. Often, in part because of strategic philanthropy’s 
influence, but also the power derived by a near-absence of accountability (Heydemann & 
Toepler, 2006; Prewitt, 2006), foundations experience little incentive to draw upon the 
expertise of those most affected by their work (Werker & Ahmed, 2008) – even if, 
normatively speaking, they should, since “private foundations influence…what programs 
will be introduced into a foreign community, in a manner that does not necessarily 
involve directorship or voting from the community members themselves” (Stuckler et al., 
2011, p. 7). Says one program officer, “I’ve been confronted a couple of times with 
program officers from private foundations who were extraordinarily arrogant, and I think 
that’s one of the things I worry about.” While interviewing an advisor at a prominent 
consulting firm, she bemoans the “many cases and projects [that were] very top down. It 
was the wealthy Americans parachuting in thinking that they know how to solve all the 
problems.” Increasingly, she notes, donors acknowledge the importance of local 
ownership (or “buy-in”) in the design of NGO projects and programs by “including and 
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enrolling the people most affected by the issues in whatever it is you’re trying to 
do…We’re not coming in as the savoir on the white horse to just parachute in with our 
solutions.” In these statements and others, respondents frequently describe an 
appreciation for and admiration of philanthropic actors who not only have humility, but 
also an understanding of the inherent power dynamics in the funder-grantee relationship. 
One program director in the Midwest even goes so far to say her team “will have very 
good intellectual discussions about is this way of looking at it, or is funding it this way, a 
legacy of colonialism?” This indicates the salience of power dynamics in the minds of 
funders and, as foundations assert their recognition of them relative to their peers, it 
necessarily affects how they support their grantees.  
 To this end, philanthropic actors routinely emphasize the latitude they afford 
grantees in determining strategy and theories of change, bowing to the expertise of local 
actors who are “really living the challenges,” notes a public charity program officer, of 
the issues foundations want to address. As a longtime program officer at a private 
Midwestern foundation emphasizes, foundations should involve the people “living the 
problem” in “designing the solution.” He goes on to say, “it’s all too easy for a 
foundation to come in, and hire experts and say, ‘Oh, this is what you need.’ And there 
are countless stories, like the water pumps, or wells in a village that nobody uses 
[because] that wasn’t really what they wanted.” As a result, he notes, “[Our] foundation 
has this idea of like, ‘Let’s make it as local as possible.’” This sentiment, as noted, 
reflects a broader focus in global aid toward localization (Mansuri & Rao, 2013; von 
Billerbeck, 2017). It also suggests that foundations’ theories of change “for what should 
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happen [elsewhere],” a foundation president tells me, are likely to be ineffective or 
irrelevant if developed in New York, San Francisco, or Washington, D.C. Rather, the 
goal is “to go [there] to work with local…organizations and ask them…and find out from 
them what their needs are, what their challenges are.” Similarly, the aforementioned 
public charity representative passionately states: 
There’s not a program officer in our office creating a strategy for a region of the world, 
for example. In a lot of foundations, they’ll do a strategic plan and they’ll set their 
grantmaking strategies based on scoping and getting information from the field. But the 
program officers are really in charge of developing that strategy and then carrying it out 
through their grantmaking…There’s no one doing that here. People who are developing 
the strategies are on the ground…they’re the ones who see the trends in the [field] and 
what’s going on on the ground and where the grants are going to be most strategic. 
 
Foundations acknowledge that their efforts to maximize the impact of their philanthropic 
gifts hold greater promise when their intended beneficiaries are participating in the 
development of theories of change. Notes a researcher at a funders’ affinity group, donors 
are “moving in that direction of having more participatory processes, or if they’re not set 
up to do that, [then]…to make sure that they’re looking for organizations that have deep 
ties to the community.” Thus theories of change should emanate from below, rather than 
as dictated by program officers from above. As one panelist noted in the conference 
session mentioned above, those in the global South (a rare term to hear at this particular 
conference) will implement solutions with or without support from the global North, so 
the latter would be wise to come aboard.  
The foundation representatives with whom I spoke proclaim their level of trust in 
grantees for addressing challenges in whatever way they deem appropriate, and some 
empirical work supports this claim: Elbers and Schulpen (2011), for example, find that 
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local development partners have greater decision-making input on topics like target 
beneficiaries, strategy, and project planning, rather than subjects concerning the length 
and allocation of funding. This requires not only humility, but also a willingness to listen 
and incorporate grantees’ ideas. A corporate foundation program officer, for instance, 
explains, “For us it’s really been about– I think listening is important in terms of 
identifying the issue…because our heart isn’t set on like ‘Oh, we want to just do [a given 
issue].’ I think it’s important for us to be…responsive.” In the remainder of her 
statement, she distances her foundation from her peers’ more formalized processes, as 
others have above: 
Sometimes [foundations] have [their] guidelines and then they’re set in stone…[But we 
can] support causes and issues that are relevant and that are necessary and that are maybe 
much more far reaching rather than if we had set those, say, “Okay, we only support 
women and girls in education.” 
 
In this way, being flexible with approaches is a defining trait of what one consultant calls 
“a very, very good funder.” This Boston-based consultant recounts an example in which a 
group of grantees described an emergent issue to the large foundation providing support: 
“[It] was not one of the issues that was part of their strategy, but they felt like they 
wanted to be responsive to their grantees, which we really appreciate and kind of 
treasure.” When foundations listen, demonstrate flexibility and responsiveness, and defer 
to the knowledge of grantees to identify both problems and solutions, they believe this is 
key to creating and maximizing impact for grantees and communities of beneficiaries. 
This reflects a repudiation of core elements unpinning strategic philanthropy, as 
foundations deliberately distance their practices from the less savory aspects.  
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Proximity to “Partners” 
How do large, independent foundations find local expertise to draw upon? In 
much the same way as the previous chapter described foundations’ reliance on having a 
local presence – or at least access to one – for staying vigilant about opportunities and for 
vetting potential grantees, these philanthropic actors often emphasize and assert their 
“very close interaction with the organizations that we support.” Some foundations believe 
this is best done when they have physical offices located abroad. The former director of 
one such in-country office describes to me how “Different foundations work in different 
ways,” whether by having offices in different countries or “hiring a consultant or 
someone who’s a locally-based person that can help advise them.” But, he says, “we’re 
kind of one model where…we think to be engaged in the country effectively, you 
actually have to have boots on the ground so to speak.” For another director of an in-
country office, it is precisely their “closeness to the organizations” they support that 
facilitates their superior commitment to grantees. In other cases, foundations must 
develop “a local presence” through brokers, a UN representative contends. Whether 
foundations have physical offices in other countries or simply access to them through 
NGOs embedded in communities of beneficiaries, proximity to local knowledge and 
expertise is prized for its perceived positive effect on the creation of impact.  
Nearly every foundation and public charity representative I spoke with described 
their grantees as “partners” because, as a corporate foundation program officer 
emphasizes, “we both want the same thing, you know, we want to effect change.” This 
reflects a decades-long trend across the global development landscape of “partnerships” 
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between NGOs in the global North and the global South (Fowler, 1998). Framing 
grantees as partners is a source of “pride,” a public charity representative states, in 
attempting to “disrupt power dynamics…between private foundations and grantees” by 
leveling the playing field (but see Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004; Fowler, 1998). 
Foundations espouse the value of partnerships because, as a program director in the 
Midwest states, “We’re very mindful that we aren’t doing the work, we’re funding the 
work. The grantees are doing the work.” In this sense, foundations portray themselves as 
playing a supportive, facilitating role. Says one New York-based corporate foundation 
strategist, “It’s not really us going to a country and dictating the agenda or trying to force 
[what] partners [do] from above, but rather working with people that have local 
expertise…We are very conscious of that.” For another corporate foundation 
representative whose grantees are their “implementing partners,” she notes spending “a 
lot of time listening and learning. We think a lot about power dynamics, and try to build 
equitable relationships so that they’ll tell us the hard stuff…when things aren’t working. 
We really try to solve [issues] together…[and] implement our vision.” Because the 
impact foundations can have globally is largely dependent upon the NGOs they select, it 
may be vital for them to rely on grantees’ own theories of change.  
In addition to listening, learning, and trusting, some foundations may be more 
“hands on” than others. According to a West Coast-based foundation program officer, 
“there [are] different approaches in philanthropy.” For her foundation, it’s not simply 
disbursing funds, receiving progress reports, and deciding whether to renew the grant. 
Rather, she says: 
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We’re very involved with our grantees, so we will do whatever we can to help support 
and further their goals once they’re a partner of ours. Partners don’t have to be grantees 
but all grantees are partners, and what that means is we really, truly treat it as a 
partnership. 
 
However, being “hands on” is a potentially slippery slope because it risks falling prey to 
strategic philanthropy’s emphasis on active grantee management, which funding 
recipients may perceive as overbearing. Though one respondent, for example, insists 
grantees are partners, he also notes, “We supplement our grant funding by the expertise 
that we provide.” At the same time, being “hands on” can also mean, as described by a 
veteran program officer, “having [a] high touch kind of philanthropy where staff are 
really active, and they’re involved in the fields that they’re funding in, and they serve on 
boards in those fields, and they’re involved with capacity building with grantees.” These 
different approaches to working with grantees – as purportedly equal “partners” with a 
similar stake in creating impact – reveal myriad instances of foundations asserting that 
their willingness to listen and incorporate the insights of grantees in developing, or “co-
creating” theories of change, as one respondent states, provide a more effective way of 
maximizing the impact of their philanthropic gifts.  
And yet, a substantial body of literature calls into question the extent to which 
partnerships between donors and funding recipients can ever be truly equal because there 
exist fundamental asymmetries in political and financial power that are frequently 
overlooked in practice (Ashman, 2001; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004), as well as a 
de-politicization of global development through the use of “buzzwords” like 
“participatory development” and “empowerment” (Cornwall & Brock, 2005). Reith 
(2010, p. 447) contends, “partnership lies at the heart of contemporary development 
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agendas…[but it disguises] the reality of the complex relationships in imbalances of 
power and inequality, often expressed through the control of one ‘partner’ over the 
other.” Even the focus on localization can obscure local inequalities in power (Cornwall 
& Brock, 2005; Mohan & Stokke, 2000), and its opaque definition calls into question 
precisely who local actors are (von Billerbeck, 2017). In addition, local actors often have 
their own agendas and approaches. Swidler and Watkins (2017, p. 198) observe that 
donors must rely “on a chain of local brokers who may have their own understanding of 
what is needed” in creating social change. But because funders hold the purse strings, 
conferring with local actors does not guarantee that donors will meaningfully incorporate 
their insights and opinions (Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Elbers & Schulpen, 2011). This 
suggests that despite foundations’ claims to defer to their grantees’ theories of change 
while acknowledging underlying power dynamics and the importance of funders’ 
humility, the organizations respondents represent still face certain intractable challenges 
that can complicate their efforts to maximize impact.  
“We Buy Into Their Total Organizational Mission” 
A central assumption of strategic philanthropy, as originally conceived (Porter & 
Kramer, 1999), is that funding for discrete, time-bound projects is most effective for 
creating (and, importantly, measuring) value. Attention shifts away from building up the 
general organizational capacity of grantees – in other words, their ability to effectively 
serve their communities and targeted beneficiaries (Barman & MacIndoe, 2012; Despard, 
2017) – and toward the outcomes a philanthropic gift will produce (Lecy & Searing, 
2015). Scholars and observers note a widespread preference among donors of all kinds, 
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including foundations (Aksartova, 2009; Sprenger, 2016) for project funding (Elbers & 
Arts, 2011; Krause, 2014) because – it is argued – funding tied to projects lasts only a 
couple of years, holds greater promise for creating impact in the short-term, and allows 
both donors and grantees to measure the results of funding more easily (Edwards, 2009).  
One element of the shift toward public and nonprofit sector accountability in the 
late 1980s and 1990s, from which came the focus on outcome measurement (Barman, 
2016a; Barman & MacIndoe, 2012), was an effort to increase organizations’ financial 
transparency; in other words, to determine how well nonprofit organizations use the 
funding they receive. Growing access to nonprofits’ financial information (through 
watchdogs like Guidestar and Charity Navigator and the availability of IRS Form 990s 
that tax-exempt organizations [including foundations, who have their own 990-PF] must 
file) has enabled donors to calculate potential grantees’ “overhead ratio,” or the ratio of 
expenses spent on overhead (e.g., administrative costs) relative to total expenses (Lecy & 
Searing, 2015). Donors’ logic contends that the lower an organization’s overhead ratio, 
the more efficiently it uses its resources; these ratios thus serve as a “proxy for 
effectiveness” (Lecy & Searing, 2015, p. 541; Louie, 2018). As Elbers and Arts (2011, p. 
715) contend, “Fueled by the ideas and practices of managerialism, donor agencies have 
tightened control and accountability measures to improve effectiveness, efficiency and 
transparency.” Despite the increasing professionalization of the nonprofit sector in recent 
decades (Hwang & Powell, 2009) and consequently higher administrative expenses 
(dedicated, in part, to fundraising efforts), donors have often bristled at high overhead 
expenses – often because they underestimate costs associated with running nonprofits 
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(Gregory & Howard, 2009) – as well as requests to fund them (Burkart, Wakolbinger, & 
Toyasaki, 2018; Silverman & Beatty, 2006). In other cases, donors worry that funding 
overhead (through so-called “general operating support”) fosters grantees’ dependence on 
continued funding (Delfin & Tang, 2006; Letts, Ryan, & Grossman, 1997).  
Donors’ reluctance to provide this general operating support risks the 
organizational health of grantees by limiting the resources they can invest in their overall 
infrastructure, whether in the form of office space, utilities, staff salaries, or staff training. 
Since the mid-1980s, nonprofits have reduced their overhead expenditures to “gain a 
competitive edge in donor markets” (Lecy & Searing, 2015, p. 540), despite some 
evidence suggesting nonprofits with lower overhead ratios do not, in fact, receive more 
funding (from individuals, foundations, and corporations) than their peers with higher 
overhead ratios (Frumkin & Kim, 2001). Scholars have shown that reduced overhead 
expenditures have a detrimental effect on nonprofits – and one that threatens how well 
they manage and operate the programs donors are so eager to fund (Burkart et al., 2018). 
This contributes to what Gregory and Howard (2009) deem the “nonprofit starvation 
cycle,” through which funder expectations for less overhead, coupled with compliance by 
nonprofits, lead grantees to be “starved” of the resources so critical to their overall 
functioning (Sprenger, 2016). It is a “tension in the nonprofit space,” a philanthropic 
consultant tells me, because “you can have enormous programs and [yet] not enough 
money to run those programs, much less to grow your management team, your IT 
systems, [or] the capacity of the organization.”  
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In addition to contributing to this “starvation cycle,” foundations have often been 
critiqued for their reluctance to support grantees or causes over a long period of time. 
Globally, foundations “shift priorities and grant dollars,” Heydemann and Kinsey (2010) 
argue, “from issue to issue or region to region in relatively short funding cycles, further 
mitigating the long-term impact of their presence in a particular field” (p. 211). This 
short-term focus therefore threatens not only foundations’ stated desire for impact (Grady 
et al., 2017), but also the sustainability of the grantee organizations and projects they 
support (Benjamin & Quigley, 2010), as it hinders their ability to plan and operate on a 
longer time horizon (Elbers & Arts, 2011; Sprenger, 2016). Moreover, it can lead 
nonprofits and NGOs down the path of mission drift as they reframe programming to 
adapt to the changing preferences of donors (Elbers & Arts, 2011; Morfit, 2011; Swidler 
& Watkins, 2017; but see Delfin & Tang, 2006; Kanter & Summers, 1987). Thus, both 
the short-term window within which donors expect change and the insufficient funding 
provided to grantees to effectively implement said change work in concert to 
inadvertently hinder grantees’ work and their ability to operate for the long haul.  
 
Funding the Organization as a Whole 
Against this backdrop, many respondents agree that too narrow a focus on 
projects is “a really bad practice,” contends a former foundation strategist, because the 
issue is that “Rather than supporting organizations that they love, foundations love to 
support projects that they love.” This means, he says derisively, that: 
[When a grantee] is saying, “Hey we’d like for you to support our work,” [a foundation 
would say], “Well I love you guys but I only want to support this like little piece of what 
  
 
188 
you’re doing. Oh and by the way I have real limitations on the amount of overhead that 
you can include in that.”  
 
One vice president of programs observes, “Everybody wants to squeeze blood out of each 
grantee and say, ‘We only want program returns. We don’t want to help build your 
internal capacity to train your staff or to keep the lights on,’ but that’s part and parcel of 
making the grantee strong and robust.” These statements reflect the extent to which the 
representatives with whom I spoke acknowledge the challenges of the “nonprofit 
starvation cycle” and remain critical of those funders that contribute to it, in part because 
it implies a lack of trust by donors who question the ability of grantees to use funding 
appropriately or toward impactful ends. To be sure, however, some respondents did 
display a preference for project funding because it eases reporting metrics and more 
clearly demonstrates impact (which I discuss in greater detail below).  
Respondents therefore frequently tout their provision of general operating support 
to grantees. “Flexible funding,” to which it is sometimes referred, allows grantees to 
cover their overhead expenses, build their internal capacity, and use funding however 
they see fit. As a corporate foundation program officer notes, “We know that [the grantee 
is] doing great work…[and we’re] not necessarily dictating what they would work on” 
by, for instance, tying funding to specific programs or projects. In other words, the 
aforementioned vice president of programs states, “We’re increasingly looking at not 
nickel and diming our grantees, but giving them the wherewithal to do the job properly, 
and try to be as generous as we can in terms of general operating support.” In a 
particularly insightful interview with a longtime program officer at a private foundation 
in the Midwest, he describes the importance of general operating support for grantees:  
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We are go-to general purposes funding... [which] is completely flexible. It’s saying that, 
“Okay, it takes you a million year, whatever it is, to run your organization. To do 
everything you want to do. We’re going give you 100,000. And you could use it however 
you want. If you need it to pay the utility bills, fine.” If you [as the grantee] say, “Oh, I 
got a grant from another agency to do program X, but they only gave me 20,000, and to 
do it well I really need 30,000.” We’d say, “Okay. If you use 10,000 of our money to put 
towards that, fine.” So it’s totally flexible funding. What it means is usually we’re 
supporting organizations where we buy into their total organizational mission.  
 
This means supporting the overall capacity of the grantee organization to perform the 
work foundations hope will achieve some level of impact. Indeed, Hwang and Powell 
(2009) find that grants foundations make specifically for capacity building can further 
professionalize grantee organizations.32 However, nonprofits consistently report that 
general operating grants – more flexible and accommodating to the needs of grantees – 
go much farther in strengthening their organizations than grants specifying a particular 
kind of capacity building activity (Buteau et al., 2018; Delfin & Tang, 2006). Investing in 
grantees in this way – a way that not all of their peers value – therefore allows 
foundations to help increase the sustainability of organizations and their social change 
efforts. It means pursuing “organization-centered grantmaking,” as a foundation 
representative in New York describes: “Of course we’re interested in supporting 
organizations which are aligned with [our] mission and values, but...we think the best 
way to actually achieve that mission is if organizations are kind of strong and resilient.” 
Consistently, then, respondents extol the value of funding an entire organization, rather 
than a narrow aspect of it.  
  
                                                        
32 Though they tend to fund certain aspects of capacity more than others, such as strategic planning 
processes (Hwang & Powell, 2009) and trainings (Delfin & Tang, 2006).   
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Funding Over a Long Time Horizon 
Much like the disdain many of my respondents display toward a myopic focus on 
funding projects, so too are they critical of peer foundations that underestimate the length 
of time creating meaningful impact can take. A philanthropic consultant, for example, 
levies a critique on what he describes as “a propensity to fund for too short an amount of 
time” among foundations. He contends, “There’s a propensity to being really addicted to 
innovation…and that makes for really short-term relationships…I used to call [it] the 
field of titill-anthropy. Right? Like that funders need to be titillated or else they get bored 
and distracted and they walk away.” His statement is critical of funders that refuse to 
commit to causes and organizations for an appropriate period of time.  
In a similar rebuke of this short-term, results-oriented approach, a retired program 
officer emphasizes the importance of a longer-term commitment. He reflects on 
employing this strategy in his work in decades past: 
One of the first things I did, almost every time we went into a new area, I’d ask my board 
of trustees for at least 10 years’ worth of being able to make grants. We can’t go in 
anywhere at least for less than 10 years. Why start? You can’t just work on projects. You 
have to build institutions and public understanding, and a lot of things that take a very 
long time. This is one of the things that a lot of foundations never were willing to do in 
the past, and some aren’t willing to do now.  
 
Similarly, the aforementioned vice president of programs in California notes: 
One of our philosophies is that…you have to think long-term. You have to think 
multiyear. You have to give the grantee some kind of confidence in knowing that they’re 
not going to have the rug pulled out from under them. You have to have faith in the fact 
that they don’t have all the answers, but with the confidence of knowing that they’ve got 
the right staff, tools, objectives, goals that coincide with our vision, you know, give them 
the resources to do it over an extended period of time. 
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His statement demonstrates a dedication to the grantees his foundation selects, along with 
an acknowledgement that not only do grantees possess the expertise to make change, but 
that foundations can also trust grantees to steward philanthropic gifts thoughtfully.  
In contrast, when grantees face uncertainty over when they receive funding or for 
how long and “you [the grantee] are not sure from moment to moment if you’re going to 
have the money you need [to operate as an organization], it just creates a lot of instability 
and starting and stopping and disruption and fragmentation in the work,” as one 
consultant states. That is to say, it greatly hinders the potential impact foundations can 
make through the work of their grantees. To remedy this, respondents boast funding 
grantees over multiple grant cycles, which are usually only a few years at most. For 
example, a veteran program officer states, “We’re ready to stick with an organization for 
much longer over several cycles of renewals. I told you our usual is a two-year grant. We 
try to stretch it to three-year if we can...often we’re in there for a good decade, with 
funding an organization.” A public charity representative echoes this sentiment: 
“Typically speaking, if a [grantee] organization continues to do work that is innovative 
and working, even if it’s challenging [to fund them], we’re going to keep funding 
them…We don’t have a cutoff date” beyond which they will cease providing support. 
These donors seek neither to pull the rug out from under grantees doing important work, 
nor switch gears on them by pursuing a different issue area.  
Foundation representatives therefore pride themselves on their commitment to 
particular issues or regions and to grantee organizations. Says one program director in the 
Midwest: 
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Some [foundations] will have a unit that kind of scans the horizon for new opportunities 
and they might...start something completely different that they’ve never done before. 
That’s not really characteristic of our approach. I can’t think of an example of something 
we do de novo like that. 
 
Relative to other funders who may jump from issue area to issue area, then, she 
represents an organization that believes in having staying power. Other respondents laud 
this long-term perspective in a similar way. One program officer in New York, for 
instance, states, “A big plus for [our] Foundation is that it has a long-term horizon.” 
Unlike other foundations, he notes, “It’s not looking for quick success and the flashy 
headline in the New York Times [saying], ‘look what we have done for the poor people 
in Africa’…or declare victory over hunger, poverty, [or] malaria…This is not that kind of 
foundation.” That is, he works for a foundation that prizes lengthy commitments to 
grantees, not one that seeks to create substantial impact in a short period of time because, 
as he states elsewhere in his interview, partnering with grantees is “not a one-night stand 
or weekend fling. It is [a] long-term partnership.” Another program officer extols this 
same value, reflecting on making grants to a particular geographic region where, relative 
to other funders, he says, “The contrast there was…We are much more long-term in our 
perspective. It’s one of the things I liked about [this foundation] when I came here.” For 
foundations with offices abroad, this can signal commitment to foreign governments, as a 
former in-country office director describes:  
It was always nice when you could bring up [how long we’d been there] with the 
government…[as if to say] “What more do you need to know to prove our commitment 
to this country?”…So we go to a country, and we believe in staying there and really 
investing in it. 
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These shows of long-term commitment illustrate the extent to which foundations believe 
themselves to be truly invested in the work of their grantees, as well as their efforts to 
distance themselves from the less reputable behavior of their peers who employ much 
narrower approaches to funding that cause unintentional hardship for grantees.  
 
Challenges of Long-Term Commitment and General Operating Support 
Investing in grantees over the long haul, coupled with providing general operating 
support to grantees, present salient challenges that complicate foundations’ effort to 
maximize their impact. First, it can prevent foundations from funding as many new-to-
them, potentially impactful organizations as they may like. This is summarized by a 
program officer on the West Coast who laments:  
Generally it’s this constant tension of you want to make bigger, larger grants…That’s 
what everybody prefers to get. The challenge is that if you do those multi-year, large, 
gen[eral]-op[erating] grants, which we do many of, then you’re just closing the space for 
other organizations to get in the door. 
 
In other words, committing to certain grantees may mean saying “no” to others. Part of 
this stems from a budgeting practice within many foundations, where program officers 
within a particular program area are allocated a certain amount of “grant dollars” each 
year, which they subsequently disperse among their various grantees. Often there is some 
space for negotiation (whether between programs or between program officers), but there 
can be a “zero sum kind of tension,” a program director states, that pits program officers 
and their grantees against one another, whereby one organization receiving a funding 
commitment for several years may reduce the pot of money available to others.  
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 Second, as I explained in the previous chapter, when private U.S. foundations 
fund overseas organizations directly, they must ensure that grantees are equivalent to a 
U.S. 501(c)(3) charity for their philanthropic gift to be tax-exempt. In cases where 
determining equivalency is not possible (for instance, the grantee cannot provide 
adequate financial documentation), foundations may conduct expenditure responsibility, 
but the oversight and reporting requirements are much more stringent because the grant 
must be used solely for charitable purposes (New York Community Trust, 2002). When 
private foundations report their financial activities, as required by the IRS Form 990-PF, 
any grants over which they have exercised expenditure responsibility are clearly 
delineated as serving a specific charitable purpose. Foundations typically include 
language such as the following from the Hilton Foundation’s 2016 990-PF:  
To the best of our knowledge, no grantee has diverted any portion of the funds from the 
purpose of the grant. We have received ample progress reports and are satisfied with the 
work being carried out and that all funds have been properly expended to carry out 
charitable activities. 
 
Similarly, the Ford Foundation writes in its 2016 990-PF, “The Foundation has no reason 
to doubt the accuracy or reliability of any reports received from the grantee.” This 
specificity required by the IRS, however, can greatly circumscribe grantees’ use of 
funding, as a former in-country office director illustrates through the hypothetical 
example of a grant used to purchase an office desk:  
I mean it’s all quite cumbersome but IRS has the useful life of various products, so like a 
desk is considered office equipment so that has a ten-year useful life. So then literally that 
organization has to report to you for ten years that [they] are still using this desk for a 
charitable purpose. So there are lots of reasons why you want an organization to be 
equivalent [to a U.S. 501(c)(3) charity]. Or if they’re non-equivalent, there are lots of 
reasons why a program officer would say, “If you need a desk, please buy it with 
someone else’s money, but not ours.”  
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Between the reporting requirements and concerns about terrorist financing (whereby 
foundations face serious consequences if that desk were somehow used to commit acts of 
terrorism), general operating support can be difficult to grant,33 even if it is what a grantee 
needs most or requests.  
Finally, there is an ongoing disconnect between the attitudes of foundation leaders 
and the leaders of their nonprofit grantees. For example, the several public charity 
representatives I interviewed contend that the funding they receive from donors 
(including large, private foundations) has become increasingly project-tied and, in that 
sense, driven by the perceived expertise of donors, rather than of grantees. Much to their 
chagrin, this constrains their ability to respond adequately and appropriately to the needs 
identified by in-country brokers. To this end, a recent report from the Center for Effective 
Philanthropy finds that 95% of foundation leaders34 say their foundation cares about 
strengthening grantee organizations’ overall health, yet only 43% of nonprofit leaders 
feel that funders demonstrate this care (Buteau et al., 2018). Moreover, in his analysis of 
U.S. foundation funding for Chinese CSO capacity building, Spires (2012) contends that 
funders’ professionalization efforts reflected their priorities, rather than responding to the 
organic needs of organizations (see also Delfin & Tang, 2006; Hwang & Powell, 2009). 
Thus, foundations may inadvertently impose their own approaches on grantees despite 
trusting their discretion in the use of funds. Together, these are challenges that 
                                                        
33 General operating support is more difficult to grant to organizations over which foundations exercise 
expenditure responsibility, but it is possible to allocate this type of grant to foreign organizations that 
demonstrate equivalency. 
34 The sample of foundations in this study tended to give less annually than those in my research, though 
many are similarly private and independent. 
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respondents frequently grappled with during interviews, and they highlight the 
complexity of philanthropic efforts to maximize impact through grantee support. 
Monitoring and Evaluating Impact 
Because large, independent U.S. foundations share an orientation to the 
maximization of impact – and so distribute their philanthropic gifts in its pursuit – they 
are thoroughly attentive to the consequences of their funding. As such, they evaluate and 
assess both the work of grantees and themselves by, as one experienced program officer 
states, “keeping a mindful eye on the progress that any of the work that you are currently 
funding or have funded is in any way moving the dial on some of the issues that you’re 
trying to impact.” While evaluation has traditionally allowed foundations and nonprofits 
to legitimize their value to society (Barman, 2013; Hall, 2004), there are practical 
benefits to assessing their work, as well, whether to ensure the quality of the programs 
they support, learn from past mistakes (Greenwald, 2013), or determine whether grantees 
should receive additional funds (Carson, 2000). Indeed, as multiple program officers 
mentioned to me, grantee reports must be reviewed and approved before their next 
payment is dispersed, rendering additional funding contingent upon the demonstration of 
progress. 
With the growing influence of accountability metrics (outcome measurement, 
overhead ratio calculations, and the like) across the nonprofit sector (Barman, 2016a; 
Barman & MacIndoe, 2012; Lecy & Searing, 2015; Woolford & Curran, 2012), it should 
come as little surprise that evaluating the impact of foundations’ grantmaking is of great 
interest to the entire philanthropic sector. And over the past decade, foundations have 
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increased the financial and staff resources committed to conducting evaluations 
(Coffman, Beer, Patrizi, & Thompson, 2013). In the early 2000s, some observers 
described foundation evaluation efforts as an “inexact science” because donors and 
funding recipients rarely established progress benchmarks at the outset of a grant 
(Carson, 2000) and because some were skeptical of whether such information would be 
meaningfully incorporated into daily decision-making (Braverman, Constantine, & 
Slater, 2004). More recently, however, as the tenets of strategic philanthropy have 
permeated foundation practices, it is now quite common to find grant agreements 
stipulating what grantees will achieve and how foundations will measure their progress. 
Hwang and Powell (2009, p. 285) write, “many foundations have recently become very 
strong advocates of systematic analysis of the nonprofit sector and can make formal 
measurement a condition of funding.” But what precisely monitoring and evaluation 
entail varies considerably across foundations (Ostrower, 2004).  
 
Performance Evaluation Practices 
In my conversations with foundation program officers and public charity 
representatives, the subject of monitoring and evaluation is never far from their minds. 
For foundations, measuring impact and assessing the effects of their grantmaking are 
often accomplished through the reports grantees provide that describe how grant funding 
was used and what impact it created. These are often annual reports, but may occur more 
frequently, such as on a semi-annual basis. A corporate foundation program officer in the 
Midwest, for example, finds these progress reports helpful because they provide her with 
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the opportunity to determine “…Are [grantees] well on their way [to] spending the 
budget? Are they well on their way with the amount of people that they said they were 
going to impact and the types of things that they were spending their budget on?” Her 
statement defines impact in relatively narrow, quantitative terms – as “counting” 
(Watkins et al., 2012) the number of people the NGO serves – which is a common metric 
in outcome measurement (Barman, 2016a) and a type of information foundations often 
report to the IRS.35 For others, however, reports are considered more holistically and with 
“analytical work,” says a longtime program officer in the Midwest. He continues, “I have 
to digest what it is they’re doing, and not just from a formal perspective [i.e., whether 
funds are used as stated], but to try to understand what progress is being made.” The 
statement “what progress is being made,” rather than “was made,” suggests a sort of 
continuous learning engagement with grantees, in contrast (or in addition) to more 
retrospective evaluations that reflect on the success or failure of past efforts (Chelimsky, 
2001; Coffman et al., 2013).  
Many respondents touted the superiority of a continuous, rather than periodic, 
learning process, which extends beyond (or even eschews) simple numerical measures of 
impact in favor of more comprehensive understandings of a foundation’s intervention. A 
program director in the Midwest, for example, states: 
Just based on conversations we’ve been recently having with counterparts, I would say 
the way that we’re approaching learning now is distinctive. I think it’s more common for 
foundations to do retrospective evaluation of work they’ve supported, and I think it’s 
distinctive that we have evaluation built in from the beginning in our strategy design.  
                                                        
35 Part IX-A of the IRS Form 990-PF requires that foundations “List [their] four largest direct charitable 
activities…[and] include relevant statistical information such as the number of organizations and other 
beneficiaries served, conferences convened, research papers produced, etc.” Quantitative measures about 
grantee activities can therefore simplify foundations’ reporting.  
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In other words, the theory of change that foundations develop (to varying degrees in 
consultation with grantees or with outside experts) specifies a set of inputs and outputs to 
achieve certain outcomes, as well as progress benchmarks or indicators by which to 
assess success. This allows foundations to examine their efforts toward creating impact 
on an ongoing basis. Similarly, a vice president of programs in California notes, “It’s not 
as though we’ve got one game plan that we set at a particular time and then five years 
later we look at whether we’re accomplishing what we set out to do. We track in real time 
what we’re learning and what kind of impact we feel we’re having in the area.” Should 
red flags emerge, for example, foundations can make “some mid-course corrections,” as 
another program officer notes. Continuous learning thus enables foundations to assess 
whether grantees appear to be achieving the intended impact of funding and to intervene 
in their work if deemed necessary.  
Whether foundations practice continuous learning or retrospective evaluations 
(Chelimsky, 2001; Coffman et al., 2013), the reporting expectations grantees encounter 
often require substantial administrative effort. Funding recipients may be subject to 
different “logics of evaluation” (whether these differences are based on the frequency of 
reporting or on the type of data requested), but each carries “resource implications” for 
grantees, who “are increasingly required to use more sophisticated evaluation approaches 
but with limited (or no) funding for such purposes” (Hall, 2014, p. 310). Even if funders 
place full trust in grantees to use grant money appropriately, they still require reports 
from grantees documenting how that funding was used. For grantees, this often entails 
completing foundation-specific reporting guidelines and providing evidence of impact. 
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The executive director of a public charity in California, for examples, describes tailoring 
reports to different funders: 
Different private foundations want different information. Like one…really likes numbers, 
and really likes to know the impact of, “How many people is each grant [helping]? How 
long has the grantee been funded? The cost per beneficiary”…Other funders [want to 
know] more about movement building…[and] how different agendas are being moved 
forward.  
 
Framing grantees’ impact in different ways, according to the diverse preferences or 
demands of foundations, requires not only collecting and conveying such information, 
but also knowing how to present these assessments of impact to each donor in question.  
Increasingly, some actors across the field of international grantmaking are at the 
forefront of an effort to decrease – or at least make more flexible – reporting 
requirements for grantees, as this has been identified as key to creating longer-term, 
sustainable impact (e.g., Grady et al., 2017). I first became exposed to this burgeoning 
discourse of “streamlining” at a conference in the Summer of 2017, when a young 
activist representing a grassroots organization in the U.S. encouraged funders to lessen 
the burdens placed on grantees. This may mean greater flexibility about reporting 
deadlines or reducing reporting requirements so grantees can focus less on administrative 
tasks and more on their important social change work. A consultant at a prominent 
philanthropic consulting firm levies a similar critique, stating: 
I think a flaw with a lot of foundations is…the grantee has to do a detailed proposal for 
every single funder and then go through the due diligence for that funder. And then they 
get the proposal funded, and then they have to have separate aims and objectives and 
reports for every funder. That takes a big toll! 
 
Later, in the leadup to the endnote speaker for that conference, participants gathered 
together to reflect on their conference experiences. One woman, the director of a public 
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charity in the Philippines, expressed her gratitude for donors that understand that not 
every single expense can be budgeted and accounted for – like “raft receipts,” she 
chortled, the method of transportation she uses to meet with beneficiaries.  
In light of this field-level contestation that has focused on the behavior of 
foundations (Grady et al., 2017) – more so than the impact-producing activities of 
grantees (e.g., Porter & Kramer, 1999) – a number of respondents emphasized their 
leniency, with one private foundation program officer noting, “We try to be as light touch 
as possible....and not to get [into] too heavy burdens.” Representatives of public charities 
are particularly cognizant of the effort that reporting to demonstrate impact requires of 
grantees, partly because they have closer relationships to beneficiaries (fewer levels of 
the aid chain stand between them) and partly because – as a result of that proximity – 
they are also grantees. The activities a grantmaking public charity undertakes are only 
possible through the funds it raises. One representative in California, for example, states, 
“As a donor, because we’re kind of in that grantee position, we also try to be flexible 
with our grantees...We don’t want to burden them with a lot of paperwork and a lot of 
long final reports.” These statements suggest a compassion and respect for grantees and 
they work that they do, such that contending with elaborate reporting requirements places 
excessive burdens on them that may limit the actual social change work they undertake.  
 
Lost in Translation 
Importantly, the reports grantees provide are ultimately what enable foundations 
to assess the impact of their grantmaking, which – at least for the large, primarily 
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independent foundations in my sample – often goes above and beyond their compliance 
with IRS regulations. That is to say, there is only so much leeway foundations can extend 
to grantees before it becomes too difficult to determine what the foundation’s impact has 
been. Some donors are exceptionally flexible and, arguably, enlightened; one program 
officer in the Midwest, for instance, notes, “When we ask [a grantee] to report to us, we 
say, ‘Don’t report to us just what you spent [our] money on. Report to us all the money 
you spent,’ because we’re funding a piece of the bigger picture.” Other donors, perhaps 
not so much. While speaking with a researcher for an affinity group on the East Coast, 
she relays a story about the consequences of narrow reporting requirements:  
A funder…supported an organization that was reporting on the number of women that 
attended some sort of training, but didn’t mention that, separately, outside the purview of 
the grant, they had built up a connection with a local police force and worked with them 
to develop policies and education around domestic violence. [So when the funder] asked 
the grantee, like “Why didn’t you tell us this? This is amazing!” [The grantee was] like, 
“You didn’t fund us to do that, so we were just reporting on the check boxes that were 
part of our grant.” 
 
In this case, the funder’s reporting mechanism failed to capture the larger impact the 
grantee was creating, in part because that impact could not easily be traced specifically to 
the funding provided by any one donor.  
This example also illustrates two challenges to measuring and creating impact. 
First, while funding for a discrete project may offer a clear, quantifiable indicator of 
success (i.e., a certain number of women that attended a training), the provision of 
general operating support helps facilitate the wider breadth of activities a grantee 
undertakes, but it is also more difficult to evaluate. Foundations regularly struggle with 
balancing the importance of holistic organizational support with the need for 
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demonstrable impact evaluation. This was even the topic of a roundtable discussion I 
joined at the aforementioned conference, where participants lamented the explicit tension 
between the provision of general support to nonprofits and foundations’ desire to 
demonstrate the impact of funding. Second, there are certain types of activities whose 
impact is more difficult to assess (Watkins et al., 2012) – according to certain 
conceptions of impact and performance measurement (Hall, 2014; Lee & Nowell, 2015) 
– than others. As one representative of a public charity states, “It is really hard to monitor 
and evaluate movement building,” particularly when this is what donors request knowing.  
This conundrum indicates that the outcomes for some forms of social change are 
more difficult to quantify and assess, such that public charities – as grantees – improvise 
with alternative means of measuring the impact of donors’ funding. In one particularly 
illustrative example provided by a public charity program officer, she describes a grant 
provided for organizers of a social movement march to purchase walkie-talkies, asking, 
“How do we report on success for that?” She contends that the march was important for 
bringing together multiple activist communities as “a network so that it could strengthen 
[its collective] voice.” The walkie-talkies were useful for allowing those groups to 
communicate throughout the march, but:  
It’s not that the [grant] for walkie-talkies solved the…issues…It’s that they were given at 
a moment in time, in this window of opportunity when it was important to this larger 
network…that it contributed to. That’s how we frame the success or the outcomes of our 
grants. But we absolutely do get pushback around the fact that we aren’t able to fill out 
some of these really traditional monitor and evaluation check boxes and log frames and 
things like that. 
 
This illustrates the presence of what Brandtner (2017) calls “plurative evaluative 
landscapes,” whereby there are multiple legitimate, though competing, sets of evaluative 
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practices across an organizational field. Grantees perform evaluations that may be more 
or less subjective and that draw upon certain kinds of “expertise” and not others (Hall, 
2014). In the realm of international grantmaking, these reveal not only some level of 
contestation over the most appropriate means of assessing impact (Powell et al., 2017), 
but also uncertainty about the process, such that different performance indicators are 
employed variously (Lee & Nowell, 2015).  
How foundations ultimately measure their impact is both contested and, I would 
argue, somewhat uncritical. That is to say, the information foundations receive about 
grantees’ progress typically relies upon the self-reporting of grantees through progress 
reports or final reports, though foundations do, at times, hire external consulting firms to 
conduct comprehensive and retrospective program evaluations. However, as practitioners 
know and scholars affirm (Ashman, 2001; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004; Elbers & 
Schulpen, 2011; Werker & Ahmed, 2008), “One of the biggest challenges” in 
grantmaking, a philanthropic consultant explains, “is the power dynamic that exists 
between funders and grantees.” There are certainly donors with whom grantees have 
open and honest relationships and who understand the complexities of grantees’ work. 
But in the absence of those relationships, this Boston-based consultant suggests, grantees 
feel like, “‘Well, we have to report that everything went perfectly or we’re not going to 
get more funding.’” The inherent imbalance of power between donor and recipient 
permeates the field of international grantmaking, leading to immense pressure on 
grantees to perform in accordance with funders’ wishes.  
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To be sure, respondents willingly acknowledge that, in the words of a former in-
country office director, “When you’re really trying to work for impact, it takes a long 
time to see it…you may not actually know for five or ten years whether [the work you’re 
doing now] was good or not.” And yet, as public charity representatives emphasize, 
sometimes the year within which donors expect to see change is not actually enough time 
to meaningfully realize it. This leads to a phenomenon that others have noted and deemed 
“creating success” (Swidler & Watkins, 2017), whereby grantees work to convey – 
through reports and communication with donors – the success they believe donors want 
to see. Grantees may minimize their challenges, portraying themselves in a more positive 
light, lest they jeopardize additional funding (Elbers & Arts, 2011), or they may 
manipulate information given to donors in accordance with their expectations (Reith, 
2010) to articulate the kind of impact donors are thought to desire regardless of actual 
outcomes. Foundations’ pursuit of measurable social change, then, incites a sense of 
reactivity (Espeland & Sauder, 2007) in grantees as they respond to the pressure of 
needing to demonstrate the impact of foundations’ funds (Lee & Nowell, 2015).  
That a process instigates reactivity means actors – those who are being measured 
or assessed – alter their behavior in response to knowingly being evaluated because they 
“accept and internalize [evaluative] criteria as relevant guidelines for decision making 
aimed at survival and success” (Brandtner, 2017, p. 203). Espeland and Sauder (2007) 
offer a clear example of this effect: American law schools altered their operations in light 
of the importance of U.S. News rankings, despite disapproving of the ranking system and 
its criteria. The rankings themselves took center stage over the more unique qualities of 
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individual schools. Similarly, in the humanitarian NGO space, field-level standards – so-
called Sphere indicators – often lead NGOs to select relief projects where these can be 
met more easily (Krause, 2014).  
For some of the public charities whose representatives I interviewed, they have 
responded to this pressure by bolstering – or “systematizing,” as one respondent calls it – 
their monitoring and evaluation systems or by expanding their activities. Notes one 
program officer in California, “because our grants are small, sometimes people will ask 
us, ‘What’s the long-term impact? How can we amplify our grantmaking?’ So we use 
another strategy called advocacy” to support the marginalized communities of 
beneficiaries her organization funds. “Creating success” (Swidler & Watkins, 2017) thus 
requires work from grantees as they translate their activities and outcomes into evidence 
of impact. This often includes the use of case studies and narratives, as one representative 
of a New York-based public charity describes: “We put quite a bit of emphasis and 
thought into communicating with our funders about…what it really is like to be one of 
our partners and really sort of trying to capture…case studies and stories.” The efforts 
grantees undertake to complete reports and satisfy what they believe to be the preferences 
and demands of foundations – i.e., that they must work to “create” the “success” donors 
are thought to desire – suggests that their own needs regarding monitoring and evaluation 
remain largely unmet. That is to say, how grantees collect data, how they report back to 
donors, and, ultimately, how they understand impact may be insufficiently accounted for 
by foundations, in spite of the value the latter places on flexibility, humility, and latitude.  
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The Impact of Failure 
Despite foundations’ focus on maximizing impact and what grantees perceive as a 
relentless emphasis on “success,” however defined, the respondents of large, private 
foundations with whom I spoke emphasized a preference for “learning,” rather than 
“success.” Many of them even go so far as to equate learning with impact. Learning 
occurs through evaluation and the reports grantees provide, but its real value lies in its 
dissemination across the international grantmaking field. As the Californian vice 
president of programs states, “you acquire learning, which you feed into your future grant 
making, but you also share [it] with the sector and the community, hoping that what 
you’re doing can be leveraged by others so that you can really have a major impact.” He 
goes on to say, reflecting a sentiment echoed by numerous other respondents, “We want 
people to know [what we learn has worked], but also what hasn’t worked.” Conferences, 
publications, informal relationships, and conversations facilitated by affinity groups or 
peer networks (Edge Research & Harder+Company, 2017; Grady et al., 2018; Soskis & 
Katz, 2016) all provide the means for information to reach other funders.  
Because many program officers describe their grantmaking as “an art…not a 
science,” they typically acknowledge that, as one respondent states, “we’re not right all 
the time…not everything works out.” That is, the foundation representatives with whom I 
spoke extend some level of understanding to grantees that accepts unintended or 
nonexistent outcomes. For example, a corporate foundation program officer notes 
funding “organizations that want to take risks… sometimes it’s great. And sometimes it 
doesn’t work and we want to know the reason why it didn’t work.” Similarly, an in-
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country office director reflects on funding an organization that confronted challenges, 
rendering its work more difficult: “Would it be a total loss and a waste of money, or 
would you still have gains?” One representative of a public charity that re-grants funding 
to other organizations notes defining a “good grant” as one where “even if what they 
intended to do didn’t happen…they use[d] the money correctly [and] the field learns 
something.” In this sense, when anticipated outcomes are not realized through a 
foundation’s grant, the knowledge gained through that experience still constitutes impact. 
When this occurs, sometimes foundations cease supporting a particular grantee, 
but they may also continue to work with that organization to realize the impact they could 
not originally create. In other words, when anticipated impact is not realized, the goal 
becomes to understand why, which allows for changes to be made to achieve intended 
outcomes moving forward. Over coffee with a representative of a corporate foundation’s 
international grantmaking program, I asked about how reporting from grantees factors 
into future grantmaking decisions. She explains that year-end reports provide “the 
opportunity to say, ‘Either...you didn’t spend all your grant funds, so...we’re skipping a 
year…Or you didn’t serve the number of kids you thought you were going to, so the 
capacity of your organization to do what we’re hoping you’re doing is just not there.” I 
quote at length from my interview with a New York-based corporate foundation strategist 
because his statement clearly reveals the considerations foundations take into account 
when pursuing impact. He recalls: 
We definitely had programs over the years where the outcomes were not achieved, or at 
least not everything that the organization set out to deal with was done. When that 
happens, we make a decision: Do we continue to fund the partner or is this the end of the 
road for our relationship?...Where was the issue? Was it an issue in program design? Was 
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it an issue with the organization itself? Because that ultimately determines whether we 
continue funding them or not. If it’s an issue with the program design, where maybe the 
program itself might be good but it needs to be shaped differently…then we continue 
funding them in some cases. In other cases, we don’t continue funding them.  
 
In this sense, when foundations feel their grantee holds particular promise for 
maximizing the impact of philanthropic gifts, they will maintain the relationship. This 
supports existing findings that suggest a grantee’s reputation or relationship with its 
funder can be more important in grantmaking decisions than objective measures of 
performance (Tassie et al., 1996). As a former in-country office director tells me: 
You do want to feel like you can measure your successes and you can measure the things 
you’ve learned. But in fact, in just the short course of a grant, you don’t actually learn 
that much. Or what you think you learned might not – in the longer term – actually be the 
real impact. 
 
However, when that faith in grantees wanes, it hinders foundations’ ability to create the 
meaningful and measurable social change they seek, and so can lead them to turn their 
attention elsewhere. Unfortunately, this can belie their claims of supporting grantees as 
whole organizations and for the long haul if it appears the grantee will not deliver the 
type of impact foundations anticipate. 
Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how foundations endeavor to create measurable social 
change in the way they fund their selected grantees. Their decision-making processes are 
shaped in relation to their fellow philanthropic peers against the backdrop of contentious 
field-level debates surrounding how best to maximize impact (Grady et al., 2017; Kania 
et al., 2014). Rather than be perceived as purely “strategic” (Brest & Harvey, 2008; 
Porter & Kramer, 1999) – in which grantees are treated as the means to carry out donor 
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demands, rather than as partners with valuable expertise and knowledge – and heavy-
headed with grantees, or as excessively “donor-driven,” dictatorial, and demanding, the 
foundation program officers I interviewed portray themselves in opposition: as flexible 
and humble by deferring to grantees’ expertise for developing theories of change; as 
trusting of grantees to use “untied” funding or general operating support however they 
deem appropriate; and as amenable to lessening the burdensome reporting practices 
required of grantees. In turning their attention to grantmaking practices that promise 
impact, respondents readily acknowledge the importance of their own behavior (Grady et 
al., 2017), as the dictates of strategic philanthropy – by scrutinizing the activities of 
grantees – are unlikely to create the change they desire (Delfin & Tang, 2006). They 
understand and argue that prescribing grantee activities, providing funding for only 
projects but not overhead, and expecting to realize (easily measurable) change within a 
short span of time collectively place undue and unrealistic expectations upon grantees. In 
that case, grantees risk ultimately serving the demands of donors, as opposed to their 
communities of beneficiaries. 
The challenge for foundations remains that grantmaking to maximize impact 
largely precludes this level of flexibility. The large, independent foundations analyzed 
here are oriented toward creating unique and measurable social change, but this pursuit is 
complicated by supporting grantees contra strategic philanthropy’s dictates. Respondents 
claim, as described, to defer to grantee expertise, but research questions the extent to 
which grantee input is meaningfully incorporated in foundations’ decisions (Elbers & 
Schulpen, 2011). Even for flexible foundations that develop theories of change in concert 
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with knowledgeable funding recipients, grantees’ needs outside the purview of that 
theory may go unfulfilled. Similarly, foundations express their desire to support grantees 
holistically, providing not only program funding, but also general operating support to 
allow them to cover overhead expenses, among other costs (Gregory & Howard, 2009; 
Lecy & Searing, 2015). Yet, while foundations perceive themselves to be supporting 
grantees’ capacity building efforts, it is unclear whether grantees see this support in the 
same way (e.g., Buteau et al., 2018; Spires, 2012). General operating support also renders 
impact assessment more challenging, as particular activities are no longer tied to certain 
funds provided by certain donors.  
Grantee progress or year-end reports not only provide information about how 
funders’ grants were used and the impact produced, but they also ensure that foundations 
are operating in accordance with IRS guidelines by confirming all funding is allocated 
toward charitable purposes. More so, grantee reports form the basis of foundations’ 
efforts to evaluate themselves and the “success” of their grantmaking. Yet when grantees 
feel legitimate pressure to “create success” (Elbers & Arts, 2011; Swidler & Watkins, 
2017) – particularly within a short period of time – the credibility of those achievements 
is potentially dubious. While foundations therefore express a desire to fund long-term, 
widespread social change – and recognize that meaningful change requires many grant 
cycles to accomplish – grantees know that if impact is not demonstrated quickly, funders 
may not provide additional philanthropic gifts. Here again, grantees’ needs for time and 
patience may go unrealized in the pursuit of potentially elusive impact.  
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Some scholars call into question the extent to which funders truly practice what 
they preach. As Ostrower (2004, p. 1) argues, “all too often foundations have not made 
an institutional commitment to scrutinizing whether or not their practices match their 
stated beliefs.” In other words, if foundations are truly committed to maximizing the 
impact of their philanthropic gifts, are they willing to make grants in ways that inch them 
closer to impact’s realization? Fleishman (2007, p. 96), for one, is doubtful:  
One might assume that every foundation officer is eager to achieve significant impact. 
But the actions of many trustees and staff members sometimes make me wonder…I think 
the only conclusion we can reach is that many foundations are less interested in achieving 
real impact than in showing the world that their hearts are in the right place. 
 
Yet others disagree, pointing instead to exemplars of grantmaking for long-term impact 
(e.g., Grady et al., 2018) or to consistency between foundations’ values and their funding 
practices (Whitman 2008; 2009). To be sure, discrepancies between rhetoric and reality 
persist as products of intentional or unintentional decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) 
and therefore illuminate spaces in which – despite good intentions – grantee needs may 
still not be met. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL GRANTMAKING 
That large, independent philanthropic foundations in the U.S. have a long history 
of making grants internationally is well known (Curti, 1998; Heydemann & Kinsey, 
2010; Zunz, 2011), and research indicates their international giving has increased in 
recent decades (Lawrence & Mukai, 2010; Petersen & McClure, 2011; but see Mukai, 
2012), as the urgency with which global challenges must be addressed is brought into 
ever-starker relief (Gelles, 2015). What is much less known, however, is why these 
foundations distribute their philanthropic gifts in the ways that they do and how they 
decide to do so. Much of the existing research investigating these questions is either 
highly laudatory, assuming that the inherently altruistic motives of foundations drive their 
giving (Comte, 1973; Whitman, 2008), or highly critical, whereby their grantmaking is 
driven by self-interested motives and the reproduction of social, political, and economic 
hegemonic arrangements (Arnove, 1980; Berman, 1983; Fisher, 1983; Levich, 2015; 
Parmar, 2012). For other scholars, it is not these motives that determine giving, but rather 
foundations’ mimicry of their peers (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Kallman, 2017; 
Spires, 2011) in light of the considerable uncertainty characterizing the international 
grantmaking field (Gronbjerg et al., 2000; Nichols & Mackinnon, 2004; Renz & Samson-
Atienza, 1997). 
These theoretical assertions are informative and necessary, but they cannot fully 
explain the patterns of U.S. foundations’ international giving that research documents 
(Foundation Center & Human Rights Funders Network, 2018; Needles et al., 2018). We 
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know, for example, that the majority of philanthropic funding from American 
foundations benefits recipients in lower-middle and upper-middle income countries – in 
other words, neither the poorest nor the already well-off. We also know that foundations 
do not grant heavily to organizations in other countries, but neither are they averse to 
providing funding to smaller, more grassroots organizations through the use of 
intermediary public charities (and, in fact, funding for human rights-related grassroots 
organizing has actually increased over the last decade; Foundation Center & Human 
Rights Funders Network, 2018). Finally, research shows that foundations have diverse 
interests and priorities spanning funding topics, geographies, and approaches; that is to 
say, these interests and priorities have neither congealed around a select few topics 
(despite some trends; Needles et al., 2018), nor have they indicated uniformity in giving 
practices over time. Each of these findings therefore calls into question the extent to 
which foundations’ giving is simply a matter of their altruistic or self-interested motives 
or their mimicry of peers.  
Rather than ascribe their giving to motives or mimicry, I have employed a 
relational approach inspired by Bourdieusian field theory to investigate how, amid 
myriad pressing worldwide challenges, U.S. foundations choose to distribute their 
philanthropic gifts on a global scale. Bourdieu (1990), though critical of foundations, did 
not bring his analytical perspective to bear on the philanthropic sector as a whole. Yet his 
field theory captures the relational approach employed by U.S. foundations’ in 
distributing their philanthropic gifts globally. My findings center on the field’s shared 
orientation to the maximization of impact, whereby the large, primarily independent U.S. 
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foundations in this study seek to create unique, measurable social change with their “do 
good money.” Their understanding and operationalization of impact is only meaningful in 
relation to other sets of actors, from development institutions and foreign governments to 
an array of potential grantee organizations and the behavior of their peers. I do not 
suggest that motives and mimicry are irrelevant, but I have sought to extend analysis past 
these understandings toward a more fine-grained examination of foundations’ ongoing 
and dynamic resource-allocation decisions. Indeed, as Emirbayer and Johnson (2008, p. 
29) emphasize, “analysts frequently interpret as the mission, strategy, or goal of an 
organization…that which is actually the temporary outcome of struggles to impose 
particular position-takings.” Bringing Bourdieu to bear on the international grantmaking 
field therefore complicates such assumptions by revealing a great number of 
considerations that factor into American foundations’ decision-making beyond static 
motives or mimicry.  
Though the notion of impact is hardly novel to actors and analysts in this space – 
in large part a product of the push for strategic philanthropy amid a wider turn toward 
accountability (Barman, 2016a; Woolford & Curran, 2012) – its operationalization across 
the international grantmaking field has largely evaded scholarly attention. In what 
follows, I unpack some of this dissertation’s findings and provide insight into their 
theoretical and practical significance. 
Is Impact Changing Philanthropic Giving? 
To many of my respondents, impact is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it 
is thought to demonstrate the potential contributions of their philanthropic gifts. On the 
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other, it places grantees in a bind, having to assess and convey their progress without 
much room for error or for patience. This pressure has increased alongside relatively new 
developments in the philanthropic sector, from philanthropic capitalism (McGoey, 2014) 
to venture philanthropy (Moody, 2008), as well as relatively new actors, such as the 
Gates Foundation (Fejerskov, 2015), so-called “next-gen” donors (Goldseker & Moody, 
2017), and, internationally, a growing role for community foundations in the U.S. 
(Madoff, 2016; Schill et al., 2017). In light of these 21st Century developments, Fleishman 
(2007, p. 273) declares, “the day of private, independent foundations as the exclusive 
vehicle for philanthropic initiative has ended.” What I would argue, however, based on 
my many conversations and conference observations, is that these changes have not 
fundamentally altered the way U.S. foundations conduct their international giving. If 
anything, they have reinforced and affirmed (but also challenged foundations to practice) 
the style of grantmaking by which the American philanthropic sector has traditionally 
been known: a “scientific approach to philanthropy.” After all, the giving practices of the 
early 20th Century foundations have left an indelible mark on the field’s subsequent 
trajectory (Adloff, 2015; Zunz, 2011).  
Scholars are now, in fact, drawing parallels between the contemporary era and the 
early 1900s. Rising income and wealth inequality and increasing monopolization (Wu, 
2018) have yielded a new generation of robber barons (Callahan, 2017) – but this time 
from Silicon Valley (Goldseker, & Moody, 2017). Observers express anxiety about the 
threat that philanthropy – particularly “disruptive philanthropy,” thought to displace state 
authority in favor of philanthropic control (Horvath & Powell, 2016) – poses to a healthy 
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and viable democracy (Bernholz et al., 2016). Like their counterparts a century ago 
(Adloff, 2015; Hall, 2006; Reich, 2016), this may signal a wider aversion to 
governmental solutions to societal ills. In addition, despite concern about the so-called 
“marketization” of the nonprofit sector (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Maier et al., 2016) 
and the phenomenon of philanthropic capitalism (McGoey, 2014), the distinctions 
between the private and civil society sectors remain as blurred as ever. As many point out 
(e.g., Berman, 1983; Karl & Katz, 1981), the early philanthropists Carnegie and 
Rockefeller approached their giving in a rationalized way. Through the application of 
business sensibilities to the charitable giving context, they “separate[d] their practices 
from the acts of alms giving…which viewed charity as valuable in itself, regardless of 
whether a donation produced any observable benefits” (McGoey, 2014, p. 111). But early 
applications of business principles to philanthropy were, I would argue, a tamer version 
of their contemporary counterparts to which much ire is directed (e.g., Edwards, 2009).  
Certainly, in respondents’ statements and across the U.S. philanthropic field, 
foundations very earnestly pursue these “observable benefits.” However, I do not find 
that respondents are so narrowly focused on the maximization of impact that they entirely 
disregard its effects on grantees. Throughout this dissertation, I have tried to show that 
many philanthropic actors – despite the constraints they face – feel compelled to do right 
by their grantees (but see Kohl-Arena, 2015). They take this to mean helping them hold 
their governments accountable; convening grantees and encouraging other donors to fund 
them; placing trust in grantees; lessening the burdens of the funding application and 
reporting process; and affording them the breathing room to create social change over the 
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long haul. I want to be clear that this sentiment does not reflect the perspective of each 
and every one of the people I interviewed, but it is my strong sense that many individuals 
and organizations express a bit of disdain for the excessively impact-driven quality of 
strategic philanthropy (Brest & Harvey, 2008; Porter & Kramer, 1999) and the California 
Consensus (Edwards, 2009). I would argue that such derision toward a paternalistic, 
“donor-driven” approach has introduced a renewed faith in small-scale, grassroots 
development; an appreciation for local communities and local expertise (Mansuri & Rao, 
2013; von Billerbeck, 2017) in identifying and devising solutions to social, economic, 
and environmental challenges; and a commitment to the value of broad organizational 
support over a long span of time. 
Much of this dissertation has alluded to and explored these tensions and debates, 
as well as their effects on foundations and grantees. I hope to have unpacked these 
tensions and debates in a thoughtful and novel way. More so, I hope to have adequately 
described their bearing on the grantees that receive foundations’ funding, for whom the 
stakes remain consistently high. 
Mimicry and Homophily 
Throughout my empirical chapters, foundation representatives describe various 
fissures within the field of international grantmaking – with which other actors should 
they work? Should they fund already well-supported issue areas, geographies, and 
grantees? What is the best way to fund grantees so as to create measurable social change? 
Whereas the latter half of the 20th Century bore witness to a more cohesive philanthropic 
sector – in part because the sector as a whole drew the ire of government officials on 
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multiple occasions (Brilliant, 2000; Hall, 2006; Karl & Katz, 1981) – it appears that the 
divisions across the field may be more salient than in times past. Though the 
philanthropic sector has exhibited some isomorphic tendencies, particularly through its 
widespread professionalization (Frumkin, 1999), it is also characterized by a plurality of 
evaluative landscapes in which assessments of various criteria (e.g., what is a good 
grantee? How does a funder best support their grantees? What is a good funder?) remain 
in flux (Brandtner, 2017) and not yet institutionally settled (Powell et al., 2017).  
 These tensions, as well as the diversity of grantmaking interests and approaches 
that empirical work documents (Foundation Center & Human Rights Funders Network, 
2018; Needles et al., 2018), suggest less mimicry across the international grantmaking 
field than we might anticipate given the uncertainties of grantmaking (Gronbjerg et al., 
2000), particularly on a global scale (Nichols & Mackinnon, 2004; Renz & Samson-
Atienza, 1997). This stands in contrast to the expectations of New Institutionalism and 
the findings of some (e.g., Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Kallman, 2017) who 
contend that in situations characterized by uncertainty and ambiguous means and ends, 
organizations mimic their purportedly more successful peers (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). In tending toward isomorphism over time, then, this New Institutional theory 
would anticipate that philanthropic foundations grant in similar ways and to similar 
recipients.36  
                                                        
36 But see Brandtner (2017) and Oliver (1991) for instances in which uncertainty need not necessitate 
mimicry and Barman (2002) for when competition leads to differentiation.   
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Certainly, some have documented mimicry in the international grantmaking 
space. Given the uncertain conditions and insufficient knowledge grantmakers have, they 
have been accused of “allocative failure” (Kallman, 2017) by distributing their funds via 
interpersonal networks (Gronbjerg et al., 2000). Because awarding funds through 
networks contradicts and undermines funders’ stated goals of supporting grassroots 
development projects, they engage in a practice of decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) 
by adhering to “a different set of guidelines in actually making grants” (Kallman, 2017, 
p. 765). (I will return to the notion of decoupling below in discussing the dissertation’s 
limitations.) Spires (2011; 2012) also documents homophily in the field, asserting that the 
institutional demands placed upon U.S. foundations (namely, regulatory compliance) 
deter them from supporting small grassroots NGOs. Instead, given the ease of funding 
large, bureaucratized, English-speaking organizations, those organizations become their 
preferred grant recipients: “Ensuring that, at the very least, their…grantees are producing 
polished financial reports and look and operate like a ‘healthy’ nonprofit allows donors to 
feel confident about their grantmaking choices” (Spires, 2012, p. 145). Other research 
similarly suggests that foundations exhibit a preference for organizations much like 
themselves: bureaucratized, goal-oriented, and highly professionalized (Jenkins, 1998; 
but see Stacey & Aksartova, 2002). 
My analysis calls these assertions into question. To the extent that homophily and 
mimicry are present across the field, respondents generally contend that these are not 
desirable outcomes. In each chapter, respondents question whether they should operate 
like others in their field, whether that means working in concert with development 
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institutions, funding a given issue area in the same way as their peers, or following the 
dictates of strategic philanthropy. In many cases, in fact, foundations work to distinguish 
themselves as autonomous and unique, at both the organizational level and the field level. 
In Chapter 3, for example, I documented how foundations actively work to reduce 
duplications in grantmaking, but acknowledge the importance of collaboration. There, 
they also describe actively searching for new-to-them grantees, as opposed to relying 
solely upon peer networks, as well as a desire to support smaller, grassroots organizations 
that may not resemble themselves.  
I am therefore suggesting that actors in the international grantmaking field do not 
intentionally emulate one another or necessarily tend toward isomorphism. Rather, they 
typically strive to differentiate themselves from their peers so that their unique 
contribution to social change is heightened. Though certain decision-making practices 
may be similar across foundations (Frumkin, 1999), funding outcomes are divergent, 
suggesting instances of differentiation following diffusion (Bromley, Hwang, & Powell, 
2012). Capturing this dynamic – the means by which the pursuit of impact prizes unique 
and measurable contributions to social change – is made possible through a Bourdieusian 
analytical framework. 
“The Gift” 
What do the findings of this dissertation mean for the notion of “the gift,” in the 
Maussian sense? For Mauss (1924), gift giving entailed a moral obligation for the 
receiver to reciprocate. While this cycle of reciprocity and exchange is what builds 
relationships and social solidarity, it also contains an explicit dimension of power 
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accorded the giver should the receiver not reciprocate (Silber, 2009). Gifts are 
paradoxical, as they create “relationships that can both bring social actors closer together 
and set them further apart” (Adloff, 2015, p. 2004) and are therefore both altruistic and 
egoistic. Yet some (see Silber, 2009 on philosopher Derrida’s contention) have argued 
“the gift” is impossible because the presence of an obligatory exchange renders any sense 
of disinterestedness moot; in other words, the gift can only be a product of egoism. In 
contrast, Bourdieu (1990) argues that disinterestedness is precisely what yields the 
acquisition of symbolic capital (Silber, 2009). This is why, he maintains, the wealthy 
establish foundations: they appear generous and altruistic while upholding the socio-
economic inequalities that render vast accumulations of wealth possible (Bourdieu, 
1990), and philanthropy therefore allows the elite to convert their economic capital into 
symbolic capital. 
Some have theorized the notion of the “organizational gift,” which, as Steiner 
(2015, p. 275) describes it, is “a specific form of gift-giving behavior in which an 
organization, or set of organizations, intervenes between the donor and the donee.” This 
complicates traditional understandings of giving because of intermediary organizations, 
such as organ procurement organizations (Healy, 2006), which both facilitate and imbue 
meaning into giving and the obligatory exchange. In the context of the international 
grantmaking field, the organizational gift dominates, as funding flows from institutional 
philanthropic vehicles to public charities to yet smaller organizations and eventually to 
the benefit of individuals and communities, such that the organizational gift is part and 
parcel of the global aid chain (Watkins et al., 2012). Yet the unequal power dynamic 
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between giver and receiver remains: “donors giving money to NGOs tie themselves into a 
partnership which immediately creates a hierarchy of power” (Reith, 2010, p. 448). Each 
organizational gift from donor to NGO, NGO to NGO, and NGO to beneficiaries 
instigates new relations of power.  
For our purposes, the gift is indeed quite relevant, as philanthropic foundations 
engage in the distribution of organizational gifts. However, the extent to which it 
necessitates an obligatory exchange varies across foundations in a way that reflects the 
debates around impact assessment, evaluation, and the type of support provided to 
grantees (e.g., for discrete projects or for general organizational purposes). Despite what 
one respondent tells me – that “foundations are made to give out money, and they don’t 
expect anything in return” – what grantees do provide donors is information about how 
foundation funding was utilized and what impact it created. In this case, there is no “no 
strings attached” funding because reporting is always required. The rigor, timing, and use 
of reporting varies, of course, but the obligatory exchange remains, and it often results in 
grantees “creating success” (Elbers & Arts, 2011; Swidler & Watkins, 2017) in order to 
maintain a relationship from which grantees both win and lose. Even if donors wish to 
provide funding without knowing its effects, the pursuit of maximal impact and 
measurable social change – which orients that giving – largely precludes this possibility. 
While Silber (1998) similarly argues that Mauss is highly relevant to 
contemporary philanthropy – despite little work employing this analytical lens and 
Mauss’ own contention that gift giving becomes less salient in modern societies – she 
points to the personal dimension of philanthropy, which, coupled with the increased 
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involvement of donors with their nonprofit recipients, renders “philanthropic giving…one 
of the most significant vehicles for the expression of both individual and collective 
‘personal’ identity in contemporary American society” (Silber, 1998, p. 144). My 
approach to the sociological study of philanthropy, however, has been to locate giving 
within its wider context and to examine how the social relations in which foundations are 
embedded shape their giving (Barman, 2017). In this way, my analysis calls attention to 
how the shared field-level orientation to impact bears on “the gift,” as opposed to prior 
accounts that ascribe interested and/or disinterested motives to donors.  
Legitimacy of Non-State Transnational Actors 
The primary issue with American foundations intervening in the global 
development space concerns what others have already observed: their lack of 
accountability and transparency (Frumkin, 1999; Prewitt, 2006; Reich, 2016) render them 
questionable subjects as they advocate for particular solutions to their conceptions of 
social problems. This has, of course, remained an ongoing issue for the most 
internationally-oriented component of the philanthropic sector (Arnove, 1980; Berman, 
1983). Reviewing the critiques of foundations in decades past renders apparent the 
parallels to contemporary critiques. Berman (1983, p. 161), for example, argues: 
The [large American] foundations’ approach to Third-World development assumed that 
the problems could be analyzed dispassionately, appropriate strategies determined and 
implemented, adjustments made in the original plans, and the pace and scale of the 
developmental process managed accordingly. Their belief in the principle of incremental 
reform precluded the possibility of considering rapid and widespread change managed by 
people not beholden to foreign-aid donors. 
 
Even Zunz (2011, p. 284) describes the Gates Foundation as “today’s counterpart to the 
Rockefeller Foundation in the 1920s and the Ford Foundation in the 1960s” – the 
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Rockefeller Foundation for similar interests in public health, and the Ford Foundation for 
comparable involvement in contentious issues and at times uneasy relationships with 
foreign governments. With Ford, it was the promotion of its population and family 
planning programs abroad (McCarthy, 1997; Micinski, 2017). With Gates, its focus on 
reproductive health is controversial at times; for example, recipients of its funding may 
receive information about condoms, abortion, and other issues of reproductive health, 
whereas recipients of official aid via PEPFAR cannot (Zunz, 2011). 
 Some argue that because, as Ostrander & Schervish (1990, p. 73) remark, 
“philanthropy tends to be driven more by the supply of philanthropic resources than by 
the demand for them based in recipient needs,” their endeavors – particularly 
internationally – may be less legitimate. After all, if they are not responding to 
beneficiaries’ needs, what purpose do they serve? I think there is a partial truth here, but 
recall that the needs of grant-seeking organizations worldwide dwarf the availability of 
philanthropic resources (Bob, 2010) for which they compete in the “contributions 
marketplace” (Frumkin & Kim, 2001). At the same time, however, as I argued in Chapter 
3, the way that foundations in my study operationalize impact can leave some potential 
grantees in areas of high need without philanthropic support. Further, to the extent that 
foundations are emboldened by their supply of resources relative to grant-seekers, they 
may issue paternalistic, donor-driven prescriptions, which lessen not only the potential 
relevancy of their philanthropic gifts, but also undermine any sense of legitimacy they 
hope to have abroad.  
  
 
226 
 “We increasingly valorize the private efforts of philanthropists and nonprofits to 
develop new organizations to provide public goods. In doing so,” Horvath and Powell 
(2016, p. 121) assert, “we obscure the power of these new agenda setters, as their hand in 
transforming the landscape is less visible.” Such an observation, shared by others (e.g., 
Callahan, 2017),37 speaks to why the legitimacy of U.S. foundations is often in question. 
Pragmatically, it also encourages the philanthropic sector to find additional ways to hold 
itself accountable to the communities of beneficiaries it seeks to assist. Reid (2018), for 
example, describes the concept of “situational transparency,” strategic instances in which 
funders exercise greater transparency with their more trusted grantees to build stronger 
relationships and so better understand the needs of recipients.  
 I am not inclined to render a normative verdict on the transnational legitimacy of 
the foundations whose representatives I interviewed, as I would rather emphasize that 
Horvath and Powell’s (2016) observation is, in large part, why scholars should scrutinize 
the decision-making practices of foundations because they ultimately serve as gate-
keepers. And the more shrouded this gate-keeping role is, the more we should seek to 
understand precisely how foundations choose to distribute their philanthropic gifts. At 
issue, most fundamentally, is their capacity to define social challenges and devise their 
own solutions to address them in particular ways. Perhaps this exertion of power can be 
curbed with humility and greater reliance on grantees, but we should not be blind to the 
potential issues that a focus on localization and partnerships may mask (Cornwall & 
                                                        
37 But see Moran (2014) on the reality of foundations’ international engagement as falling somewhere 
between benevolent and detrimental.   
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Brock, 2005; Mohan & Stokke, 2000). Turning our gaze on the evaluators themselves 
(Brandtner, 2017; Lamont, 2009; 2012) illuminates the decision-making practices and 
evaluative mechanisms that lead foundations to ultimately valorize particular 
grantmaking approaches to addressing global issues at the expense of others. And yet, we 
must also consider not simply new actors and practices within the American 
philanthropic field, but also the changing nature of philanthropy globally. To this end, 
various parties (U.S.-based consulting firms and foundations, as well as advocates of the 
SDGs) are working to bolster the burgeoning philanthropic sectors of other countries that 
do not share the U.S.’s long history of institutional giving. How this dynamic will affect 
international grantmakers in the U.S. remains to be seen.  
Lessons for Funders and Grant-Seekers? 
In addition to its theoretical contributions, I hope this dissertation promotes 
understanding of both donors and donees by shedding light on the challenges facing both 
parties. One element I have most enjoyed about this research has been providing 
respondents with space to reflect on their work. I have found the vast majority of them to 
be delightfully self-reflective and passionate and to exercise humility, so cognizant of the 
inherent power dynamics of philanthropy and gift-giving. In assuming a normative 
stance, many of them strike me as “on the right track” and interested in listening to the 
needs of and challenges facing grantees. But it is crucial they wield this power with care, 
because their funding can inadvertently shift the work of grantees (e.g., AbouAssi, 2012; 
Pallas, 2010), including by inciting some level of reactivity (Espeland & Sauder, 2007) in 
grantees as they assess the impact of grants. I acknowledge the difficulties stemming 
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from their various institutional constraints, but encourage them to honor the wishes of 
grantees in calling for greater flexibility and trust and fewer burdensome reporting 
requirements (Grady et al., 2017). Importantly, this research has not blinded me to the 
critiques facing foundations, many of which are warranted, but it has instead shone a light 
on the complex and complicated dynamics of the field.  
I similarly greatly admire the work of the dedicated individuals operating or 
working for public charities. Many are decidedly cognizant of the need to frame their 
work in terms of its impact, but perhaps the findings presented in this dissertation can 
provide greater nuance or specificity to that effort. Further, I may only encourage them to 
give philanthropic representatives a modicum of patience when warranted (which, I 
believe, many already do). As Aksartova (2009, p. 161) notes, analyses of foundations 
“tend to overestimate the extent to which U.S. donors’ activities are driven by their 
declared goals…and to underestimate the organizational dynamics impelling the day-to-
day operations of aid agencies and philanthropic foundations.” I hope to have illuminated 
some of these operations and constraints, which can mediate funders’ good intentions. 
While most of them want the best for their grantees and advocate for reform, changes 
within foundations are often slow to materialize – every foundation, as an organization, is 
complex and multifaceted (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008) – and heavily dependent upon 
buy-in from foundation leadership (Grady et al., 2018).  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation has several limitations. First, while I ultimately interviewed 
fewer foundation and public charity representatives than I would have liked, I did not 
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pursue additional interviews because I believed I had reached a saturation point (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967) with respect to data collected. That is, each additional interview 
provided less and less new information (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Perhaps some findings 
could be enriched with additional interviews, but that is an opportunity for future 
scholarship. Some readers may also question the rigor or validity of my field analysis 
because I withhold detailed information about respondents and the organizations they 
represent that would convey their position in the field more precisely. However, 
divulging such details as where they fund, their program priorities, or their institutional 
histories (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008) would risk the anonymity I guaranteed my 
respondents in exchange for their invaluable insights. In addition, because I focused data 
collection and analysis on the more prominent private philanthropic actors in the 
international grantmaking field, my findings and conclusions are not applicable the entire 
philanthropic sector – or, for that matter, all large, independent foundations. Though 
generalizability may be an issue for some, the narrower scope offered here provides a 
snapshot of how the philanthropic actors with whom I spoke understand and approach 
their work. This is a valuable contribution in itself, and one that others have struggled to 
make.  
That difficulty is, of course, partly due to the perennial critique of foundations as 
woefully opaque and reluctant to place themselves under the scrutiny of scholars (Magat, 
1999). I remain exceedingly grateful for the information and insights respondents 
provided, and I acknowledge the professional risks some of them feel they took to share 
their thoughts with me. Even so, the final limitation of the dissertation involves gaining 
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additional access to the philanthropic world – particularly the world of large, 
independent, predominantly private foundations in the U.S. – which continues to be a 
challenging endeavor (Oelberger, 2016). For instance, a fascinating source of data would 
be ethnographic observations of meetings in which board members and/or program 
officers discuss and evaluate potential or current grantees. Rivera (2012) was fortunate to 
observe similarly evaluative decision-making processes in the context of elite firm hiring, 
as was Lamont (2009) in her study of research award allocations. Both acknowledge the 
challenges of acquiring this level of access that is frequently denied to outsiders, 
including researchers. The challenge for me is that it limits the extent to which I can 
assess the rhetoric versus reality of foundations’ pursuit of impact. Is it merely talk 
among the philanthropic sector, or is the pursuit institutionalized into organizational 
practice? I think the answer lies somewhere in between, but I would encourage future 
research to parse out this issue of decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
In addition to a greater number of interviews and gathering ethnographic data on 
decision-making within American foundations, sociological scholarship on philanthropic 
giving would benefit immensely from carefully tracing funding along the global aid chain 
(Watkins et al., 2012). I have focused here on some of the practices that orient the 
beginning of this trajectory – though I unfortunately cannot speak as confidently to the 
minute details of resource allocation – while others (Krause, 2014; Swidler & Watkins, 
2017) have analyzed resource flows at points later down the line. Though I do not explore 
the perspectives of foundations’ ultimate beneficiaries (beyond the public charities that 
receive private foundation grants), others have similarly called for additional work 
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attending to the intended and unintended consequences of philanthropic foundation 
funding (Barman, 2017; but see Wolpert, 2006 on the limited re-distributional effects of 
grantmaking). This is particularly relevant in the sphere of international giving, where 
many argue that the accountability of U.S. foundations and donors must lie with members 
of the organizations and communities they fund (Ebrahim, 2003; Seibert, 2017; Stuckler 
et al., 2011; Vogel, 2010; Werker & Ahmed, 2008). Following philanthropic grants in 
this way would not only further enrich scholarly understandings of the distribution and 
direction of material resources from the global North to the global South, but would also 
shed additional light on why some beneficiaries in some places benefit while others, 
unfortunately, do not.
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APPENDIX 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
 
Below are samples of the interview schedules (which drew inspiration from 
Krause, 2014) that I employed in conversation with program officers at foundations and 
public charities, as well as a variety of third party actors (including philanthropic advisors 
and consultants, directors of affinity groups, and other intermediaries that assist in the 
allocation of foundation funding in one way or another). I made slight alterations in 
preparation for each interview to reflect differences in respondent role, organization, and 
time allotted for the interview. Sometimes certain questions were irrelevant to their work. 
At other times, I needed to select the most generative questions if given a short window 
of time to collect data. Once interviews were scheduled, I provided respondents with a 
consent script to review and keep for their records. In addition, I began each interview by 
providing a brief overview of my dissertation project and what I hoped to discuss with 
the respondent.  
Sample Interview Schedule for Program Officer 
1. In your role as X, what does that entail and what do you do on a typical day? What do 
you enjoy about your work? 
 
2. Why does your foundation grant internationally? What were some of the 
considerations that went into whether your foundation should grant internationally or 
was it always a given? What do you see as the primary goals of your foundation 
funding international/global development efforts?  
 
3. How many grants do you typically make in a given year? Are these most often single 
or multi-year grants? Are these often to prior grant recipients? 
a. (If applicable) How many applications do you receive? 
 
4. Does your foundation prefer to accept grant proposals or does it prefer to seek out and 
solicit applications from specific grantees? Why?  
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5. Before requesting proposals from particular organizations or regarding particular 
programs, how do you determine these to be of interest to your foundation? How do 
you determine which potential grantees deserve funding or are worth requesting a 
proposal from?  
 
6. (If applicable) What are you looking for in a grant application? What makes a grant 
application stand out from others? What is a good or high quality grant application? 
How can you tell? 
a. Can you recall a particularly good application and why you thought this was 
so? 
 
7. (If applicable) What would you say are the most important criteria in evaluating a 
grant proposal? 
a. How do you actually evaluate a proposal? Do you use rankings or ratings? 
What is involved in this process? Is there a reason for doing it this way/using 
these tools? 
 
8. What is the decision-making process from grant application/proposal to fund 
dispersal? Who is involved in this process? What is the typical timeframe? How 
much interaction do you have with colleagues when making these decisions?  
a. Have you ever had disagreements with colleagues regarding decisions about 
what to fund? Can you recall any of these, what they regarded, and how they 
were resolved? 
 
9. Can you recall one of the last few grants you made and explain the process of how it 
came about? 
 
10. Broadly, what is the process for determining which issue areas or geographies to 
fund? How does your foundation assess potential or current grantmaking strategies? 
How and why do you decide to pursue health, or education, or economic development 
(or another issue area)? Have these funding areas changed over time?  
a. What makes for a good area or strategy to pursue?  
 
11. What about for determining which projects, programs, or organizations to fund? What 
kind of information do you typically seek? Where do you get this information (e.g., 
foundations, consultants, other organizations, or grantees themselves)? In what ways 
is it valuable? 
 
12. In general, do you think your foundation decides funding strategies and grants made 
in a manner similar to other foundations? How do you know either way? Does it 
matter one way or the other to you?  
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13. What do you think differentiates you from other foundations that grant 
internationally? How is your foundation similar, or how does it have a similar 
approach to global philanthropy?  
 
14. Can you describe your relation to other foundations? How much interaction do you 
have with other foundations, and what do those interactions or relations look like? 
a. Can you also describe your relation to the private sector, governmental 
agencies, and/or multilateral institutions? 
b. What do you think about public-private initiatives?  
 
15. What do you hope to see as the outcomes of your foundation’s funding? Can you 
recall a grant whose outcomes you thought were particularly good and why this was 
so?  
 
16. Is there anything you hope not to see from the outcomes of your funding? Can you 
recall a grant whose outcomes were less desirable and why this was so? Do grants 
ever not go well? Can you provide an example of when things went poorly, how it 
happened, and what you learned from it? How do you know it didn’t go well? 
 
17. How do you measure the success of your funding? Do you take this into consideration 
when determining which projects, programs, or organizations to fund? If so, how?  
a. Does this information ever inform future funding decisions, like whether to 
renew a grant?  
 
18. How do you think international grantmaking has changed over the past couple 
decades?  
 
19. How do you think international/global development has changed over the past few 
decades? Have any such changes altered the way your foundation grants 
internationally? In what ways? 
 
20. In recent years, foundations have increasingly been subject to critique – perhaps they 
are hijacking development efforts, are undemocratic (i.e., who is to say a small 
private group can determine what’s best for public good?), are not sufficiently 
transparent or accountable, or are too focused on outcomes and measurement, etc. 
What do you make of these critiques? How would you respond to them? Do these 
bear at all on what you do or what you fund? 
 
21. In what ways do you think foundations play a role in larger international/global 
development efforts? As non-state (i.e., non-governmental) and non-market actors, 
how would you characterize this role? What do you hope these foundations achieve? 
 
22. Can you tell me about how you learned to do your work (to evaluate grant proposals 
or to help the foundation determine its strategy)?  
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23. What is challenging about your work? How do you overcome or work past these 
challenges?  
 
Sample Interview Schedule for Consultant 
1. What is your current role in your organization? What do you do on a typical day? 
 
2. How did you become involved and interested in international grantmaking? What is 
your background? What do you enjoy about your work? 
 
3. How does your organization work to the benefit of international grantmakers? What 
activities does it undertake, or what information does it provide? 
 
4. How did your organization come to be involved in helping international grantmakers? 
Why do you see this as an important endeavor? 
 
5. Do you reach out to foundations, or do they often reach out to you? Can you describe 
your relationships with foundations and with the organizations that benefit from their 
grants? 
a. Can you describe your clients? Are they mostly a certain type of foundation or 
interested in certain issues?  
 
6. What are some of the pieces of advice or services that you offer international 
grantmakers? 
a. How does this seem most beneficial to funders? How have you learned that 
this is important or useful?  
b. How do you determine what funders should know or how they should make 
funding decisions, both in terms of broad areas to pursue and individual grants 
to make? What do you recommend goes into this process?  
 
7. What sorts of things should foundations take into consideration when making grants 
internationally? What makes a good funding strategy or problem to target? What 
makes a good grant applicant and a good funding recipient?  
 
8. Can you recall a particularly successful experience you had with a funder, and why 
this was so? 
 
9. Can you recall a less successful experience you had with a funder, and why this was 
so?  
 
10. How do you think international grantmaking has changed over the past couple 
decades?  
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11. Has your organization altered the way it supports international grantmaking over 
time? In what ways? 
 
12. In recent years, foundations have increasingly been subject to critique – perhaps they 
are hijacking development efforts, are undemocratic (i.e., who is to say a small 
private group can determine what’s best for public good?), are not sufficiently 
transparent or accountable, or are too focused on outcomes and measurement, etc. 
What do you make of these critiques? How would you respond to them? Do these 
bear at all on your work with foundations? 
 
13. In what ways do you think foundations play a role in larger international/global 
development efforts? As distinctly non-state and non-market actors, how would you 
characterize this role? What do you hope these foundations achieve?  
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